

Southern New Hampshire University

Cicero and Caesar in America

*John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson,
And the Political War of the 1820s*

A Capstone Project Submitted to the College of Online and Continuing Education in Partial
Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in History

By

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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'R. Bayer', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

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Abstract

The election of Andrew Jackson over the incumbent president, John Quincy Adams, in 1828, led to a fundamental change in American politics. The following study argues that the results of the presidential elections of 1824 and 1828 redefined America's earlier definition of republicanism and democracy, effectively ending the political ideology of the Revolutionary generation. Furthermore, this study argues that the emergence of Andrew Jackson, and his subsequent accumulation of executive power—the greatest fear of Jeffersonian Republicans—was made possible through the very ideology embraced by the Republican faction.

To complete this study a wide assortment of primary and secondary sources will be utilized. Included within the primary sources are the Adams Family Papers, courtesy of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and the personal diary of John Quincy Adams. Political and personal correspondence, speeches, government documents, and political cartoons, courtesy of the Library of Congress, National Archives, and the Founders Online databases, will also be incorporated. Secondary sources will be predominantly used throughout this study and address the historical background of individuals and events pertaining to the thesis.

The presidential elections between John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson led to a shift in politics that drastically transformed the socio-political ideology in America. Bitterly fought campaigns, wide-ranging personalities, growing sectional divide, the expansion of voting rights, populist rhetoric favoring the “common man,” and the emergence of party politics, all led to the transition of what became known as Jacksonian Democracy.

For my wife and son

Your love and support made this journey possible

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List of Abbreviations

JQA	John Quincy Adams
JA	John Adams
AA	Abigail Adams
AJ	Andrew Jackson
HC	Henry Clay
TJ	Thomas Jefferson
MHS	<i>Massachusetts Historical Society.</i> https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/
FO	<i>Founders Online</i> from the <i>National Historical Publications & Records Commission of the National Archives.</i> https://founders.archives.gov/
AJP	<i>The Papers of Andrew Jackson Digital Edition</i> from Rotunda http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JKSN.html

Introduction

On March 4, 1829, Andrew Jackson was sworn in as the seventh President of the United States. Not since the presidency of George Washington did the American people elect a general of the armed services to such an honored position, nor was a presidential candidate as readily known for his military career above anything else. As a renowned veteran of multiple wars against Native American tribes, the Spanish in Florida, and the famed victory over the British at the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812, Jackson was very much a celebrity president, who represented the vim and vigor of the American spirit during the nationalist period. The inauguration was a momentous occasion for Jackson and his supporters. The 1828 presidential campaign between Jackson and his opponent, John Quincy Adams, had been burdened by vicious personal attacks in the newspapers, allegations of corruption within the government, and even death. It was a campaign unlike any other in American political history. But now, appearing before one of the largest inaugural crowds to ever hold assembly in Washington City during the nineteenth century, “Old Hickory,” at sixty-one, bowed to the “majesty of the people,” and received a thunderous applause.¹

Jackson’s predecessor, however, represented something wholly different to the American people. John Quincy Adams, the son of a Founding Father, a successful veteran of diplomatic service, and an architect of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the war that made Jackson famous, had exited the White House in the same manner as his father—defeated. Just as John Adams did in 1801, following his defeat by Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams forwent the traditional

¹ Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 175.

welcoming of the new president to the White House, and departed into the night, relocating to Meridian Hill, a neighborhood in the capital.² It was a somber and humiliating time for Adams. In his personal diary, on February 28th, shortly after learning that he had lost the election, Adams lamented the state of affairs. “I shall be restored to private life and left to an old age of retirement, though certainly not of repose.” Seeming defiant in the face of defeat, Adams nonetheless acknowledged the theme of the previous presidential campaign. Continuing in his diary, Adams wrote, “I go into it [retirement] with a combination of parties, and of public men, against my character and reputation such as I believe never before was exhibited against any man since this Union existed.”³

Andrew Jackson’s victory in 1828 was not an accident. The 1820s were a transformative period for the United States. Gone were the days of the previous American generation, symbolized by the Founding Fathers, and by what a Boston newspaper once referred to as the “era of good feelings.”⁴ The nation’s borders were expanding westward, arguments over the growth and continuation of slavery were becoming part of the national dialogue, economic development more clearly divided the northern and southern states, and the once united political party apparatus, envisioned by the Founding Fathers, continued to deteriorate into warring factions. Jackson’s victory was the result of this transformation and it fundamentally changed American politics and society. Running on a platform that promised massive reforms that would

² Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 172.

³ John Quincy Adams, *John Quincy Adams Diaries, 1821-1848*, vol. II, ed. David Waldstreicher (New York: Library of America, 2017), 193.

⁴ Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93. Quoted from the Boston Federalist newspaper, *Columbian Centinel* [sic], July 12, 1817, referencing the election of President James Monroe.

empower the American people and end what was viewed as gross corruption in national politics, Jackson coasted to any easy victory over John Quincy Adams.

Prior to the election itself, the campaign of 1828 was one of the dirtiest in American political history. With the exception of the 1800 presidential election between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, the United States never experienced a more viciously fought competition between two warring factions, which ultimately resulted in a virtual transformation of American political ideology. However, unlike the Jeffersonian philosophy of limited government that would dominate American politics for a generation, the election of Jackson redefined the meaning of American democracy and challenged the limits of presidential power. This study argues that the results of the presidential elections of 1824 and 1828 ended the Republican ideology of the Revolutionary generation. Furthermore, this study argues that Andrew Jackson's singular concentration and use of executive power—the greatest fear of Jeffersonian Republicans—was only made possible through the very democratic ideology earlier embraced by the Republican Party.

Although much attention has justifiably focused on specific events within the campaigns, such as the “corrupt bargain” in 1824 or the unprecedented vicious rhetoric of 1828, less attention has been paid to how the Jeffersonian ideology of the Revolutionary generation, and the expansion of the democratic principles, inadvertently worked against the same leadership virtues once extolled by the Republicans. These two concepts are exclusive in theory and in practice to a Jeffersonian. In an analysis of selected Founding Fathers historian Gordon Wood, when discussing Jefferson's views towards the relationship between the people and the elected officials, emphasized Jefferson's “doubts about all officials in government,” but also his belief that “the people, if undisturbed by demagogues or Federalists monarchists, would eventually set

matters right.”⁵ Although this aligns with Jefferson’s idealistic and optimistic attitude, Americans were and are susceptible to demagogue behavior as much as any other people.

Throughout history radical changes in government have largely stemmed from leadership positions and democracies are not exempt from such changes. Democracies, in this respect, are actually rather unique. Many in high leadership positions, such as the presidency, are elected into representative office, not appointed, and as such, there is a connection between the ideology of the candidate and that of the electorate. It is the candidates themselves who breathe life and legitimacy into such ideology. By the end of the 1820s, Jackson is that manifestation. He is viewed as the representative hero of the common man and the embodiment of American military success. Jackson’s ability to win sympathy and support for his war against the corruption in government was aided by his defeat in the earlier 1824 election. The alleged “corrupt bargain,” orchestrated by the Washington elites, and the wealthy establishment, was the tipping point for an American electorate, who embraced the principles of a Jeffersonian democracy.

The primary resources that have been gathered for this paper are a combination of physical and virtual. In the physical form comes the personal diary of John Quincy Adams. A dutiful writer, Adams, who’s self reflective work is considered to be open and honest, compiled years of personal feelings into multi-volume diaries. The entries found throughout his diary express his personal feelings through some of the most major events in American history to which he was present, including the elections of 1824 and 1828, his time as Secretary of State and a member of Congress, but also his own personal feelings of others, namely Andrew

⁵ Gordon Wood, *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 107-108.

Jackson. Adams's diary, particularly the second volume, which dates between 1821-1848 will be used to more clearly express the motivations and feelings of Adams during this period.

In addition to Adams's diary, I make great use of the online database *Founders Online*, which works in conjunction with the National Archives, through the National Historical Publications & Records Commission. The online database houses thousands of primary source documents from the Founders, such as the papers of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Franklin, and Madison. The Massachusetts Historical Society database, which has digitally housed and transcribed the correspondence of John and Abigail Adams, as well as selected works of the entire Adams family, including the diary of John Adams, and the famous letter exchange between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson will serve as a source in the earlier chapters to explain the relationships and views held by members of the Adams family.

The Library of Congress online database will also be utilized for the presidential papers and personal correspondence of Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay, but also serves as a source for select examples of campaign literature and political cartoons. Additionally, the Library of Congress will also be utilized for its collection of newspapers, many of which contain specific campaign illustrations. The election of 1828, in particular, was known for its elaborate and dark imagery, such as the "*Some account of some of the bloody deeds of General Jackson*," which depicted several hand drawn coffins, representing the lives taken by Andrew Jackson.⁶ Finally, online databases, such as the *Avalon Project*, will be utilized to present additional government documents, such as the presidential inaugural addresses of Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe,

⁶ John Binns. "Some account of some of the bloody deeds of General Jackson," Illustration. 1828. Retrieved from the Library of Congress Rare Book and Special Collections Division. Accessed June 15, 2018. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2008661734/>.

John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson. The incorporation of their speeches serves as a literary compass, indicating the direction each intended to take the nation.

The secondary works chosen for this paper reflect the character and political background surrounding the thesis. Essentially divided into two categories, the abundance of secondary sources will focus on biographical detail and those of historical analysis. From the position of biographical detail, the works of Harlow Giles Unger will be utilized for the presidencies of John Quincy Adams and James Monroe. Additionally, his biography on Henry Clay will also be used, in comparison, to the Clay biography by David and Jeanne Heidler. Unger is an accomplished historian and journalist, whose writings focus heavily on the Revolutionary generation, with a concentration on the Founding Fathers. David and Jeanne Heidler, both professors of history, have too written several books and articles on early American politics. Both Unger and the Heidlers approach their respective subjects in a generally favorable light, looking to promote their subjects in historical context rather than criticize them.

In addition to Unger and the Heidlers, several biographical accounts on John Quincy Adams have been collected from a multitude of historians. Receiving a re-emergence of interest in recent years, Adams enthusiasts have examined the sixth president from multiple perspectives, which allow for in-depth analysis. For example, in *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, a Private Life*, Paul C. Nagel, an accomplished writer and historian, examines in great detail the personal life of John Quincy Adams by analyzing the president's diary, seeking to humanize rather than romanticize. In *The Remarkable Education of John Quincy Adams* by Phyllis Lee Levin, the focus is on the early life and career of John Quincy Adams before entering the White House. Rich in detail, Levin focuses on his interaction with worldly figures, and his political knowledge overseas, to explain how he shaped his political views. In *The Lost Founding Father*,

award winning historian William J. Cooper argues that John Quincy Adams, and not James Monroe, should be considered the final link to the Revolutionary generation, and examines Adams's experiences in Europe and policies as president, to reveal a man who was ahead of his time and therefore misunderstood in the current political climate. Additional biographies, many of which attempt to highlight the complex but political genius of Adams, come from James Traub's *John Quincy Adams: Militant Spirit*, Fred Kaplan's *John Quincy Adams: American Visionary*, and Robert V. Remini's short biographical work, *John Quincy Adams*. Each biography invariably uses the same sources and argues for the re-examination of the Adams legacy as a statesman. With the exception of Remini, a well-known Andrew Jackson supporter, Adams historians have looked to humanize and highlight the complexities of the sixth president in recent years. Remini views Adams as a failed president and does little to counter any arguments against that view.

The works of Robert Remini, H.W. Brands, and Jon Meacham will be used to biographically focus on the life and times of Andrew Jackson. Principle among them is Remini, who is considered to be the definitive Jackson historian, for having written a well-respected multi-volume biography of the seventh president. Although considered the preeminent historian on Jackson, Remini does at times come off as apologetic for Jackson's actions when president, and avoids specific criticisms, such as Jackson's role in the 1820s elections. Brands and Meacham pursue Jackson in separate ways. Meacham's biography, *American Lion*, focuses largely on the personality of the president when in the White House, omitting much of his background beyond the opening chapter. Brands' account devotes more time to Jackson's upbringing and military career and less time on his actual presidency. Collectively, however, each author allows for a full perspective on the seventh president.

Additional biographies addressed throughout the paper support secondary historical figures related to the thesis and the principle characters. Historian Robert W. Merry, and his examination of President James K. Polk, a Jackson protégé, in *A Country of Vast Designs* examine the enduring legacy of Jackson. Considered another Jackson in his own time, Polk represents the logical conclusion to the Jacksonian legacy and is also considered one of the final presidents related to the Age of Jackson. Historians Irving Bartlett and Merrill D. Peterson offer biographical accounts in *John C. Calhoun*, and the political partnership between congressmen Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun and Daniel Webster in *The Great Triumvirate*, respectively. Separate from the roles of Adams and Jackson, both works examine the roles and relationships of congressmen against the executive office during one of the most turbulent eras in American political history.

David McCullough's award winning biography, *John Adams*, Joseph Ellis' *Founding Brothers*, John Ferling's *Adams vs. Jefferson*, John Avlon's *Washington's Farewell*, Gordon Wood's *Friends Divided*, Jon Meacham's *Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power*, and Harry Ammon's *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity*, each address the biographical and secondary sources necessary to review the turbulent Revolutionary generation of American politics, including the rise and division of the Republican party through the early nineteenth century. Each work explores the relationships developed and strained between the Founders, and act as a lead in to the future of politics in America, where the views of democracy and republicanism inevitably will end with their deaths.

Two influential works, which focus largely on the socio-political development of the United States during both the Revolutionary and Jacksonian era, come from historians Gordon Wood and Daniel Walker Howe. Wood's *Empire of Liberty* and Howe's *What God Hath*

Wrought are both included in the celebrated Oxford History of the United States series.

Comprehensive and meticulously researched, Wood and Howe deliver a fascinating look into the socio-political and economic development of the United States. Their work offers a wide range of resources and the best insight to the average American during their respective time periods.

Historian Sean Wilentz's two books, *The Rise of American Democracy* and *The Politicians & the Egalitarians*, also examine the emergence of political parties in America and the tenuous relationship between the government and the governed. Of the two books, *The Rise of American Democracy* takes a more comprehensive look at the development of democratic ideology in the United States and explores the principles of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian politics at great length.

The Jacksonian era of American politics are explored in Harry Watson's *Liberty and Power*, Lynn Parsons' *The Birth of Modern Politics*, and Michael Holt's *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party*. Watson examines the political ideology of Jacksonian politics, the expansion of democratic principles, and the enduring effects of Jackson's presidency on the economy and government. Parsons work examines the elections of 1824 and 1828, and provides an overview to how 1828, in particular, brought about new campaign tactics. Although the book is expected to focus on the elections, Parsons' work is largely a biographical comparison between Adams and Jackson, and does not focus on the elections until the very end.

Nonetheless, the inclusion of new campaign tactics serves as beneficial to the understanding of changing dynamics in the 1820s. Finally, Holt's exploration on the Whig Party, though expansive in scope, serves as an example of the defiance to Jacksonian politics. Just as meticulously researched as Wood and Howe, Holt reviews the principles of the Whig Party and their policies in the face of Jackson's presidency, almost symbolizing the Revolutionary's generation response to such executive power.

In addition to the secondary works, several scholarly articles have been chosen to address how the different histories of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson impacted the American elections and politics. Paul C. Nagel's article "The Election of 1824: A Reconsideration Based on Newspaper Opinion," argues against the article by Everett Brown, "The Presidential Election of 1824-1825." Brown's original argument was that the election of 1824 was nothing more than a popularity contest between Republican candidates and no real issues defined the campaign. Nagel argues against Brown's claims by sourcing regional newspapers to specifically highlight contentious issues, such as economic development, in order to prove that there were many debatable topics in the campaign, and that it was not simply built on personality. In the article "John Quincy Adams: Virtue and the Tragedy of the Statesman," historian Greg Russell critiques Adams's role as a nineteenth century statesman, from his time in Congress to the presidency, and how he was viewed through religious, moralist, and political perspectives. Russell's article shares common ground with Robert Thompson's "John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From 'Outrageous Federalist' to 'Republican Exile,' 1801-1809." In Thompson's article, he explores Adams's political transformation through a ten-year period, and his tip-toeing between being a follower of his father's policies, but also a representative of the new American generation.

Arthur Darling's "Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts 1824-1848," examines the regional differences in America during Jackson's presidency with an emphasis on the New England states, and Massachusetts, specifically. Darling points out the various forms of opposition to Jacksonian reforms, in particular the economic transformation of Massachusetts

from an “agricultural and seafaring community into a manufacturing state.”⁷ Although mostly steeped in economic background, Darling’s article shares relevance with Michael Holt’s *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party*, as an example of oppositional policies to Jackson’s presidency. In Lynn Hudson Parsons’ article, “In Which the Political Becomes the Personal, and Vice Versa: The Last Ten Years of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson,” the story of Jackson and Adams continues in their post-presidential life. Unlike the famed rekindling of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson’s friendship, Parsons examines the continued deterioration between Adams and Jackson in their final years and how they politically battled over issues of state. Parsons’ article stands out as another example to what separated the Jacksonian era from the Revolutionary era, where politics had become so bitter and partisan, that the possibility of reunion seemed to be impossible.

The chapters of this paper will follow a timeline ranging from the early Revolutionary period to the Jacksonian presidency. Introductory chapters will address the state of Revolutionary politics, with a strong emphasis on the development of Jeffersonian principles that guided America through the early nineteenth century. Following the introductory chapter, focus will shift to the personal histories of John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and supportive historical figures, such as Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and James Monroe. Focus will then concentrate on the historical elections of the 1820s, their effects on American politics, and the American electorate. The paper will conclude with an examination of the Jacksonian presidency, criticisms against his policies, and the opposition formed against him, in order to identify how the Revolutionary era of politics “died” and Jackson himself betrayed the leadership virtues of

⁷ Arthur B. Darling, “Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts 1824-1848,” *The American Historical Review* 29, no. 2 (Jan., 1924): 271. Accessed June 16, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1838517>.

the Jeffersonian-Republicans, an ideology he claimed to support. The inclusion of how Republican values in leadership from the Revolutionary era, as a result of the 1820s elections, will contribute to the understanding of early nineteenth century American politics. The importance of the elections would have drastic consequences for the United States and would lead America down an unknown path, where the expansion of presidential power would, ironically, come at the expense of the American democratic values that were fought over in the Revolution.

Chapter 1: Democracy, Ideology, and Political Parties in the Time of the Founders

The clearly defined two-party system that would result from the election of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson in the early nineteenth century did not exist in the early days of the republic. There was an almost immediate split in the ideologies of the Founding Fathers following the American Revolution over issues, such as economic development, government authority, and state power, however, the existence of a general will to preserve the unity of the new republic held everything together. This tenuous unity slowly began to deteriorate during the presidencies of George Washington and John Adams, until it fully fractured with the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800. Following Jefferson's victory, his policies led the United States in a new direction that would not fundamentally change until the election of Andrew Jackson, roughly thirty years later. The groundwork for the Jacksonian political revolution in America was laid with the creation of the United States, and it was the unwitting contributions of the Founders that led to its inception.

The Founding Fathers never intended for political parties in the United States. They feared that if extreme divisions existed within the government then the unity that held the nation together during the American Revolution would collapse. Their early attempts at creating the republic reflected their hopes. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison, as part of his national tour to have the Constitution ratified, warned against the existence of "factions" and denounced them for their ability to "vex and oppress each other [rather] than to co-operate for their common

good.”¹ When the Founders drafted the Constitution they did not at all reference the existence of political parties. They believed the built-in separation of powers between the three branches of government would, in theory, restrict any attempts by one branch from dominating over another. Finally, and perhaps more foolhardily, there was a naïve belief on the part of the Founders, that America would only be governed by men of integrity, who would “reason together as individuals.”² Their naiveté in the existence of such a utopian government soon disintegrated into a suspicion of one another and nearly derailed the country.

Despite their best efforts at creating a unified form of government, free of political parties, factions nonetheless emerged. In truth, many Federalists did not see themselves as part a political party to begin with. They were simply “the government, the administration.”³ Thomas Jefferson, who would come to lead a future political party, even lamented that, “If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all.”⁴ This position would change, as would much of Jefferson’s thinking, in the coming years. Almost ten years after penning his thoughts on the issue of party, Jefferson wrote another letter, reflecting his participation in the drafting of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Now Jefferson believed that “in every free & deliberating society, there must from the nature of man be opposite parties, & violent dissensions & discords...perhaps this party division is necessary to induce each to watch & debate to the people the proceedings of the other.”⁵

¹ James Madison, “*Federalist No. 10: The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection*,” From the New York Packet, *The Avalon Project*, November 23, 1787. Accessed July 13, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp

² John Avlon, *Washington’s Farewell: The Founding Father’s Warning to Future Generations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 38.

³ Gordon Wood, *Friends Divided: John Adams and Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 265.

⁴ “TJ to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789.” *FO*.

⁵ “TJ to John Taylor, June 4, 1798.” *FO*.

Much of the division spewed from regional concerns, such as old rivalries between the northern and southern states. For early state's rights advocates, they continued to be suspicious of federal power and were anxious of any further encroachment on American liberties.⁶ The disputes between the members of the newly formed Congress also stemmed from long standing divisions during the drafting and ratification process of the Constitution itself. James Madison, as the Constitution's chief architect, wanted to create a government that in one historian's words, "was a republican, people's government, not complicated, and could be understood by anyone."⁷ This simplicity was largely accomplished in the Constitution, save for the nonexistence of a bill of rights, which many delegates saw as necessary to "protect ordinary citizens against a government that they saw as too nationalistic and too powerful."⁸ Although a bill of rights was added shortly thereafter to the Constitution, concerns over the possible size and similarity to the British monarchical system remained. The proximity to the British government naturally spurred fears of a return to autocratic rule, a fear that would dominate American politics throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, if not the twentieth and twenty-first as well.

During the American Revolution there was a sense that the new government would extend to the citizenry a form of democracy that would empower every man. However, by 1789 many Federalists recognized that America could not survive with a limited government. This did not mean that a return to the monarchy system was imminent, as many of the Federalists "had little desire to return to the monarchical and patriarchal politics of the colonial ancient regime,"

⁶ Avlon, *Washington's Farewell*, 38.

⁷ Bruce Chadwick, *Triumvirate: The Story of the Unlikely Alliance that Saved the Constitution and United the Nation* (Naperville: Sourcebooks Inc., 2009), 12.

⁸ Chadwick, *Triumvirate*, 13.

but they recognized that certain elements were necessary.⁹ There still needed to be men that were educated, disciplined, and capable of running the country. To simply throw power to the people and hope for the best would not be in the nation's best interest. The Founders settled on a representative-democracy, a government wherein the people have a voice in the form of elected officials, who would be entrusted in their position to represent the best interests of the people. As a result, the framers tried to "balance the imperatives of popular sovereignty against the fear of excessive democracy," however their efforts turned more and more futile as more forms of democratic societies sprung up around the country, alarming many of the nation's leaders.¹⁰

The question of what type of democracy would exist in America inevitably led to the political disgruntlement. Democracy had already existed in many different forms throughout the American Colonies before the Revolution. In Sean Wilentz's *The Rise of American Democracy*, he described early democracy in prewar-America in two ways: country and city. Wilentz describes country democracy as rising "from a white rural majority of farmers," who subsisted primarily on "the produce of their own farms and what they could obtain from exchange with neighbors."¹¹ Theirs was a democracy built on numbers and access to land through which cooperation with one another at the state level was a collective good. City democracy was quite different. Built less on the idea of numbers and land, city democracy was based more on an intellectual and social philosophy, which formed the basis of equality between the merchant and artisan classes.¹² Taken together, both before and after the Revolution, the city and country democracies were distinguishable largely by the geopolitical reality. City democrats were closer

⁹ Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54.

¹⁰ Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 40.

¹¹ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 15.

¹² Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 20.

to state and federal governments and were therefore more likely to influence politics and the economy. Country democrats were more isolated and forced to fend for themselves, which, as a result, instilled a deeper sense of independence and self-reliance, apart from government intrusion.¹³ Now the question facing the Founders was how to preserve the essence of democracy while maintaining law and order through a centralized government that presided over all the states.

Interestingly, many in the United States, following the Revolution, now seemed worried about expanding democratic values to the masses. During the war, many of the colonies liberalized their suffrage laws.¹⁴ However, this liberalization came at a cost by the war's end. Historian Gordon Wood describes how the Revolution had democratized the state legislatures by increasing the number of its members and expanding the electorate. Now men of much more humble backgrounds, who were less educated, sat alongside the well-to-do in the local assemblies. The stability of local assemblies also experienced large turnovers in membership as challengers for positions came from every direction. Everywhere it seemed that new self-appointed leaders, taking advantage of the expanded suffrage laws, were speaking and organizing groups against those in power.¹⁵

This may have been the scenario envisioned by Thomas Jefferson. He once expressed to Abigail Adams in a letter that "The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions...It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all. I

¹³ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 26.

¹⁴ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 28. Religious tests, that previously disenfranchised non-Protestants, were dropped except in South Carolina. Voting by written ballots became normal in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Georgia.

¹⁵ Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 16-17.

like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the Atmosphere.”¹⁶ Regardless of Jefferson’s hopes the expansion of democratic values were not reassuring to others. There were those who still wished to see men of prominence in government. During Jefferson’s own presidency, his surveyor of public buildings, Benjamin Latrobe, complained that democracy was getting out of hand, that the government resembled its constituents too closely, and that they were “unlearned.” Some congressmen were bankers and lawyers, others were “plain farmers,” blacksmiths, and butchers.¹⁷ Whether or not many in government were aware of it, these protests at the local, state, and eventual federal level, were sowing the seeds of political parties in the United States.

If there was one person who, at the very least, was capable of calming the dividing waters in the nation, it was George Washington. His election as the nation’s first president steadied the fears of those who were suspicious of the federal system, as his character was seen as above dispute. Two of the most important issues during the Washington presidency, according to John Avlon, were the centralized financial plan of Alexander Hamilton and the permanent location of the national capital. Both issues led to a formidable showdown between the already warring factions within the United States Congress, and ultimately paved the way for America’s ideological future and political parties.¹⁸ The banking issue consumed the advocates of limited government. Hamilton’s plan of creating a centralized banking system, which would assume the debts of states, and therefore hold power over them, expanded the federal government’s authority.

¹⁶ “TJ to AA, February 22, 1787.” *MHS*.

¹⁷ Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 332.

¹⁸ Avlon, *Washington’s Farewell*, 38-39.

This expansion of power worried many, particularly Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who saw the banking issue as less to do about money and more “about control, about trust, [and] about independence.”¹⁹ After fighting a war against an autocratic and overpowering financial system it seemed hypocritical to now endorse it. Furthermore, Jefferson feared that the creation of a centralized banking system would inevitably lead to corruption in the legislature. Economic ties between bank and lawmaker would lead, as Jefferson saw it, to a form of “corruption” whereby Hamilton and his allies could control the government.²⁰ Despite their reservations, both Jefferson and Madison worked with Alexander Hamilton, who was now acting as Washington’s Treasury Secretary, to finalize an agreement that would achieve as close to a peaceful compromise as possible.

The agreement, which historian Joseph Ellis suggestively describes as the “compromise of 1790,” allowed for the passage of Hamilton’s banking plan in exchange for the placement of the national capital in the South.²¹ However, even after its passage in Congress, the banking issue would continue to divide the political powers throughout the Washington presidency. Although the Federalist Party was the only intended political party in America, it was steadily dividing. In 1792, Madison, now a congressional leader openly opposing many of the Federalist policies, including the banking system, published a series of essays that justified the need for more political parties. Viewing them as “natural to most political societies,” Madison differentiated the two current factions in the Federalist Party as one being an anti-republican

¹⁹ Joseph Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 58.

²⁰ Jon Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power* (New York: Random House, 2012), 257-258.

²¹ Ellis, *Founding Brothers*, 50. On July 9, 1790, the House of Representatives passed the Residence Bill, which located the permanent national capital to the Potomac after a ten-year residence in Philadelphia.

party, allied to the rich and influential, and one as an oppositional party, which represented the majority, but held no power.²²

Despite his best efforts, and much to his chagrin, the political infighting came from among Washington's closest advisors. Washington's cabinet was comprised of men who had fought in the American Revolution, either militarily or politically. Among the most notable were Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom were largely responsible the fractioning of the Federalists. Their earlier disagreements over the role of government, particularly the finances, had continued while in the administration. In a letter to Washington in 1792, Jefferson outlined what he viewed as a hostile takeover by leaders within the Federalist Party. Referring to them as "the Monarchial federalists," Jefferson accused them of attempting to interpret the Constitution broadly, rather than literally, in order to suit their own means and turn the republican nation into a monarchy. Only Washington, according to Jefferson, could keep the country united.²³ Although he stayed on for a second term as president, Washington could not heal the divide. He was growing concerned with the level of division in his own cabinet. He could see it spilling out into the political sphere, further dividing the national politics, and splintering the Federalist Party into two separate factions. It was Washington's nightmare; he did not want to leave the presidency with a divided nation. In a letter to Jefferson in 1796, Washington wrote, "I was no party man myself and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them."²⁴

Before Washington stepped down as president there were two emerging factions within the party: Federalists and Republicans. Neither side respected the other's legitimacy and neither

²² Sean Wilentz, *The Politicians and the Egalitarians: The Hidden History of American Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2016), 5.

²³ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 264.

²⁴ George Washington, July 6, 1796, quoted in Avalon, *Washington's Farewell*, 111.

actually viewed themselves as a party, but rather the true representative of the Constitution and the people.²⁵ In his Farewell Address to the American people in 1796, Washington warned against the further erosion of political unity. In a speech co-authored by Alexander Hamilton, Washington, without formally identifying anyone by name, attacked the “organized political opposition” that formed against him. Unlike Madison’s opinions of political parties, Washington stated that they were not “natural” and any support for oppositional forces would be, in themselves, a threat to the republic.²⁶ Though his words were prophetic, they did not matter. The damage had already been done.

During Washington’s second term the United States was plagued by foreign affairs. France and England were continuing their war in Europe and France was slowly embarking on their own revolution to overthrow the monarchy. Washington, to his great credit, recognized the risk in becoming embroiled in either country’s internal strife and chose neutrality. The French Revolution’s rush to a bloody mobocracy horrified Washington, Adams, and Hamilton, who “perceived the extremes of liberty lurching from anarchy to tyranny.”²⁷ This was just what they wanted to avoid in America and Washington had the presidential courage to remain apart from it. Politically, however, this position damaged Washington’s presidency. Others in his cabinet, notably Jefferson, saw the French Revolution as a “consequence” of the American struggle, and concluded that France had become a sister republic to the United States.²⁸ To abandon their one time ally now was to abandon their revolutionary spirit. Beyond his devotion to the revolutionary spirit, Jefferson’s love of the French, in general, was well known. When he returned to America, after serving in France as an ambassador, he attempted to recreate his

²⁵ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 265.

²⁶ Wilentz, *The Politicians and the Egalitarians*, 6.

²⁷ Avlon, *Washington’s Farewell*, 56.

²⁸ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 223.

Philadelphia home to resemble his residence in France. He had a French housekeeper and coachman, drank French wine, and purchased French paintings.²⁹

During the congressional debates over America's declared neutrality between England and France, John Adams agreed with Washington. He never fully shared Jefferson's views on liberty and freedom and he was concerned over Jefferson's apparent blindness to what was happening in revolutionary France. Jefferson, in contrast, disliked the positions and decisions that Adams made while Vice-President. He saw his friend as mimicking too closely the British system of government. Adams certainly gave Jefferson and the Republicans ammunition. While acting as President of the Senate, Adams routinely "dressed in European-court style with a powdered wig and small sword," after arriving to the Senate in an elaborate carriage pulled by six horses. Over questions on how one should address the president, Adams believed that he should have a grand title, such as "His Majesty the President."³⁰ Despite his steadfast loyalty to the independence of the United States, Adams did harbor beliefs that it was a republican monarchy, a limited form of the British system, but still a republic in practice. Where this may have been a confusing interpretation to some, Gordon Wood clearly explains that this belief was built off Adams's own interpretation of power and the danger of its use when scattered among the populace. Jefferson, along with most other southerners, was less frightened of a democracy and fervently supported the ideas of liberty, equality, and popular republican government.³¹

The friction between both men would carry over into Adams's own presidency and hasten the divide between the Federalists and Republicans. In Washington's presidency,

²⁹ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 261-262.

³⁰ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 241; David McCullough, *John Adams* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 406-408. Adams' appeal for such noble titles earned him condemnation from other politicians, even his allies. To mock his vanity of presidential titles, as well as his outward appearance, it was suggested that Adams be referred to as "His Rotundity."

³¹ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 233-234.

Hamilton's financial plan was the most contested issue that led to the political divide. In Adams' it would be the French Revolution. During Adam's presidency the question over America's continued neutrality plagued the administration, with Jefferson, now elected as Adams's Vice-President, firmly in the pro-French Republican camp. The French and English were embroiled in yet another war and both countries were attacking American trade ships. To calm the tension between the two countries, Adams sent a delegation to meet with the French. What came to be known as the XYZ Affair infuriated Americans, including the Republicans.³² Although the country and both political parties rallied behind Adams, his handling of the situation soon led to further political divide.

There were unsubstantiated rumors that the French population in America was planning a revolutionary takeover, with some suggesting that France had already declared war on the United States, and that an invasion was underway to take possession of Florida and Louisiana.³³ Adams responded to such fears by passing two provocative laws, both of which gave the Republicans the opportunity to political strike against the president and the Federalists. The first was the Alien Act, which granted the president the right to expel any foreigner he considered "dangerous," which in Jefferson's imagination meant deportation by the shiploads. The second, and more serious controversial law was the Sedition Act, which granted the fining and imprisonment of anyone writing "False, scandalous, and malicious" content against the

³² John Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 108-109. The delegation sent by Adams was met by the French foreign minister, Charles Talleyrand, who refused to speak to them unless offered a bribe. After receiving scattered updates from Adams over the issue, Republicans demanded to see all documents from the delegation, fearing that Adams was attempting to use the slight as an excuse to declare war. Once the documents were released it was clear that the French acted disrespectfully to the delegation. The only retractions made in the dispatches were the names of the three French officials. They were simply designated as X, Y, and Z.

³³ McCullough, *John Adams*, 496.

government, Congress, or the President.³⁴ This was a clear violation of the First Amendment, despite the Federalist's argument that it was required in the current climate, and the Republicans pounced on it. In an odd twist, Jefferson, for all his initial love of the French Revolution, now feared that the Federalists were imitating the French revolutionaries, and creating an environment of fear to manipulate the people, in order to empower themselves.³⁵

Jefferson, too, was guilty of rousing the mob in the prevailing fear. During the crisis, Jefferson and James Madison secretly drafted what became known as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which argued that the states had the right to nullify a federal law that they deemed to be unconstitutional. Jefferson's involvement in drafting the resolutions fell in line with his ever-evolving belief that the United States was not, in the strictest term, united. Jefferson's position was that the states should have the power of autonomy over the federal government and retain the loose alliance that prevailed in the earlier Articles of Confederation. The position of an officer in federal government actively arguing against its own power was an irony championed by Jefferson. Jon Meacham addresses this irony stating that Jefferson was not being "intellectually consistent," and constantly shifted both his politics and ideals in order to "arrange the world as he wanted it to be."³⁶ As has always been the case with Jefferson, he can be equally charged with hypocrisy and political practicality in any given situation.

The political battles over government power, financial matters, individual rights, and foreign affairs that plagued the Washington and Adams administrations came to a head in the 1800 presidential election. This would be the first election that tested America's democratic and republican ideology. In a broader, and unbeknownst sense, it would also set the stage for the

³⁴ McCullough, *John Adams*, 505-506.

³⁵ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 112.

³⁶ Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson*, 318-319.

political war of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson twenty years later. The election between Adams and Jefferson would be different from previous electoral bouts. Jefferson did not see his victory over Adams as anything less than revolutionary. In a letter, Jefferson referred to the election as the “revolution of 1800,” and that it “was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of ’76...not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the rational and peaceable instrument of reform, the suffrage of the people.”³⁷ This was a much more passive approach to the cleansing of government that the Jefferson of yesteryear first proposed. In a letter to James Madison in 1787, Jefferson wrote, “I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical...It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.”³⁸ Jefferson always feared that the Federalists sought to turn the United States into a “European-type state with an enlarged bureaucracy, a standing army, a national bank, high taxes, and a credit system that tried to tie the financial interests of the country to the government.” Now, with the republican faction controlling the White House and both houses of Congress, he believed that the true revolutionary spirit that inspired the American Revolution was finally complete.³⁹

The election of 1800 was the first true contentious election in the United States. It was the first and only time in American history that a Vice-President openly campaigned against the incumbent.⁴⁰ If the Federalists and Republicans did not consider themselves as two separate parties, they certainly did not act like it. Their positions were wholly different in every aspect, ranging from money interests, to foreign affairs, to sectional disputes. Partisan newspapers attacked the candidates on a daily basis. It was made to seem as if the world would end if the

³⁷ “TJ to Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819.” *FO*.

³⁸ “TJ to James Madison, January 30, 1787,” *FO*.

³⁹ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 320; Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 276.

⁴⁰ McCullough, *John Adams*, 536.

wrong man were chosen for the presidency, as did one paper in New York, which suggested to its readers that if Jefferson won it would mean civil war.⁴¹ Republicans insisted that the Federalists wanted to create a grand standing army capable of crushing the will of the people, expand an already bloated government, and protect the rights of only the merchant and financial classes. Federalists were labeled as the “monarchic, aristocratic, tory faction.”⁴² Adams himself faced charges of being “insane” and a warmonger. These attacks were not new to Adams by the Republicans, but the attacks by Hamiltonian Federalists were. They berated Adams for his “fainthearted” efforts in the face of French aggression.⁴³ Near the end, it seemed Adams was a man without a party, similar to the political position of his son in years to come.

Although Adams’s reelection may have been considered a lost cause, the remaining Federalists in Congress also failed to successfully fight back against the Republican attacks. They were less organized, outnumbered by Republican newspapers, and engaged in only amateurish responses to Republican charges. The best hand the Federalists had to play was the linking of Republican politics to the French Revolution. By comparing the bloodshed of the revolution in France to the Republicans in America, the Federalists hoped to depict Jefferson as a member of a radical faction, who wanted to bring America into a new war with England, in order to aid their French revolutionaries.⁴⁴ As the votes were tallied, it was evident that Adams lost his bid for reelection, receiving sixty-five votes to Jefferson’s seventy-three. Although Adams suggested that he was indifferent to the election results, he was devastated. He could not believe that after all he had done for his country he could be rejected. His melancholy came not just from losing the election, but from also learning that his son, Charles, had died several days

⁴¹ McCullough, *John Adams*, 543.

⁴² Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 147-148.

⁴³ McCullough, *John Adams*, 544.

⁴⁴ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 149-151.

earlier, succumbing to alcoholism.⁴⁵ Although the relationship between father and son had become estranged, the loss was no less heavy. Writing to his son, Thomas, Adams reflected on Charles “affliction [as] a more serious nature to this Family than any other. Oh! That I had died for him if that would have relieved him from his faults as well as his disease.”⁴⁶

The presidency of Thomas Jefferson and the democratic legacy that bears his name began within his inaugural address. Thomas Jefferson was a complex man of many contradictions. His presidency would be no different. In public, Jefferson was optimistic, reserved, avoided personal controversy, and was charming, while in private, he would hold grudges. He would purchase all that he wanted, but criticized against the obsessive moneymaking enterprises. He hated the accumulation of public debt, but would borrow more and more money to cover his own expenditures. For all his writings on liberty and freedom, he lived in a life of wealth and leisure, made possible through the work of hundreds of slaves.⁴⁷ Believing that his election was indeed the final and true end to the American Revolution, Jefferson and his fellow Republicans set out to fulfill what they believed were the true goals of the Revolution. Chief among their aims was the reduction of government power. Jefferson and the Republicans wished to create a smaller national republican government. This is a critical point for during his first term, Jefferson himself, seemed to deny the premise of a unified state at all. His interpretation was that the United States was a loose alliance of states that had been overburdened by centralized authority.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Wood, *Friends Divided*, 321-322; Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 163. John Adams had previously renounced his son for his personal vices and decent into alcoholism. Prior to Charles’ death, Adams received news from his wife, informing him that their son was ill and likely to die. Two weeks would pass before Charles would finally succumb to the effects of alcoholism, yet Adams never wrote to his son.

⁴⁶ “AA to Thomas Boylston Adams, December 17, 1800.” *FO*.

⁴⁷ Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 277-278.

⁴⁸ Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 108.

In an effort to limit the presumptive role and status of the president, the Republicans wished to simplify and purge its ritualistic power by ending the elaborate and regal formalities. Jefferson walked to his inauguration rather than take an ornamented, horse drawn coach.⁴⁹ In his inaugural speech, in an attempt to mend fences between the Federalists and Republicans, Jefferson declared to the American people that, “We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”⁵⁰ Despite these words of reconciliation, Jefferson wasted no time in making certain political and symbolic actions to dismantle the Federalist agenda. He pardoned those affected by the Sedition Act, he chipped away at the Hamiltonian financial system, and he attempted to improve the role of patronage positions in government by hiring workers based on merit and not birth.⁵¹

Jefferson’s presidency experienced success and failures, like all presidencies, but the most fundamental effect on the American public was the altering of democratic principles throughout the nation. Under Republican leadership there was a resurgence of interest in democratizing society. There were positives and negatives to the socio-political changes that were occurring throughout America. The American government, unlike others throughout the world, cut taxes, diminished its armed forces, and shrunk its bureaucracies. These changes were significant, as no other government in history had voluntarily cut back its authority. Popular voting, too, was amplified at all levels, especially in the North, where participation increased to nearly eighty percent in the first decade of the nineteenth century. This increase in democratic voting also gave way to a more diversified class of men, whom under a Federalist government,

⁴⁹ Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 287-288.

⁵⁰ Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address.” March 4, 1801. *The Avalon Project*. Accessed July 24, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. See Appendix A for full text of First Inaugural Address.

⁵¹ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 101-102.

would never have been considered for office. Federalists were stunned by the amount of “uneducated and illiterate” men coming into office at the expense of other talented individuals.⁵²

These elections were part of the core beliefs, and the greatest political achievement, according to Sean Wilentz, for what became known as Jeffersonian democracy. Unlike before, the possibility of the self-made man existed in the United States. To rise from nothing and still achieve a place in high political office was the cornerstone of democracy.⁵³ The limiting of government, the expansion of democratic power, the preponderance of state sovereignty, and a society run by the agricultural class, rather than the economic elite, were what built the nation’s foundations in Jefferson’s mind. However, for all of Jefferson’s optimism towards the future, he failed to see the potential danger that lay ahead. The United States was expanding, but without a strong military to control and guard its boundaries. Slavery was becoming a sectional issue as Northern states slowly abolished its practice. Jefferson’s economic policies, especially his embargo on European trade, began to damage American finances that were already strained from his attacks on Hamilton’s banking system. One of the most hypocritical political decisions on Jefferson’s presidency was the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from France. For all of his talk on limited government, as president, Jefferson would double the size of the United States with the stroke of a pen and use federal money and troops to occupy it. It was a decision by a Republican president that in one Federalist’s words had “done more to strengthen the executive than Federalists dared think of even in Washington’s day.”⁵⁴

Perhaps the most ironic of all circumstances would be the extolling of the self-made man in America. It is entirely possible Jefferson comprehended the idea that a man, like Andrew

⁵² Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 301-303.

⁵³ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 138.

⁵⁴ “Governor Morris to Roger Griswold, November 25, 1803,” quoted in Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson*, 392.

Jackson, could assume the office of president. It is another thing, entirely, on whether or not he would have tolerated him. As Jefferson stepped down from the office that he believed fulfilled the American Revolution, he unknowingly set the stage for another revolution in America. At the core of Republican attacks against the Federalists was the fear that their rule would ultimately lead to the establishment of a monarchist, or a Caesar, in America. They believed that they alone, with the support of the people, armed with the power of the vote, could stand in the way. What the Republicans did not account for was that such a man could come from their own making. A series of unseen events would shape the political climate over the next two presidential administrations, leading to the consequential elections of the 1820s and the beginning of a political war for the heart of America's beliefs under a Jackson presidency.

Chapter 2: Adams, Jackson, and Growing Up Jeffersonian

The American Colonies were not yet at war with England when John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson were born. The British armies had not yet invaded, Washington was not yet leading an American army of rebels, Jefferson had not yet penned the Declaration of Independence, and John Adams had not yet put his life on the line by defending the British soldiers in the so-called “Boston Massacre.” These events were all to come in the next decade, unwittingly influencing the lives of two of America’s future presidents. Born four months apart in 1767, Adams and Jackson grew up very differently, however, their shared experiences during the war, particularly for Jackson, left a lasting impact, one that influenced their future understandings for what America should be. Adams, influenced by the experiences he would share with his father during the Revolution, would grow up to become one of America’s greatest statesmen, unmatched in intellect and vision. Jackson, by contrast, would lead a life of pain and loss, reaching greatness not through political intrigue, but through violence and war.

Their views on the United States were shaped during the Jeffersonian era of American politics, albeit through different means. Both men were nationalists, both men were raised in the Revolution, and both were dedicated to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, however, each man interpreted them differently. Under the presidencies of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, both men would reach adulthood and achieve acclaim from their countrymen. Jackson would be remembered as the hero of New Orleans for defeating a superior British army in the War of 1812. Adams, too, would be known as the famed diplomat, who achieved peace with England, officially ending the war. As each man rose in popularity and reached for the highest political office, the greatest obstacle to overcome was the understanding that the political

world in their parent's time had ceased to exist. The principles of a Jeffersonian democracy were reshaping America and their visionaries of the future. Adams and Jackson were not exempt from this vision. As the 1820s elections were destined to highlight, both men came to represent the divide in American society. As the second generation of political leaders, both Adams and Jackson would have to contend with the legacy that had been left behind by the Founding Fathers. To understand the character of both men is to understand the world they grew up in. Their personal character and views on democracy and republicanism would inspire and be admired by the next generation of political leaders in the United States.

John Quincy Adams was born in 1767 to John and Abigail Adams, and raised in Boston. At the time of his birth, the American Colonies were only just beginning the revolutionary spirit, which would soon engulf the entire populace into war with their mother country. When war finally came to Boston in 1775, Adams was a first hand witness. Along with his mother, Abigail, young Adams watched from the safety of their home in Braintree, the Patriots battle against the British forces at Bunker Hill.¹ This first sight into the mindless and bloody ferocity that is war left an indelible mark on Adams's outlook. Years later, in a letter to his brother, Adams wrote of the horrors of war. "Those were times of public distress, and terrors, and sufferings...I remember the smoke and the flames of Charlestown which I saw from the orchard on Penn's Hill. I remember the packing up and the sending away of the books and furniture from the reach of Gage's troops, while we ourselves were hourly exposed for many months to have been butchered by them."²

¹ Harlow Giles Unger, *John Quincy Adams* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2012), 14-17. The Battle of Bunker Hill instilled a sense of loss in Adams as well. The family's personal doctor and friend, Joseph Warren, was killed in the battle.

² "JQA to Thomas Boylston Adams, April 3, 1813," quoted in Fred Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams: American Visionary* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 16.

This was, however, the closest to war Adams would come. In 1778, he would join his father, John Adams, on a diplomatic mission to France.³ This departure from America would briefly remove Adams from the effects of the war and prepare him for a life of diplomatic service. While in France, Adams did indeed excel. Unlike other boys his age, Adams was now venturing across the Atlantic, to the Old World, and would dine with the great Americans of the time. Adams would live and dine with Benjamin Franklin in Paris, he would learn to speak French and Latin, and be given a learned understanding in the arts of music, dancing, and fencing.⁴ Although Adams was enjoying his European experiences, after about eleven months, John Adams's mission was drawing to an end. Originally sent to France to help forge an alliance in their war against England, John Adams was recalled, in favor of Ben Franklin acting as sole commissioner. Both Adams' were elated to be returning home. On the near six-week journey home across the Atlantic, the elder Adams assisted his son in his studies, including an understanding of what would become John Quincy Adams's greatest influence, the writings of Cicero.⁵

Adams was nearly twelve years old on the return trip to America. During his time alongside his father, he received an education, ate with celebrated guests, and witnessed the majesties of the European culture. Across the Atlantic, however, the American Revolution was raging. Fighting had spread to the Southern Colonies, the homelands of Andrew Jackson. Like Adams, Jackson was born in 1767, but on a much more ominous day. Born four months before

³ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 23-25. John Adams was selected by the American Congress to replace Silas Deane as a commissioner to France after accusations of embezzlement. At his parents urging, John Quincy Adams accompanied his father in order to experience foreign travel and enhance his education.

⁴ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 34.

⁵ Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams*, 31-33. While onboard the frigate *Sensible*, John Adams helped his son translate Cicero's orations from Latin and French. John Quincy would continually identify himself with the writings of Cicero, as well as the man.

Adams, Jackson's birth occurred on March 15, the Ides, a date that should worry any accused Caesarian. Although the same age as Adams, nearly everything else about their childhoods would differ. Unlike Adams, who enjoyed and benefitted from the company of his father, Jackson was born without one.⁶ In his youth, it was clear to his mother that he was "a wild child, with an almost unmanageable will and a defiant temper."⁷ In contrast to the reserved Adams, this behavior would serve Jackson throughout his life and come to define his character.

When the war reached the Southern Colonies, the Jackson family lived in the Waxhaw district, bordering North and South Carolina. The same year that Adams and his father departed for France, away from the war, Jackson came face to face with its realities. The war by this time had shifted to the Carolinas and escalated quickly. Jackson's older brother, Hugh, was killed in battle in 1779, and the British captured the city of Charleston in 1780.⁸ Jackson himself was involved in the fighting, and his experiences with the British were drastically different from Adams. Whereas Adams witnessed the bloodshed at the Battle of Bunker Hill from the safety of far off hill, Jackson shed literal blood when British soldiers captured him in 1781. In a story made famous by Jackson's defiance and hatred towards the British, when ordered by a British soldier to shine his boots, Jackson resisted and received a sword blow to his head and arm. "The sword point reached my head and has left a mark there...on the skull, as well as on the fingers," Jackson would later recall.⁹

⁶ H.W. Brands, *Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 15-16. The death of Andrew Jackson Sr., is unclear, but he died several months before Jackson's birth in a workplace accident. In a humiliating incident, Jackson Sr.'s pallbearers, according to local legend, drank so much whiskey that they temporarily lost his body on the way to the burial sight.

⁷ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 17.

⁸ Jon Meacham, *American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2008), 11.

⁹ Andrew Jackson, *Correspondence*, VI, 253, quoted in Meacham, *American Lion*, 12.

Jackson's suffering, at the hands of the British, did not stop with this attack. Following the incident, Jackson and his younger brother, Robert, were taken to a prison camp. Although his mother, Elizabeth, managed to secure the release of both boys, Robert died of illness shortly after returning home. Jackson, too, began to suffer from smallpox, which he seems to have contracted while in British custody. He would survive the disease, but would suffer yet another loss. Shortly after Jackson's recovery, Elizabeth traveled to Charleston, seeking the release of her nephews from a British prison. Only a bundle of her clothing would return to Jackson as she herself died of cholera and was buried in obscurity. Jackson was now without both parents and siblings, and he was only fourteen.¹⁰

The radical differences between Jackson's early life and Adams's cannot be overlooked. Each man's earlier experiences would provide him with a set of principles that would inevitably come to impact his character. As they left their childhoods, the world that Adams and Jackson grew into as young men was no more polarizing. After much tribulation, Jackson, in his late twenties, succeeded in becoming Tennessee's first representative in Congress. Although his time as a representative would last but a matter of months, the significance of his time in Congress is noteworthy for two issues. First was Jackson's opposition to both the Jay Treaty with England and his vote of disapproval over a resolution of thanks to the departing of George Washington as president. Both issues were steeped in Jackson's hatred for the British and anything that may resemble their style of government. Jackson even went as far as to call for the impeachment and

¹⁰ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 30; Meacham, *American Lion*, 12-13.

removal of those involved with the treaty.¹¹ His opposition against the Jay Treaty placed Jackson in the hands of the Republican faction of the Federalist Party. Historian H.W. Brands notes that the ways in which Jackson's political ideology and instincts matched the Republicans are that he simply despised Great Britain, was suspicious of those who favored the wealthy, and wished to see the power of the central government returned to the states.¹² The second issue of note was Jackson's fight for the financial restitution of the Tennessee militia, who fought against the Cherokee in 1793. Jackson appealed and was later granted the sum of \$22,816 for the members of the militia who participated in the expedition.¹³ This direct relationship between Jackson and his constituents won him much popularity and undoubtedly highlighted his understanding of the connection between elected officials and the people they serve.

Jackson's time in the House was short-lived as he was soon elevated to a Senate position, another post that Jackson did not occupy for very long. Although his time in the Senate was short, his political opposition towards President Adams and the Federalists, and his support of the French Revolution, and Napoleon, in particular, would earn him the cautious attention of Thomas Jefferson. Still, Jefferson many years later recognized the temperament of Jackson, when he supposedly labeled him a "dangerous man" to Daniel Webster. His temperament was not suited for the protracted debates in the Senate. He was a man of action, a man whom historian H.W. Brand notes as having "an executive temperament. He could make decisions far

¹¹ Lynne Hudson Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14-15. The Jay Treaty of 1796 was intended to complete lingering issues between American and British relations following the Revolutionary War, such as the impressment of American sailors and occupancy of British forts. Many Republicans believed that the treaty failed to adequately resolve any of these issues. *See also* Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 80. Jackson's opposition to Washington's farewell speech was rooted more in the custom rather than the man. Jackson viewed the delivery of a presidential speech to Congress as too reminiscent of a British king addressing Parliament.

¹² Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 76.

¹³ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 80-81.

more easily than he could make compromises. He had much greater confidence in his own judgment than in that of others.”¹⁴

Jackson’s tenure in the Senate lasted nearly six months. Resigning his post, he returned to Tennessee and was granted a position on the state superior court and remained there for six years. While in the position, Jackson acted less like an impartial judge and more like a self-aggrandizing vigilante. His temperament was not fit for a traditional judgeship anymore than it was for Congress, but it was well suited for the “rough-and-tumble southern frontier society,” where most had little patience for the law, which they viewed as “pettifoggery,” and were more inclined to believe that justice was “something any honest man could discern.”¹⁵ In short, if Jackson viewed a situation and deemed it wrong, it did not matter what the law said, he would pass judgment as *he* saw fit. It is important to understand that within the context of the time period and the isolated frontier location in which Jackson inhabited, he could get away with such behavior. It was not above Jackson to take matters, or the law, into his own hands and retaliate against those he perceived to be escaping justice, as was the case with Russell Bean.¹⁶ This granted Jackson a particular reputation. As Jon Meacham notes in his biography, while a judge in Tennessee, Jackson “did what others would not—or could not—do. In a world of threats, that willingness made him a hero, a central figure, someone who could be counted on.”¹⁷

Jackson’s reputation for bravery, however, came up against his other reputation, one of quick temper and violence. Jackson’s temper was notorious to all who knew him or knew of him. It was never above him to call an individual out for a duel if he felt that he was insulted.

¹⁴ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 96-97.

¹⁵ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 18; Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 100-101.

¹⁶ Meacham, *American Lion*, 26-27. Russell Bean was accused of “cutting off the ears of his infant child in a drunken frolic.” When he failed to appear in court, Jackson ordered the formation of a posse, armed himself with a pistol, and engaged in a brief shootout with Bean, who soon surrendered.

¹⁷ Meacham, *American Lion*, 27.

The concept of dueling should not be discarded, as it not only relates to Jackson's character, but also as an indicative form of action in Jeffersonian America. In Gordon Wood's *Empire of Liberty*, the historian notes that many Jeffersonian Republicans, particularly in the South, enjoyed competition and were always ready to assert their abilities and status. Perceiving an insult, no matter how small, it was not uncommon for "Southern gentlemen" with hair-trigger tempers to retaliate in the form of a duel. It was about personal "honor and gentlemanly status," particularly on the frontier, where duels would grow out of the most trivial causes. The practice was less common in the Northern states, where many New England Federalists and foreign visitors saw the Southern practice of dueling as "worthy of their savage neighbors."¹⁸ Despite the savagery of the duel, many prominent men would continue to fall to its practice during Jefferson's presidency, perhaps none more famous than Alexander Hamilton at the hands of Aaron Burr, Jefferson's own Vice-President, in 1804.

For Jackson, dueling was a means to settle scores and preserve his honor. However, the excessiveness of his dueling past would come to haunt his political future, and give much added ammunition to his opponents when running for president in 1824 and 1828. Perhaps the most well known duel involving Jackson occurred in 1806 when he killed Charles Dickenson. In an extended quarrel that included insults on Jackson, his wife, and unpaid gambling wages on a horse race, Jackson challenged and killed Dickenson, despite receiving a near-fatal bullet wound to the chest. Any satisfaction Jackson received in the duel did not save his standing in the community, which quickly plummeted.¹⁹

¹⁸ Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 327.

¹⁹ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 19-20.

As Jackson's reputation wavered between heroism and wretchedness, during the Jefferson presidency, John Quincy Adams's ambitious career was also beginning to waver. Upon returning to the American Colonies during the Revolutionary War, Adams did not remain in Boston long. His father had been appointed the sole ambassador to France, a position he immediately agreed to. Once again, Adams would set sail with his father over the Atlantic, away from the fighting in America. Once reaching Paris, his father once again enrolled him in school to continue his studies. The education that John Quincy Adams received throughout his life is notable for its time. In an era where public education was not yet a national concern, Adams, at home and abroad, was becoming immersed in the great works of history and literature. In her 2015 book *The Remarkable Education of John Quincy Adams*, author and historian Phyllis Lee Levin, wrote the definitive history on Adams's educational career and how it impacted his political advancement before reaching the presidency. While in Paris, Levin notes the daily life of Adams's schooling in a letter he composed to his father. Dated March 16, 1780, Adams, under the title "My Work For a day," listed the following: Make Latin, Explain Cicero, Erasmus, Pierce Phaedrus, Learn Greek raciness, Greek grammar, Geography, Geometry, Fractions, Writing, Drawing.²⁰

As Adams's studies continued, so too did his travels. At the age of fourteen, the same age Jackson was to lose the remaining members of his family to war, Adams was entrusted by his father to accompany an American appointed ambassador to Russia and act as secretary and

²⁰ Phyllis Lee Levin, *The Remarkable Education of John Quincy Adams* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 52.

interpreter.²¹ While in St. Petersburg, Adams continued his education by reading history and learning to read and write in German.²² Following the conclusion of the American Revolution, John Quincy Adams returned to America in order to enroll in Harvard University in Massachusetts. After successfully enrolling in the university, the elder Adams congratulated his son. In a letter John Adams wrote, “you will find a pleasure and improvements equal to your expectations. You are now among magistrates and ministers, legislators and heroes, ambassadors and generals.” Adams had always pushed his son to advance and to be ambitious, just as Abigail nurtured their son’s education. Earlier in life John Adams implored his son to achieve “great and glorious deeds,” and that receiving a good education would enable him to “become a wise and great man.” Now, the younger Adams was fulfilling that ambition.²³

Adams’s success in education is only one aspect of the man. His overall character and political merit, compared to Jackson, is another matter entirely. Although Jackson was both elected and appointed to the House of Representatives and the Senate, he neither served his full term, nor did he drift far from the Republican ideology of which he embraced. The same cannot be said of John Quincy Adams. Adams’s career in politics would be filled with controversy and complexities. Loved and hated, loathed and admired, his stewardship was unlike any other at the time. His entry into politics followed his father’s defeat in the presidency. First elected in 1802 for a state senate position on the Federalist ticket in Massachusetts, Adams quickly came to

²¹ Levin, *The Remarkable Education of John Quincy Adams*, 55. Adams accompanied Francis Dana, a Boston lawyer who was assisting John Adams as secretary to the peace commission in France. Congress appointed him as America’s first minister to Russia in 1780 and was tasked with concluding a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Russian empress.

²² Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 49-50. Unger lists the historical works that Adams studied while in St. Petersburg. Among the list include all eight volumes of *History of England* by David Hume, Catherine Macaulay’s eight-volume *The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line*, Adam Smith’s *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Cicero’s *Orations*, and John Dryden’s *Works of Virgil*.

²³ JA to JQA, May 26, 1786, quoted in Levin, *The Remarkable Education of John Quincy Adams*, 147; Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 19.

alienate his colleagues over his campaigns against corruption, which sometimes included other Federalists. “A politician in this country must be a man of a party,” Adams would later lament in his memoir. “I would fain be the man of my whole country.”²⁴ This ability to stand alone, against party politics, for the betterment of the republic would now truly test Adams as he was elected to the Senate in Washington during the Jefferson presidency.

John Quincy Adams’s views towards government are complex. His conclusions over issues would often appear at odds with one another, which in turn would infuriate members across the political spectrum. In an article by Robert Thompson, he sums up Adams’s political position as one in which “Adams neither dropped the Federalists nor embraced the Republicans. He belonged to the Federalist party, but was not committed to it.”²⁵ It must be taken into consideration that Adams, but also Jackson, were part of the new generation of American politicians. Issues that once compounded the politics of the Founding Fathers were expanding into new territories, shifting the national dialogue.

Literally and figuratively, one new territory was the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase. Adams would be the only New England Federalist to support Jefferson’s treaty for the cession of Louisiana from the French. His motivation undoubtedly stemmed from his sense of nationalism, as the purchase would expand American borders, open ports, and contribute to the nation’s national security interests by placing distance between the United States and territories held by France and Spain.²⁶ But the complexities of Adams’s thinking began to show. Although he agreed that President Jefferson had the constitutional right to purchase the territory, he voted

²⁴ JQA in *Memoirs*, 1:249, January 28, 1802, quoted in Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 122.

²⁵ Robert R. Thompson, “John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From “Outrageous Federalist” to “Republican Exile,” 1801-1809,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 11, no. 2 (Summer, 1991): 169. Accessed July 27, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3123239>.

²⁶ Thompson, “John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From “Outrageous Federalist” to “Republican Exile,” 1801-1809,” 171; Kaplin, *John Quincy Adams*, 198.

against all other legislation pertaining to the purchase. He believed that people living in the territory needed to consent to the purchase otherwise the imposing of a government over them would violate the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.²⁷

Jefferson's own role in acquiring the Louisiana Territory was equally complex. His decision to unilaterally acquire the territory, without a constitutional amendment, which expanded the President's powers in ways unlike before, was a complete reversal of the limited government philosophy that Jefferson extolled. Had any other man been president, Jefferson would have fought the acquisition.²⁸ This fundamental hypocrisy on Jefferson's part would help lead to the future fractioning of the Republican Party in future issues. If Jefferson would not submit to core Jeffersonian democratic principles, than how does one truly keep a political philosophy alive? For Adams, his seesaw approach to governing legislation confused and angered both Federalists and Republicans. Time and again he appeared to be a man unto himself by casting unpredictable votes but also proposing predictably doomed legislation, wasting the Senate's time. Adams recognized the deterioration of his relationship with other Federalists when he confided in his memoir that the Federalists "hate me rather more than they love any principle."²⁹

The isolation of politics, the independence of thought, and the unending complexities over single issues make Adams a composite figure of both his father and Jefferson. Although he personally came to dislike Jefferson, particularly his assaults on the judiciary, Adams did not

²⁷ Kaplin, *John Quincy Adams*, 198-199.

²⁸ Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson*, 391-392.

²⁹ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 133-135.

hold the Federalists in much higher esteem.³⁰ The issue that formally ended Adams's place within the Federalist Party was his support for the economic embargo policies of the Jefferson administration. As war between England and France continued, American trade ships were continuously caught in the crossfire. Looking to punish both European nations, Jefferson proposed a series of laws stopping the importation of trade goods. Again, Adams was the sole Federalist vote. Unlike other New England Federalists, who wished to appease England for its economic reliability, Adams was outraged by this attack on America's sovereignty. His support for the Republican trade policies however backfired politically. His very presence in Republican committees gave the Federalists justification in condemning him as a turncoat. His own mother protested his stance, but Adams's response was one of nationalism: "My sense of duty shall never yield to the pleasure of party."³¹

The final straw for the Federalists against Adams came in 1808 when he attended a Republican caucus to witness the nomination of James Madison as the next president. For attending, but also receiving one vote as a possible Vice-President, Adams's formal relationship with the Federalists had ended. With his term as senator drawing to an end, Federalists in Massachusetts nominated his successor. As Jackson had done, following his displeasures in the Senate, Adams resigned before his term ended. He was a Federalist no longer.³² His time away from politics did not last long, however. Following Madison's election as president Adams was offered a position as ambassador to Russia, which he accepted. He successfully remained in that position until the outbreak of war between the United States and England in 1812.

³⁰ Thompson, "John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From "Outrageous Federalist" to "Republican Exile," 1801-1809," 173-174. Adams' relationship to both the Republicans and the Federalists were strained over several issues. Unlike other New England Federalists, Adams favored expansionist policies proposed by the Republicans. Conversely, Adams simultaneously denounced Jefferson and the Republicans as a "privileged order of slave-holding Lords."

³¹ Robert Remini, *John Quincy Adams* (New York: Times Books, 2002), 38.

³² Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 144.

The War of 1812 was monumental for both Adams and Jackson. This was the defining moment for both men and would make them the darlings of the United States in years to come. During the 1820s elections, both men would relate their participation in the war as the means for their qualification as president. It was Jackson, however, and his victory against the British in the famed Battle of New Orleans that would receive the most praise. Although his reputation had been tarnished following the murder of Charles Dickenson in a duel, his victory against the British, now endeared him to the masses. He was the champion, the protector, and the cause of the British surrender.

However, the victory came late, as no one in America realized that the war had formally concluded weeks earlier with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. Nonetheless, Jackson's victory was timely, and Americans believed, willingly or in self-delusion, that the United States really won the war and dictated peace terms, in that order.³³ Adams's actions are less awe-inspiring, though no less heroic. His contribution to ending the war was as a member of the peace delegation in Ghent. Although his was not a victory brought by sword or bullet, Adams's contribution filled him with pride. Shortly after signing the treaty, Adams wrote to his wife, Louisa, that, "although the Peace is not what I should have wished, and although it may acquire no credit in our Country to those who made it, I consider the day on which I signed it, as the happiest of my life; because it was the day on which I had my share in restoring Peace to the world."³⁴

³³ Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 696. The terms of the Treaty of Ghent essentially returned the United States and Great Britain to a status quo in relations. No territorial changes occurred, issues pertaining to impressment or trade were not discussed or altered. The lack of significant changes within the treaty are themselves an indicator on how America deluded itself into thinking that the Battle of New Orleans played into the peace negotiations. If Jackson's victory was so significant to the peace delegation, then certainly more advantageous terms would have been discussed.

³⁴ "JQA to Louisa Catherine Johnson Adams, December 30, 1814," *FO*.

The War of 1812 devastated the Federalist Party. While the American delegation met in Ghent to negotiate the end of the war, Federalists in the New England states met in Hartford, Connecticut to publically denounce the progress, and even existence, of the war. The secrecy of the Convention's proceedings spurred speculation that the delegates were seeking to secede from the Union, or even ally with England.³⁵ Although there were no lasting agreements made during the Hartford Convention, word that the Federalists were even suggesting certain actions, such as New England concluding a separate peace treaty with England, requiring a super congressional majority for declaring war, or even the unlikely possibility of secession, further threatened their political position. Many Americans simply considered the Convention an act of treason by the Federalists. Upon hearing of the Convention, Adams, too, denounced the Federalists as unpatriotic by placing partisanship over the country's best interests.³⁶ Their recent actions convinced Adams that the Federalist Party—his father's party—was what he feared them to be during the Jefferson administration: a party of secessionists, subservient to the interests of England. Years later, during the closing days of his own presidency, Adams would include the Hartford Convention in his arguments against nullification and secession, decrying it as akin to setting one's own house on fire.³⁷ Perhaps, in the end, the war's greatest casualty was the Federalist Party. The party of George Washington and John Adams was now powerless, leaderless, and without the nation's confidence.

³⁵ Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies* (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 415-416. The Hartford Convention was viewed as a serious threat at the time. President Madison dispatched Colonel Thomas Sidney Jesup to Hartford to observe the Convention and was ordered that if the New England states appeared poised to secede he was to engage with local Republicans to secure the national arsenal at Springfield, Massachusetts. In addition to Jesup, Madison dispatched one thousand soldiers to the Massachusetts line if they were needed. The only actions to come out of the Hartford Convention were a list of demands that the delegates know would go unanswered, such as a proposed constitutional amendment to reduce the political rights of immigrants and the political power of Virginia.

³⁶ William J. Cooper, *The Lost Founding Father: John Quincy Adams and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017), 145-146.

³⁷ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 143; Cooper, *The Lost Founding Father*, 266.

John Quincy Adams's diplomatic ability would continue to bring him lasting recognition as one of America's greatest statesmen following the war. The James Madison presidency ended in 1816. Following his departure, James Monroe of Virginia was inaugurated as President of the United States. Monroe is considered to be the last of the Founding Fathers to become president as well as the last of the so-called Virginia Dynasty. A two-term president, Monroe oversaw the expansion of the nation and its progression into a new world of political and social upheaval. The nation had secured its liberty by fighting off the British for a second time. Now, it was time for peace and harmony. In a physical manifestation of Jefferson's own call for unity when announcing, "We are all Federalists. We are all Republicans," once again Chief Justice John Marshall, a staunch Federalist, inaugurated Monroe, a Republican.³⁸ Although a member of the Republican Party, Monroe does not seem a strict Jeffersonian. In his inaugural address, he speaks of the "systematic and fostering care of the Government," while simultaneously employing the same utopian vision for America that Jefferson often extolled. Hoping to fulfill the promises of harmony "in accord with the principles of our republican Government," Monroe made it clear that it would "be the object of my constant and zealous exertions."³⁹

For a short, gleaming moment, the United States did appear as Monroe described it in his inaugural address. In comparison to Washington's day, new states were admitted into the Union, territory expanded through the Louisiana Purchase, doubling the size of the United States, the economy was strong, and the balance of power between the states and the federal government seemed secure. However, what Monroe also included in his address inadvertently foreshadowed the dark future that lay ahead. While praising American progress, Monroe asked, in the same

³⁸ Harlow Giles Unger, *The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation's Call to Greatness* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2009), 263.

³⁹ James Monroe, "First Inaugural Address of James Monroe," March 4, 1817. *The Avalon Project*. Accessed July 31, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe1.asp

paragraph, “On whom has oppression fallen in any quarter of our Union? Who has been deprived of any right of person or property?”⁴⁰ Of course, in Monroe’s mind, the question of slavery was unrelated to these questions. In the coming years, the issue of slavery, and the question of its expansion throughout the United States, would become more actively discussed in the national dialogue.

Monroe symbolically wished to unify the country by creating a cabinet of men who represented the nation. Like Washington, Monroe wished to fill the cabinet with the best and the brightest. What he received were indeed men of talent, but also a group of political rivals, who would shape the future of the political playing field for a generation. For his cabinet, Monroe appointed William Crawford of Georgia, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, and John Quincy Adams, as secretaries of the Treasury, War, and State, respectively. Henry Clay of Kentucky, currently acting as Speaker of the House, and a former negotiator at Ghent, was originally asked to serve as Secretary of War, but rejected the appointment, as he believed, for the purposes of his own presidential ambition, that he earned the position at State.⁴¹ Intelligent and competitive as they were, it would be fair to assume that Monroe could not have foreseen the monumental clash of ideologies and personalities that would play out during the 1824 election. In the fight over who would succeed James Monroe, alliances would be broken, and political rivals would be made friends, all in the name of political advancement.

The presidential administration of James Monroe would end amidst a bitterly fought campaign in 1824. The presidential hopefuls were all part of the new generation of American leaders. Not one man led an army during the American Revolution, nor did they participate in

⁴⁰ James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address of James Monroe,” March 4, 1817.

⁴¹ Unger, *The Last Founding Father*, 266.

crafting the Constitution. The challenges that they faced would fracture the unity of the Republican Party and give way to partisan issues that would last until the Civil War. The contributions of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson during this period led the way. Prior to the 1824 election, Adams and Jackson were hailed as heroes in their respective rights. It is worth noting, however, the current differences between each man. Adams accumulated a strong diplomatic background by working and living as an ambassador in Europe. He was the son of a Founding Father, who renounced his own father's party and cultivated a reputation for being a political apostate. He negotiated peace treaties with America's warring nations, and served as a Secretary of State. By contrast, Jackson was a man of action. His fame came from the battles he won, and the passions he inspired. Politically, he was a mouse when compared to Adams. The terms he held in Congress, both in the House and the Senate, went incomplete. Despite their differences in temper, education, and experience, both men held similar views during the Monroe administration. Although Adams and Jackson embarked on a partnership of shared national interests, it was a relationship that ultimately collapsed through the partisan politics of the 1820s, and forever changed the Jeffersonian Republican views of government and leadership that both men grew to admire.

Chapter 3: Changing Politics and a Lost Election

James Monroe's early tenure was famously labeled as an "Era of Good Feelings" by the *Columbian Centinel*, describing it as a period in which good intentions and wisdom would transcend party conflict.¹ However, the full length of Monroe's presidency turned out to be anything but. In his monumental biography on James Monroe, historian Harry Ammon argues that Monroe's administration unfortunately marked the beginning of the fractioning of the Republican Party. Prior to Monroe's election, the Republicans had been unified in their efforts against Federalist policies, which allowed men like Jefferson and Madison to justify even the most controversial laws, such as Jefferson's embargo on European goods. With the Federalists now politically eliminated, internal divisions within the Republican Party began to emerge.² Republicans dominated the nation's politics, but due to regional concerns, differing ideologies took on new meaning. Issues that began to plague the nation, and Monroe's administration, largely focused on expansion and slavery. The roles of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson during this period, separately, and inadvertently, paved the way for additional splintering within the party.

Monroe's presidency faced a crisis of leadership as a result of the Jeffersonian practice of presidential power. Ammon notes that because of Jefferson, the Republican views towards the presidency were simplistic and vague. The president's position came to be seen as mostly an "agent for carrying out the will of the people as expressed in Congress," and not a nationalist leader, who would lead from the front. Yet, even Jefferson could not abide by his own theory of

¹ Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93.

² Harry Ammon, *James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), 380.

power, as evidenced with the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase, and his exertion of power over the Congress. The blindness of this hypocrisy was largely due to Jefferson's advantage in having a unified Republican Congress, in which he could control through friendship and personality.³ This was not the case in Monroe's administration as opposition now came from the Republican ranks over a variety of issues. Differences over slavery, state's rights, foreign affairs, nationalism, and executive power, conflicted with one another, all the while each group claimed it was fulfilling the Jeffersonian principles of government.

The first real challenge for the Monroe administration came from America's territorial expansion into Florida in 1818. Prior to its acquisition from the Spanish, Florida was a nest of pirates, privateers, escaped slaves, and warring Native American tribes, particularly the Seminole, who began to raid and burn settlements across the Georgian border. President Monroe informed his Secretary of War John C. Calhoun to order military commanders to attack the enemy, "unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post."⁴ Andrew Jackson was chosen to march into Northern Florida to attack the Seminoles. The situation was rife with international consequences. Jackson not only attacked the Seminole tribes, but due to the ambiguity of future orders, also Spanish forts. In addition to attacks on Native American tribes and the Spanish, Jackson captured and hanged two British traders, accusing them of aiding the

³ Ammon, *James Monroe*, 381-382.

⁴ "John C. Calhoun to Edmund P. Gaines, December 16, 1818," quoted in Harlow Giles Unger, *Henry Clay: America's Greatest Statesman* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2015), 83.

enemy.⁵ Single-handedly, Jackson caused an international crisis between the United States, Great Britain, and Spain.

There was near universal agreement in Monroe's cabinet that Jackson needed to be punished. Through intentional fault, or failure of communication, Jackson went above his orders and caused a crisis. Calhoun was furious by Jackson's assault and their relationship was tenuous to begin with. Before coming into office as Secretary of War, Calhoun realized that Jackson would not be a subservient general. Still riding high off the people's popularity, Jackson publically announced that he would not obey orders from the War Department unless transmitted directly to him, which challenged the principles of civilian control of the army.⁶ Wishing to avoid further embarrassment to himself or the administration, Calhoun argued for censure against Jackson and an investigation into the campaign.⁷ In Congress, Henry Clay, already furious about Monroe's conduction of military action without Congressional approval, chastised the president over his subordination to Jackson. "Remember that Greece had her Alexander, Rome her Caesar, England her Cromwell, and France her Bonaparte, and if we would escape the rock on which they split, we must avoid their errors."⁸

The one man who stood firm in Jackson's handling of the Florida crisis was John Quincy Adams. He defended Jackson by arguing that neither the Spanish nor British were controlling their citizens in the region, and the attack on the Seminoles stemmed from a defensive position.

⁵ Harlow Giles Unger, *The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation's Call to Greatness* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2009), 288-290. The campaign into Spanish Florida was made complex through the ambiguity of information between Calhoun, Jackson, and Monroe. The orders issued to Jackson by Calhoun called for him to "adopt the necessary measures to terminate the conflict," which conflicted with Monroe's later statements to not attack the enemy if they were "under a Spanish post." However, Calhoun appears to have not relayed this message, signaling to Jackson that he could use whatever means necessary to win the Seminole War, while providing Monroe plausible deniability.

⁶ Irving H. Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun: A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 99.

⁷ Lynne Hudson Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50.

⁸ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 86.

Adams's defense of Jackson was flimsy at best and he knew it. At no time did Jackson have direct orders allowing for the attack on either the Spanish or British, however, owing to his own beliefs in national security, Adams continued to publically defend Jackson.⁹ For his part, Monroe called on Jackson to relinquish several Spanish holdings and sent Adams to negotiate with the Spanish. Again, Adams showed his prowess as a negotiator by completing the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819.¹⁰ The international crisis in Florida diverges from the Jeffersonian principles of the Revolutionary generation, in regards to presidential power and acceptance of military action, but this was the result of the fractioning that was occurring within the Republican ranks. Adams, just as he defended Jefferson over the Louisiana Purchase, supported Jackson's actions in Florida as it benefited the interests of the nation as a whole. Henry Clay, acting more in line with the Republican ideology of the Revolution, feared Jackson's conduct could set the precedent of an emerging national military power. The people, however, vindicated Jackson and accorded him the treatment of a national hero once again.¹¹ This, if anything else, is more in line with the Jeffersonian belief of popular support. If the people had relieved Jackson of any wrongdoing, the Congress and President should as well.

The second issue to impact the Monroe administration and continue the fracturing of the Republicans before the upcoming 1824 election was the admittance of Missouri into the Union as a slave state. Normally, the admittance of a state to the Union would be considered a celebration, however, by entering the Union with slaves, Missouri could potentially upset the critical balance between the number of free and slave states. Furthermore, amendments were added to the bill granting Missouri's admittance that aimed to halt the future expansion of

⁹ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 50-51.

¹⁰ Unger, *The Last Founding Father*, 295. The Adams-Onís Treaty ceded both East and West Florida to the United States, including claims to the Pacific Northwest, which extended U.S. sovereignty to the Pacific Ocean.

¹¹ Howe, *What Hath God*, 106-107.

slavery in the state.¹² Northern fears of this imbalance were driven, not by moral outrage against slavery, but for its political uncertainty. The three-fifths clause to the Constitution allowed the Southern states a higher Congressional representative number by counting three-fifths of their slave population. This in turn allowed for a Southern dominance in Congress. Federalists had long been angered by this provision to the Constitution; it had previously cost them the election of 1800, and drove them from power.¹³ Now, the Republicans, the only party of substance, faced the same political fallout. It no longer strictly mattered if you were a Federalist or a Republican, it now only mattered if you were supportive of slavery.

Unlike earlier administrations, including Jefferson's, the question over the future expansion of slavery had largely been ignored. For Republicans there was no consensus on the matter. Slavery, over time, became a sectional issue. During the debates in Congress over Missouri's admittance, southern Republicans viewed any opposition as "a desperate power play on behalf of discredited Federalist heresy." Northern Republicans, and Federalists, countered with constitutional arguments over restrictions to the expansion of slavery. Their adherence to Jeffersonian ideology stemmed from the argument of individual rights, as defined by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence and of republican principles in state governments, as guaranteed by the Constitution.¹⁴ As the forces for Missouri's admission without restrictions intensified, so too did the rhetoric. From the most extreme delegates came the most extreme of threats of

¹² Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 223-224. The added amendments were brought forth by House Representative member James Tallmadge, who called for resolutions banning the introduction of slavery in Missouri and freeing all slaves born in that state at the age of twenty-five.

¹³ Howe, *What hath God Wrought*, 69.

¹⁴ Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 224-226. Northern Republican arguments asserted that individual rights, as defined by Thomas Jefferson, were "an authority admitted in all parts of the Union [as] a definition of the basis of republican government." Therefore all people are born free and entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under a republican government. Since the Constitution guaranteed the establishment of republican government the further expansion of slavery would, in the strictest terms, be unconstitutional.

disunion. In response to these threats, New York congressman James Tallmadge, the man responsible for the additional amendments to Missouri's admittance, declared to a threatening Missouri delegate, "Sir, if a dissolution of the Union must take place, let it be so!"¹⁵

Monroe, and his cabinet, did not inject themselves into the debates. The cause of their indifference towards the matter was not over their opinion of slavery—Monroe, Calhoun, and Crawford were themselves slaveholders—but it was Congress, not the president, that has Constitutional jurisdiction over the admission of states.¹⁶ Although they were removed from the matter, each man had his own opinion. Calhoun did not trouble himself over the paradox of slavery and freedom. He believed life, liberty, and equality only applied to white people and the admission of a slave state would not change that fact.¹⁷ Adams, ever the independently minded, confided in his personal diary his anger over the situation. He berated the Southerners as "slave drivers," and Northerners as cowards for succumbing to "the slave-scourging republicanism of the planters." Adams, nonetheless, sided with the eventual compromise for, among other reasons, to ensure the preservation of the Union.¹⁸ Monroe's own feelings and personal conduct on the matter seem to be in accordance to the time. Historian Harry Ammon notes that it would be wrong to judge Monroe on his inaction during the Missouri crisis in comparison to future presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln. Were Monroe to break with tradition and directly interfere over a matter that strictly belonged in Congress, the moderate congressmen would perhaps "adopt extreme positions in order to prove their independence." It is also worth noting that

¹⁵ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 224.

¹⁶ Unger, *The Last Founding Father*, 305-306.

¹⁷ Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*, 218

¹⁸ JQA, *Memoirs*, IV, 305, quoted in William J. Cooper, *The Lost Founding Father: John Quincy Adams and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017) 171.

Monroe's silence during the debate can be attributed to his own upcoming re-election in 1820 and he did not wish to risk any political support.¹⁹

The Missouri crisis ended without violence, civil war, or secession. In Congress, senators and representatives worked behind the scenes to find a compromise. In the end, an amendment proposed by Illinois senator Jesse Thomas called for the unrestricted admission of Missouri and Maine, formerly part of Massachusetts. In addition, an invisible line would divide the remaining land of the Louisiana Purchase at latitude 36° 30'. Slavery would be allowed below the line, while all remaining land, except for Missouri, would be considered free. Henry Clay is commonly regarded as the man responsible for the compromise but as one historian points out, this is erroneous. Clay said very little about the debate publically, and even doubted its future merit.²⁰ It would have been very hypocritical of Clay to involve himself at all. Like Jefferson, Clay could not reconcile his own contradictions on slavery. He despised slavery, yet owned slaves, and he did not believe that ending slavery abruptly would benefit the nation, as immediate emancipation would leave thousands with no place to go or means to survive.²¹ Though not publically choosing a side on the matter, Clay still worked to propose a compromise in order to preserve the Union, and forestall the possibility of state secession.

Just as the War of 1812 destroyed the Federalist Party, the Missouri Compromise further divided the Republicans. The show of southern solidarity in opposition to any limitation of slavery shocked everyone. Republicans in the Northern states began to form oppositional groups in response. The prospect of northern Republicans uniting under any issue, but particularly slavery, worried the aging Thomas Jefferson. Prior to the Missouri crisis, Jeffersonian

¹⁹ Ammon, *James Monroe*, 450-451.

²⁰ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Henry Clay: The Essential America* (New York: Random House, 2010), 147.

²¹ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 90-91.

Republicans were largely united. However, following the decline and fall of the Federalists during the presidencies of Jefferson and Madison, separate factions within the party began to organize themselves, based around individuals, ideologies, and section.²² If these smaller factions emerged as strong, new, independent parties in their own right, based along sectional lines, and advocating sectional concerns, they would threaten the principles that bounded the Republicans together.²³ Although the fight over slavery would continue through the next eleven presidencies, Jefferson described the current political situation on slavery best, writing “we have the wolf by the ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go.”²⁴

Monroe’s second term in office was less satisfying than his first. Differing opinions within the Republican Party over slavery and the size of government started to drive the Era of Good Feelings to an end. Appearing before the House, dressed in a style still fitting for a man of the Revolution, Monroe delivered his seventh annual message as president. The speech, which extended for over two hours, contained a section that defined Monroe’s presidency and the policy of the United States for the coming generations. Carefully crafted by several men, most notably John Quincy Adams, the section pertained to America’s interests in the Western Hemisphere and warned European nations against further colonization.²⁵

The Monroe Doctrine, as it came to be known, empowered the United States as the lone nineteenth-century superpower in the Western Hemisphere and enshrined Monroe’s name to a

²² Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 313.

²³ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 157.

²⁴ “TJ to John Holmes, April 22, 1820.” *FO*.

²⁵ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 111-116. Monroe’s decision to include a new policy change for the United States stemmed from the expansion of Latin and Southern American independence movements, which threatened the return of European influence into the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, the Russian Empire was similarly expanding its influence on the West Coast of North America. The Monroe Doctrine outlined three principles: First, North and South America were not to be considered subjects for colonization by European power. Second, the United States would treat any foreign entanglements in the Western Hemisphere as “dangerous to our peace and safety.” Third, the United States would not intervene in European wars, effectively adopting an isolationist policy.

foreign policy. America was now confident and powerful enough to consider itself able to hold its own ground and maintain a sphere of influence over other nations. Moreover, as noted by historian Daniel Walker Howe, the Monroe Doctrine's effect on the national psychology "marked the moment when Americans no longer faced eastward across the Atlantic and turned to face westward across the continent."²⁶ Although it was Adams's writings and policy ideas that were included in Monroe's speech, Adams's own words reveal his initial apprehension over making the policy public. In an extended entry, Adams reveals his recollection of listening to Monroe practicing his speech to the cabinet. In relation to what would become the Monroe Doctrine, Adams cautioned Monroe over how both the people and the Europeans would react. "It would come upon them like a clap of thunder—There had never been in the History of this Nation a period of so deep calm and tranquility as we now enjoyed. We never were upon the whole in a state of peace so profound and secure with all foreign Nations as at this time—This message would be a summons to arms—To arms against all Europe."²⁷

On the same evening as Monroe's message to Congress, Adams recorded an entry into his personal diary, discussing his feelings on the doctrine's policy with Henry Clay. In his entry, dated December 2, 1823, Adams held firm with the Jeffersonian-Republican ideology over the matter of war and the development of a large army. During their conversation, Clay, according to Adam's entry, believed that the American government "weakened itself and the tone of the Country," by not earlier defending the South American independence movement. Adams explained to Clay that although he believed an American war for South American independence "might be inevitable, and under certain circumstances might be expedient," he feared that

²⁶ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 115.

²⁷ John Quincy Adams, *John Quincy Adams Diaries, 1821-1848*, vol. II, ed. David Waldstreicher (New York: Library of America, 2017), 51.

“placing high interests of different portions of the Union in conflict with each other...imminently [endangered] the Union itself.” Adams goes on to write that Clay then believed a “successful War” would surely create “a military influence, and power, which [Clay] considered as the greatest danger of War.”²⁸

The conversation between Adams and Clay over South American independence could easily just have been a conversation between Jefferson and Madison over America’s relationship with France a generation earlier. The fears of a permanent, large military force in America as the result of a foreign war, no doubt backed by an enlarged federal government, did not sound like a Republican government to either man. Adams, no Francophile himself, nonetheless defended the Republican ideology, writing again in his diary, before Monroe’s speech, “that the Government of the United States was Republican,” and that the “fundamental principles of this Government were...Liberty—Independence—Peace...I could not possibly believe they would give offence to [anyone].”²⁹ Despite his personal worries, Adams publically rejoiced at Monroe’s speech, knowing full well that his contribution would serve him well politically in the years to come.

The campaign to elect the next president began as most do—during the start of the current president’s term. The 1824 presidential election is unique for several reasons. All the candidates, of which there were five, referred to themselves as Republicans. Three of the candidates—John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, and William Crawford—currently held cabinet positions in Monroe’s administration. It was the first election to not feature a prominent Virginian candidate, nor was it an election that promoted a candidate that directly helped create

²⁸ JQA, “November 21, 1823,” *Diaries*, II, 54.

²⁹ JQA, “November 27, 1823,” *Diaries*, II, 53.

the United States. Each candidate hailed from a different region of the country, representing the growing sectional divide. The election is also memorable for its result. For the first time in the nation's history, the leading candidate in both the popular and the electoral vote, would not be rewarded the presidency. Most importantly, the men of the 1824 election were the children of the Revolution not the fathers. Although the candidates believed that they each embodied the spirit of the Jeffersonian philosophy of republicanism, the election would, ironically, lead to the breakup of the party as defined by region, class, and political philosophy.³⁰

Although the end result of the election would clearly define where the Republican Party divided along issues, the very appearance of such a wide array of candidates already confirmed this. Representing the North and East was John Quincy Adams, and his credentials spoke for themselves. Adams was the son of a Founding Father and former president, a public service representative to Berlin and the Netherlands, a member of the Senate, a minister to Russia, a commissioner at the Ghent treaty negotiations, and a Secretary of State, who forged lasting alliances and agreements with foreign countries.³¹ Adams danced between reluctance and ambition over the presidency. Historian James Traub notes that Republicanism, to Adams, meant self-abnegation. He was known for not actively lobbying for himself. Prior to his nomination, his constant wavering between ambition and rejection earned him the accusation of adopting what became known as "The Macbeth Policy."³²

³⁰ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 203.

³¹ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 240-241.

³² James Traub, *John Quincy Adams: Militant Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 270-271. The Macbeth Policy was coined by John Quincy Adams himself, referring to it in a letter to a friend, who first accused Adams of wavering like the Shakespearean titular character. In the play, Macbeth states, "If chance will have me king, why chance will crown me/Without my stir." In response to his friend's reference of Macbeth, Adams observed that had Macbeth adhered to his own advice, there would have been no tragedy.

The two other secretaries of Monroe's cabinet, John C. Calhoun and William Crawford, represented the Southern interests, albeit under different ideologies. Crawford, whose campaign rested largely on the appeal of state sovereignty and a return to the virtues of Old Republicanism, won the endorsements of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. By contrast, Calhoun was an animated supporter of an emerging Republican nationalism. In response to Adams's representation of the Eastern candidate, Henry Clay, the current Speaker of the House, and fellow embracer of Republican nationalism, fashioned himself the candidate of the West.³³

The lone standout in the campaign was Andrew Jackson. Unlike the other candidates, Jackson was looked upon as a military hero and not a politician. His two advantages going into the campaign proved as much. Historian Robert Remini, a Jackson enthusiast, argues that unlike the other candidates, the general benefited from the admiration of local militia units that existed in virtually every community and state. Men in these units could identify with Jackson, based on their shared military experiences. The second advantage Jackson had, according to Remini, was that he could relate to the Revolutionary War. Although his contribution to the war was small, and he certainly did not directly influence the nation's creation, Jackson, unlike his competitors, could at least claim his participation.³⁴ Regardless of these advantages, his other, darker history was not forgotten. His well-known reputation among Easterners was as a "hot headed frontier outlaw." To others, he was the model of a republican statesman, a self made man with the common touch. Still, Jackson possessed so many unfit qualities for the presidency that anyone

³³ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 204.

³⁴ Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 75.

with an education of the classics would characterize him as a potential demagogue or tyrant. The word “caesarism” would represent the danger of his candidacy.³⁵

Prior to the 1824 election an unofficial caucus of Republican congressmen nominated the presidential candidate. During the last presidency, where no other prominent party existed, the Republicans simply rallied behind James Monroe. Although Crawford seemed to be the favored candidate under this method, the remaining candidates, all nominated by their state legislatures, boycotted the caucus, arguing that the method only chose a candidate out of self-interest and was not reflective of the national public opinion.³⁶ Although a caucus did take place, Crawford was in no position to be present. He suffered a serious stroke that left him temporarily speechless, paralyzed, and partially blind. Regardless of his condition, his supporters gambled on his recovery and dutifully voted for him in the caucus. Although Crawford received sixty-four votes from the sixty-eight members who came to the caucus, 193 members were absent, holding to the boycott.³⁷ By no means would Crawford be nominated for the presidency outright.

A campaign was therefore underway, still containing an original field of five candidates. There were more ominous signs of trouble from the beginning. In a short period of time, John C. Calhoun realized that he had not the national standing or political backing to continue his run for the White House. In short order, he removed himself from the running and instead lobbied, and received, the endorsement of Jackson and Adams for the Vice-Presidential ticket, believing one

³⁵ Harry L. Watson, *Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 78-79; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 205.

³⁶ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 74; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 206.

³⁷ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 57; Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 83.

of them would win.³⁸ The campaign itself was shrouded in confusion. All the candidates were referring to themselves as Republicans and the rightful successor of James Monroe. What did they stand for? What made them different from one another? What was the election of 1824 about? In a 1925 article, historian Everett S. Brown argued that due to the lack of opposing political parties in 1824, the “basis of selection of candidates was therefore personal rather than political.”³⁹ In a direct rebuke of Brown’s claims, historian Paul C. Nagel, forty years later, argued that there were, in fact, serious issues during the campaign. Referring to a national sampling of newspapers, Nagel proves that issues ranging from slavery, tariffs, and internal improvements overwhelmed the voting public. The additional concern over sectional divide was also prevalent in the campaign, leaving one Boston journalist to note, “In this part of the country thus far it is very evident that the *sectional* has prevailed over the *national* feeling.”⁴⁰

Jackson’s campaign worked harder than any of his opponents. His managers narrowly promoted Jackson’s national appeal to the electorate. He needed to be seen a man who could unite the divisions within the country and the Republican Party. His removal from events surrounding Monroe’s administration, except for his military victories, made this possible. His name recognition and outsider status could only benefit him. Furthermore, Jackson remained vague on many issues during the campaign. Needing the approval of both Southern and Northern states, Jackson often straddled issues, such as tariffs, which afforded him the ability to

³⁸ Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*, 119-120. Calhoun did not have the political standing or organizational support from the South when compared to William Crawford. Unable to break down Crawford’s supporters, Calhoun was determined to downplay his competition to Andrew Jackson, going so far as to use his position as Secretary of War to keep Jackson’s favorite officers in the army.

³⁹ Everett S. Brown, “The Presidential Election of 1824-1825,” *Political Science Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (Sep., 1925): 384. Accessed August 8, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2142211>.

⁴⁰ Paul C. Nagel, “The Election of 1824: A Reconsideration Based on Newspaper Opinion,” *The Journal of Southern History* 26, no. 3 (August 1960): 316. Accessed August 8, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2204522>.

not take positions that favored one state or section over the other, and it largely worked.⁴¹

Jackson's campaign also invited mass participation from the populace to put on parades and rallies to invigorate the electorate. His surge in popularity puzzled the Old Republicans, such as Thomas Jefferson, who "could not grasp the appeal of the violent, passionate Old Hickory."⁴²

Jefferson may have considered Jackson "a dangerous man" but his supporters fostered his image as the only man capable of saving the republic. In a series of letters written anonymously by Jackson supporter John Eaton, and subsequently reprinted together in the newspapers, Jackson was literarily deified. Readers were reminded that Jackson "was of the Revolution," and that he fought "in the cause of freedom." He was "the last of those valiant establishers of the liberty of our Republic, who can succeed to the highest office known to our Constitution." The thematic accomplishment of the *Wyoming Letters* was an example of how Jackson spurred on his base of supporters. His rhetoric on liberty and virtue were meant to inspire the real world feelings of the American people.⁴³

Adams, in contrast to Jackson's campaign style, remained in the background. Although it was customary for the time that candidates not actively campaign for themselves, Adams took on an almost aloof role. As Fred Kaplan describes in his biography on Adams, the presidential candidate maintained that "since 1800 the contest for the presidency had become a take-no-prisoners killing field inseparable from the gridlocked nastiness of Congress and the divisions that threatened the union. Although he saw no easy way out of this madness, he believed he could best serve his country by providing an example of fairness, moral values, cooperation, and

⁴¹ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 80-81.

⁴² Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 248.

⁴³ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 76-78. Collectively, the anonymous letters sent by John Eaton were referred to as *The Letters of Wyoming* and reasserted the ideology of republicanism, highlighting the struggle between liberty and power. Jackson was the central figure of the *Letters*, marked as the man who would successfully restore the balance of power that favored the people.

nonpartisanship in government.”⁴⁴ The struggle between ambition and self-discipline—the Macbeth Policy—continued throughout Adams’s campaign until the very end. The only time he would publically engage would be in instances to clear his name of lies against his reputation. Lies and accusations of corruption were a favored tactic to be used against political opponents, particularly those in cabinet posts.⁴⁵ During the campaign season, Adams recalled in his memoirs, that “every liar and calumniator in the country was at work day and night to destroy my character...run down my reputation...defame and disgrace me.”⁴⁶

The results of the election were completed in early December. Regardless of the issues and conduct involved in the campaign, the returns on the popular vote are striking. Voting rights, at least for white men, had expanded exponentially through each presidential administration. By the 1828 election, nearly all states achieved near-universal male suffrage. Although the expansion of voting rights would allow for the increase of voter turnout between 1824 and 1828, the current election did not demonstrate this.⁴⁷ Despite Jackson’s plurality in both the electoral and popular vote, evidence shows that the voter turnout of the 1824 election was considerably less in comparison to local elections. Parsons provides examples in *The Birth of Modern Politics* to emphasize this point. In Ohio, only 35 percent of eligible voters voted for the presidency, whereas 53 percent voted for the governorship two weeks earlier. In Kentucky, twenty-three thousand voted for the presidency compared to sixty-five thousand for the governor. The candidates’ own states were not exempt from low turnout. In Jackson’s Tennessee, voter turnout was less than 27 percent.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Fred Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams: American Visionary* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 376.

⁴⁵ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 79.

⁴⁶ JQA, *Memoirs*, quoted in Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 232.

⁴⁷ Meacham, *American Lion*, 43. The voter turnout increased from 27 percent in 1824 to 57 percent in 1828.

⁴⁸ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 99-100.

John C. Calhoun handily won the position of Vice-President, however, no other candidate won the required majority for the presidency. Jackson received 99 electoral votes, carrying the majority of the South and several Middle states. Adams came in second with 84 electoral votes, the majority of which came from New England and New York. Crawford split the South with Jackson, receiving 41 electoral votes. Rounding out the candidates in fourth place was Clay, finishing with 37 electoral votes, taken mostly from the Western states. Although Jackson acquired the most electoral votes and held a plurality of the popular count—152,901—he did not earn the required 131 electoral votes to become president. The decision, in accordance to the Twelfth Amendment, would be made in the House of Representatives, where a delegation from each state would cast one vote for the top three eligible contenders.⁴⁹ The winner needed a majority in the House and the rules did not require that the state delegates support the favored candidate of their state’s voters.⁵⁰

The three qualifying candidates were Jackson, Adams, and Crawford, whom despite his stroke still had support. As he received the highest votes in all categories, Jackson was understandably optimistic about his chances in securing a majority in the House. However, the candidate that did not earn enough votes for the House procedure, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, now found himself in the position of kingmaker. Clay could not fathom an Andrew Jackson presidency. Like Jefferson, he believed that Jackson did not have the temperament or intellect for such a position. In a letter to Francis Preston Blair, Clay made clear his concerns about a Jackson victory in the House. He referred to Jackson as a “Military Chieftain,” and acknowledged, “I cannot believe that killing 2,500 Englishman at New Orleans qualifies for the

⁴⁹ US Constitution, amend. 12. See Appendix B for full Amendment text.

⁵⁰ Paul C. Nagel, *John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, a Private Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 291.

various, difficult, and complicated duties of the Chief Magistracy.”⁵¹ Clay immediately set out to ensure an Adams’s victory. Leaving Jackson aside, and despite their personal differences in character and temper, Clay had good reason to support Adams. Both men were nationalists and believed in the “American System.” Clay also considered an alliance with Adams beneficial, as it would be a “blending of eastern and western political interests that would promote national unity.”⁵²

On February 9, 1825, the House voted for the president. Each state delegation would award a single vote towards one of the three qualifying candidates. Before the election even occurred, Washington had become rife with speculation and political intrigue. Word of how the state delegates would vote became public every day. One of the most notable was the state of Kentucky, home of Henry Clay. In January, the state legislature passed a resolution overwhelmingly supporting Jackson for the presidency. However, it was soon announced that the state’s House delegation would vote for Adams. Clay had delivered his state. The Jackson camp was furious and days before the House convened for the vote, accusations of a “corrupt bargain” between Adams and Clay were printed in the newspapers. The alleged “bargain” between Clay and Adams was that in return for delivering the House votes to Adams, Clay would be awarded secretary of state.⁵³

A critical detail over how the alliance between Adams and Clay came about has been debated among historians. The motivation for Clay to seek out an Adams victory is simple enough to understand, as his hatred for Jackson was well known, as were his policy similarities

⁵¹ “HC to Francis Preston Blair, January 29, 1825,” quoted in Unger, *Henry Clay*, 111.

⁵² Unger, *Henry Clay*, 112. The American System was an economic system developed by Henry Clay, which promoted, among other policies, federally funded internal improvements, the reestablishment of a national bank, and the establishment of protective tariffs to spur manufacturing.

⁵³ Traub, *John Quincy Adams*, 307-308.

to Adams. The question of whether or not Clay was rewarded specifically for his actions, and had prior knowledge of such rewards by ensuring victory, became another matter entirely. Exactly one month before the House voted, Henry Clay visited with Adams at his home in Washington. Adams recorded the evening in his personal diary. This single entry is the only direct link to the possibility of a deal being struck between both men. In his account, Adams describes Clay coming to his home, engaging “in a long Conversation explanatory of the past, and prospective of the future.” Clay described how he was being “applied”—lobbied—by friends of Crawford “in a manner so gross that it had disgusted him.” Adams leaves open the possibility of a gentleman’s agreement without stating as much. Describing Clay as having asked for “some principles of great public importance,” Adams does not offer his response in the diary, but rather concludes their conversation by stating that Clay “had no hesitation in saying that his preference would be for me.”⁵⁴

Clay’s preference for Adams was proven by not just the delivery of Kentucky, but also Ohio and Missouri. On the first ballot, the House of Representatives elected John Quincy Adams the sixth president of the United States. “May the blessing of God rest upon the event of this day,” Adams recorded in his diary.⁵⁵ Equally enthralled at the news of Adams’s election was his father. Writing to his son several days later, the elder John Adams could not conceal his pride. “Never did I feel so much solemnity as upon this occasion...May the blessing of God Almighty continue to protect you to the end of your life as it has heretofore protected you in so remarkable a manner from your cradle.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ JQA, “January 9, 1825,” *Diaries*, II, 86.

⁵⁵ JQA, “February 9, 1825,” *Diaries*, II, 92.

⁵⁶ “JA to JQA, February 18, 1825.” *FO*.

There was nothing that the Jacksonian camp could do following the House's decision. Regardless of the means, the election was legal, carried out by the procedure of the Twelfth Amendment, and unchangeable. The resulting effect of this election would carry dire consequences for the United States. The conduct of Adams and Clay before the election also further contributed to the schism in the Republican Party. Their gentlemen's agreement had violated the strict standards of republican morality. Like Jefferson, Adams, for all his principle, finally surrendered his Macbeth Policy and allowed ambition to overcome his republican beliefs for what he conceived to be was in the best interests of the nation. The Adams who fought to ensure the people's right to consent in the Louisiana Purchase would never have agreed to Clay's promise of Kentucky, where he received not one popular vote.⁵⁷ Following the results of the House vote, Andrew Jackson put on a brave face in public. In private he was enraged. Attending a social gathering, hosted by President Monroe, Jackson appeared jovial when meeting with Adams and both men engaged in polite conversation. The momentary peace would soon end, however, when five days later it was made public that Adams offered Clay the post of secretary of state. Allegations and rumors were now a reality. "So you see," thundered Jackson, "the Judas of the West has closed the contract and will receive the thirty pieces of silver. His end will be the same. Was there ever witnessed such a bare faced corruption in any country before?"⁵⁸

It would seem odd that neither Clay nor Adams could see the potential fallout of such a union. Surely Clay was committing political suicide by accepting Adams's proposal. However, it is entirely possible that there was simply no way around the issue. It was no secret that Clay

⁵⁷ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 81-82; Traub, *John Quincy Adams*, 306.

⁵⁸ "AJ to William Lewis, February 14, 1825." *AJP*.

coveted the secretary position and harbored feelings of becoming president, since the days of the Monroe administration. He was well versed in political acumen, and a proven Republican nationalist, who believed strongly in Adams's proposals for economic and internal improvements under the "American System." For all the talk of corruption and wanting of political intrigue, Clay was quite simply the man for the job, regardless of any political sway he could muster during the election. The supposed "corrupt bargain" between Adams and Clay has been exposed for its over-exaggeration in recent literature. Harlow Giles Unger, in his biography of Henry Clay, defends the supposed bargain by pointing out that Adams did nothing other than what his predecessors had done. The previous five presidents, including Adams, had all served as Secretary of State, as a reward for their support of the president. Daniel Walker Howe considers the alliance between both men as "quite logical," as they shared similar political beliefs. Jon Meacham, in *American Lion*, doubts the existence of a bargain at all, and believes that Adams's selection of Clay simply made the most political sense, due to their similarities in foreign and domestic policies.⁵⁹

Historian Robert Remini, though conceding that there is not direct evidence of a "corrupt bargain," is one of the only historians to more broadly discuss Adams's other supposed bad behavior. In a short biography on Adams, Remini describes several examples of political favors endorsed by Adams before the House election, while omitting any wrongdoing from the Jacksonian camp. However, in his biography on Jackson, Remini alludes to the probability that Jackson would have surely rewarded Clay with a higher office position had he delivered the necessary votes to the general.⁶⁰ Whether or not the Adams-Clay alliance was built on

⁵⁹ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 117; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 209; Meacham, *American Lion*, 45

⁶⁰ Robert Remini, *John Quincy Adams* (New York: Times Books, 2002), 71-72; Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 86.

corruption or good intentions, what began next was, in the words of one historian, “the longest, bitterest, ugliest campaign in America political history.” Before Adams was even inaugurated the *Nashville Gazette*, in Jackson’s hometown, declared him a candidate for the 1828 election.⁶¹

The election of 1824 signaled the beginning of the end for the Jeffersonian Republicans. Although Adams and his Republican allies won the presidency and seemingly stopped an unfit candidate, the political cost resulted in a Pyrrhic victory. The outcome of the election ended the nonparty politics and directly contributed to the emergence of a two-party system. The alliance between Adams and Clay would form the basis of the National Republican Party in coming years, and the Whig Party after it, while Jackson and his supporters would reorganize the remaining Republican factions into the Democratic Party.⁶² The slow establishment of a two-party system would favor Jackson’s rhetoric. The people would have two rival candidates to choose from, each more likely selected for their popularity among the populace. No longer could the political leaders in the states neglect the popular opinion and choose the candidate of their choice.⁶³ A wave of populism consumed the electorate. The American people felt that they were robbed of their hero by a small group of corrupt and entitled men. The public uproar rallied behind Jackson and against Adams, opposing him at every turn, under the justification that they, not Adams, were protecting the republic and the rights of the people.⁶⁴

The opposition against Adams, without doubt, stemmed from the “corrupt bargain.” It is not because Adams and Clay met in secret to strike a deal—a “pointless topic” of argument according the Robert Remini—but rather because the presidency was given to Adams in open

⁶¹ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 389.

⁶² Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 210.

⁶³ Charles S. Sydnor, “The One-Party Period of American History,” *The American Historical Review* 51, no. 3 (April, 1946): 448-449. Accessed July 8, 2018. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1840108>.

⁶⁴ Cooper, *The Lost Founding Father*, 222.

defiance of the popular will.⁶⁵ On this point, Jackson and his allies were able to control the political spin. Jackson was convinced that the “will of the people” had been ignored and that “republican liberty could survive only if the power of the people was expanded.”⁶⁶ For this to be possible, he would need to run for president again. His steadfast belief in the importance of the people’s will dominating over the powerful, with himself as the “chief interpreter and enactor of that will,” would be the driving force of Jackson after 1824 and well into his own presidency.⁶⁷

Despite the ensuing controversy and negativity aimed at Adams, not all despaired at his election. Just days before Adams wrote to his son to congratulate him on his victory, Thomas Jefferson composed a letter himself. Writing to John Adams during their famous reconciliation, the still staunchly republican Jefferson congratulated his Federalist friend on his son’s victory. “It must excite ineffable feelings in the breast of a father to have lived to see a son to whose [education] and happiness his life has been devoted so eminently distinguished by the voice of his country.” Jefferson’s kind and encouraging words notwithstanding, he miscalculated the younger Adams’s future with his usual optimism. “I am persuaded there will be as immediate an acquiescence in the will of the majority as if Mr. Adams had been the choice of every man. The scribblers in newspaper may for a while express their [disappointment] in angry squibs, but these will evaporate without influence.”⁶⁸ Events encompassing the days, months, and years of Adams’s administration would prove Jefferson’s prediction wrong.

⁶⁵ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 98.

⁶⁶ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 83.

⁶⁷ Meacham, *American Lion*, 46.

⁶⁸ “TJ to JA, February 15, 1825.” *FO*.

Chapter 4: A Denied Presidency and a Reborn Campaign

John Quincy Adams was sworn in as the sixth president of the United States on March 4, 1825, the only son of a former president to do so, until George W. Bush 176 years later. The fifty-eight year old Adams did not sleep much the night before. As he gleefully describes in his diary, he was settling matters at the State Department, greeting “multitudes of visitors,” caring for his wife, who had become ill with fever, and making final corrections to his inaugural address.¹ As he made his way to the Capitol, and finally to the House chamber, Adams addressed his audience, outlining the successes of his predecessor and his hopes for the future. Adams chose his words carefully, albeit, at times ironically. Regarding the institution of the American republic and system of government Adams declared that “Our political creed is, without a dissenting voice that can be heard, that the will of the people is the source and the happiness of the people the end of all legitimate government upon earth; that the best security for the beneficence and the best guaranty against the abuse of power consists in the freedom, the purity, and the frequency of popular elections.”² Considering the means of which the previous election was decided, Adams’s remarks about the “will of the people” and “popular elections” were quite daring, particularly to the Jackson crowd.

One of the most striking parts of Adams’s inaugural address was his plan for uniting the country through an extensive public works project. Though born in America, Adams had spent much of his life in Europe, and witnessed the great architectural achievements of many countries. “The magnificence and splendor of their public works are among the imperishable glories of the

¹ John Quincy Adams, *John Quincy Adams Diaries, 1821-1848*, vol. II, ed. David Waldstreicher (New York: Library of America, 2017), 97.

² John Quincy Adams, “Inaugural Address of John Quincy Adams,” March 4, 1825. *The Avalon Project*. Accessed June 11, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/qadams.asp

ancient republics,” explained Adams. “The roads and aqueducts of Rome have been the admiration of all.” Adams wished to bring America the same admiration. In Adams’s mind, the creation of an elaborate system of roads, canals, and aqueducts to unite the states would benefit the country economically, politically, and even militarily. However, many in Congress, the Jacksonians more than others, recognized only Adams’s “clear intention of assuming powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.”³ To secure Congress’s blessing and to disavow fears of an overreaching federal government, Adams reminded his audience that twenty-years had passed since the federally constructed National Road, a request which originally went “unquestioned” and proved to benefit all.⁴

Regardless of Adams’s invocation of prior presidents and their uses of executive and federal power for the good of the country, the mood in Washington was now different. Aside from the nationalist Republican wing of the party, many in Congress shuddered at the thought of Adams’s proposals. In December of 1825, Adams submitted his plans to Congress, and their fears were realized. Proposing sweeping reforms in nearly every area, Adams’s message to Congress encouraged the federal funding of a national university, support for the sciences, and the creation of America’s first observatory, to compete with the one-hundred and thirty “light-houses of the skies” that already existed in Europe. What infuriated some of the more conservative members of the Congress was Adams’s suggestion that government not be “palsied by the will of our constituents.”⁵ Within the context of his message, Adams meant that for all its

³ Harlow Giles Unger, *John Quincy Adams* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2012), 240. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution addresses the structural order of federalism in the United States. Powers not directly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution were to be reserved by the states.

⁴ JQA, “Inaugural Address of John Quincy Adams,” March 4, 1825.

⁵ John Quincy Adams, “First Annual Message,” December 6, 1825. *The American Presidency Project*. Accessed August 11, 2018. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29467>.

resources and will, the United States should by no means fall behind the advancements being made in other countries. However, just his opponents believed his call for internal improvements was a means to empower the central government, the anti-Adams coalition, remembering the “corrupt bargain,” interpreted his words as a mockery of the meaning of government and the people.⁶ To have an American president, already accused of robbing the American people of their choice in leadership, now seemingly suggesting to elected officials to dismiss their will entirely, reinforced the opposition’s beliefs.

The members of Congress involved in the opposition, at this time, still referred to themselves as Republicans. Before the end of Adams’s administration many would join the growing Democratic-Republican faction led by Andrew Jackson and his allies. For most in the Republican Party, their dissatisfaction related to their fear that Adams’s program of improving the country would lead to a bloated, overtaxed government. They worried that Adams, like Hamilton, would join the “monied interest,” which would tax and exploit the farmer class until republican independence would be reduced to a post-republican dependence. High taxes and an overstuffed government infrastructure would undoubtedly lead to corruption, where “Greed would triumph, virtue would fail, and republican society would perish.”⁷ Clearly, Adams did not intend for such an outcome. He was a republican, but also a nationalist. The economic programs

⁶ William J. Cooper, *The Lost Founding Father: John Quincy Adams and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017), 227.

⁷ Harry Watson, *Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 84.

that he encouraged under a central government were intended to diversify the economy, not corrupt it.⁸

The presidency of John Quincy Adams is regarded as inconsequential, at best. At its worst, it is quite possibly the most miserable presidential term in American history. His four years in the White House saw little advancement in policy, weakened heavily by what Harlow Giles Unger describes as Adams's naivety in refusing to participate in government patronage, which resulted in a "government bureaucracy that, for the most part, worked to undermine both his policies and his chances of winning a second term."⁹ This truly was the oddity of Adams, and lends further credence to questioning his ability to be a politician rather than a statesman. Republican morality warned against the use of patronage as it surely bred corruption, but resourceful politicians relied on it to some extent to ensure their administration ran smoothly. However, Adams followed the principle of morality and bent over backward to reward his enemies and punish his friends, regardless of the political blowback. Without adequate support in government agencies, and little congressional support to pursue his goals, the president and Congress were at a "virtual deadlock" for the rest of his term.¹⁰

Further compounding the administration was the unrelenting charges of the "corrupt bargain," both in the press and in the Capitol. The level of vitriolic attacks incensed Henry Clay so much that he challenged Senator John Randolph of Virginia, one of the most vocal

⁸ Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 283-284. In one example of how Adams' economic program intended to improve the nation, it was his wish that by making a diversified economy, particularly in the border states, there would be less of a reliance on slave-grown exports. In exchange, the border states would then evolve into a mixture of farming, industry, and commerce, thereby limiting the need for slavery. Opposition to these programs came largely from the southern planter class, whom could not grapple find compatibility with Adams' vision of the future.

⁹ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 243.

¹⁰ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 85-86. One of the major failings of the Adams presidency was his inability to manage his own administration in a pragmatic way. Watson notes that "Adams would never fire anyone—even a Cabinet secretary—except for official misconduct, and political opposition never counted as misconduct."

congressional fire-eaters, to a duel. Normally duels were a means to end public and personal feuds. For Clay and Randolph, their antagonism would continue well after Jackson's own presidential election.¹¹ Threats of duels, obstructionist tactics in Congress by Jackson's supporters, and constant attacks in the press severely crippled the president. He became depressed, noticeably lost weight, and reduced his schedule to daily walks, Bible readings, dinners, and poetry. He refused to campaign for his proposals, falsely believing that their merit alone would garner the attention of the voter. In short, Adams realized that in the face of such opposition, he had become politically impotent.¹²

The troubled politics of Washington were not the only contributors to Adams's depression. Two years into his presidency, on July 4, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of America's independence, John Adams passed away in Massachusetts. In a miraculous twist of fate, Thomas Jefferson also died just hours before John Adams. The president was en route to visit his ailing father when he received word of his death. In his diary, he paid homage to his beloved father writing, "He had served to great and useful purpose his Nation, his Age, and his God... For myself all that I dare to ask is that I may live the remnant of my days in a manner worthy of him from whom I came."¹³ Later, upon reaching the Adams's hometown of Quincy, the president again felt the pain of his loss. Entering his father's bedroom, now empty of his presence, but not his memory, Adams recalled that the "moment was inexpressibly painful, and struck me as if it

¹¹ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Henry Clay: The Essential America* (New York: Random House, 2010), 196-199. The duel between Clay and Randolph resulted from an insulting speech by Randolph on the Senate floor, where he accused both Clay and Adams of cheating in the previous election. Clay, to defend his honor, challenged Randolph to a duel. On April 7, 1826, both men fired two shots and left the grounds unharmed. The Jacksonian press capitalized on the duel between the secretary of state and a sitting senator of Congress and caused the Adams' administration much embarrassment.

¹² Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 247-250.

¹³ JQA, "July 9, 1826," *Diaries*, II, 131.

had been an arrow to the heart. My father and mother have departed. The charm which has always made this house to me an abode of enchantment is dissolved.”¹⁴

The situation in Washington grew even dimmer for Adams in 1827. To distinguish themselves from the opposition in Congress, supporters of the administration began to refer to themselves as National Republicans. Conversely, those in the Jackson camp called themselves Democratic-Republicans, or simply Democrats. As with the schism between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans of Jefferson’s day, both sides did not immediately appear to be separate political parties, but rather disgruntled factions within the overall Republican Party. Just as the Federalists did, the National Republicans refused to acknowledge the emergence of partisanship, but there was no use in denying the reality. Jackson and his followers, which by this time even involved Vice-President John C. Calhoun, saw themselves as the legitimate Jeffersonian Republicans.¹⁵ Calhoun’s shift in allegiance came swiftly during the Adams presidency. It must be remembered that during the 1824 election, Calhoun nominated himself for the Vice-Presidency and appeared on both the Adams and Jackson ticket to ensure his own victory. Allegations of the “corrupt bargain” were enough for Calhoun to believe that both the president and his newly rewarded secretary of state had seemed to “violate basic republican values.”¹⁶

The Vice-President was not the only new recruit for the emerging Democrats. Much of the organization was made possible by Senator Martin Van Buren of New York. Originally a backer of William Crawford’s campaign in 1824, Van Buren, nicknamed the Little Magician, began to reorganize old party divisions under a Jackson banner to preserve “republicanism from

¹⁴ JQA, “July 13, 1826,” *Diaries*, II, 132.

¹⁵ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 275.

¹⁶ Irving H. Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun: A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 127.

its enemies.”¹⁷ Van Buren’s intellect and strength as a political strategist was deeply underestimated by his opponents. In a letter to his friend, Thomas Ritchie, Van Buren summed up his vision of the Democratic Party as one that unified “the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North.” He understood that the older republican policies of strict construction to the Constitution appealed to the worries of those suspicious of government intrusion, as well as the fears of Southern slaveholders, who were concerned that an activist government might work against their interests.¹⁸ In this regard, Van Buren and his fellow Democrats were very much in line with the Jeffersonian ideology of limited government and could easily advocate as much to the American voter.

To consolidate the necessary coalition, Van Buren met with, and easily convinced, Calhoun and coaxed the remaining Crawford supporters over to Jackson’s camp. Like James Madison, Van Buren believed in the inevitability and benefits of political parties and his grand strategy involved creating a political power base between New York and Virginia, which in effect, mirrored the political alliance that existed in Jefferson’s presidency and gave the Republicans a stronghold in Congress and the White House. If the alliance was successful and a new national party emerged, one that could now defy sectional lines and bind Northerners and Southerners over similar issues, neither section of the country could rally enough support against an opposing party in the future.¹⁹ The first political test for the newly emerging Democrats came in the 1826 midterm elections, which resulted in a clear victory for the Democrats. Prior to the Democratic takeover, the opposition in Congress was merely able to obstruct and harass

¹⁷ Lynne Hudson Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 125. Martin Van Buren’s nickname, the Little Magician, came to reference his small stature but seemingly great power of persuasion.

¹⁸ “Martin Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie, January 13, 1827,” quoted in Howe, *What God Hath Wrought*, 489.

¹⁹ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 87-88.

Adams's programs, but now they could openly pursue an agenda on their own. The situation was such that Jeffersonian Democrat John Tyler of Virginia described the majority's power as one that "constitutes in fact the *administration*."²⁰

Although achieving a majority in Congress and essentially eliminating President Adams from fulfilling his vision as outlined in his 1825 Annual Message to Congress, the Democratic Party was still battling sectional issues. The most contentious issue was the tariff. Regardless of party affiliation, sectionalism defined the United States economy, predicated on the institution of slavery in the South or the industrialized market of the North. Debates raged over which products and regions deserved tariff protection. The Northern region contained many Jackson sympathizers, but also appreciated the advantages of commercial development. Those in the Middle States also wanted tariff protections from imports, as they faced competition from abroad. Many Southerners believed, however, that the North was gaining economic favor by receiving protective rates at the expense of southern cotton production.²¹

In Congress, Van Buren demonstrated how government intervention could manipulate the economy for political gain. In a shrewd gamble, Van Buren and his supporters took control of the administration's tariff initiative and reshaped it to provide benefits for the regions that Jackson sought to carry in the upcoming presidential election, while simultaneously disregarding the effects on the Southern states. Van Buren's decision to disregard the interests of southern states, in order to carry favor with states that were considered in-play for the upcoming election, rested simply on the idea that the South would never vote for Adams. Southerners revolted

²⁰ James Traub, *John Quincy Adams: Militant Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 361.

²¹ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 88; Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 136.

against the tariff proposal, labeling it the “Tariff of Abominations.”²² Adams, who remained absent from the tariff fight, signed the bill into law. The political effects were predictable once again for Adams. He did not involve himself in the debate over the tariff, owing to the standards of the day, which expected the presidents to not openly influence legislation.²³ However, this only played against him. By not involving himself in the debate, Adams not only failed to capitalize on the division within the Democratic Party, but he failed to make the tariff itself a campaign issue.²⁴

The South blamed Adams, not Van Buren, for the tariff’s passage. There would be a cost to be paid, however, in the coming years. As a native South Carolinian, Vice-President Calhoun objected to the tariff. So enraged by its passage, Calhoun anonymously wrote the publication *The South Carolina Exposition and Protest*, which for the first time argued the merits of “nullification.”²⁵ Biographer Irving Bartlett writes that according to Calhoun, “the tariff threatened to destroy the Republic because it was an example of unchecked majority power, and republican government could never coexist with irresponsible power.” What Calhoun fundamentally argued was no different than what Jefferson and Madison argued in 1798, but where Calhoun differed was in the process of how an aggrieved state could act. Unlike Jefferson and Madison, who advocated that states argue through their legislature, Calhoun argued that it be done through a state convention, which would determine whether or not a certain law was unconstitutional. Although setting the stage for a future showdown between the states and the

²² Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 274-275.

²³ Taub, *John Quincy Adams*, 369. Andrew Jackson also did not publically involve himself in the debate over the Tariff of Abominations. Unlike Adams, however, Jackson was not criticized and could even offer a sense of deniability over how he would have voted for the tariff.

²⁴ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 158

²⁵ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 158. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison first expressed the theory of nullification in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions as the right of a state to nullify a federal law it deemed to be unconstitutional. Their argument was in response to John Adams’ passage of the Sedition Acts.

federal government, Calhoun nonetheless called for restraint, believing that a likely Jackson victory would result in the “complete restoration of the pure principles of our Government.”²⁶ With the tariff debate momentarily settled, but far from being a future problem, all eyes now turned to the 1828 presidential election.

In the words of one historian, “The election of 1828 proved a pivotal one; it marked the end of one kind of politics and the beginning of another.”²⁷ Indeed, the 1828 election was nothing like the chaotic election that came before it. Unlike what happened in 1824, there would be no disputed winner at the end of the election. The incumbent president was fighting to keep his seat rather than retire. The field was no longer crowded with multiple candidates, each representing a specific part of the country, and there was no longer a single, faction-laden political party, where its leaders were fighting for supremacy. Voter turnout would also increase in this election. Unlike the considerably low turnout of 1824, participation in the 1828 presidential election increased dramatically, aided by near universal male suffrage, an accomplishment that historian Sean Wilentz claims led to the collapse of the “politics of deference still left over from the Revolutionary era.”²⁸ However, unlike the 1824 election, the campaign conducted in 1828 was not based on policy or direction, even compared to the little that existed in 1824, but rather the personality of the candidates. This was the first true competition between Adams and Jackson, as no other candidate existed to siphon away votes, and their record in public service, as well as their personal lives, were laid bare for all to see.

Methods behind the 1828 election are revolutionary in their own right. As described by Lynn Hudson Parsons, there were “more meetings, more broadsides, more pamphlets, and more

²⁶ Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*, 150-152.

²⁷ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 283.

²⁸ Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 310.

books than ever before. Propaganda became the means for not only advocating a cause but mobilizing for it as well.”²⁹ Jackson partisans used newspapers, organized town, county and district conventions, mass meetings, parades, and barbecues to grab the voter’s attention. Speeches, banners, songs, and party emblems made clear the positions of the candidates and the importance of the election’s contest.³⁰ To get the word out during the campaign, and putting a face to the candidates, their likenesses were affixed to plates, snuff boxes, and combs. Medals were struck, to be worn as symbols, and early attempts at polling were taken at public functions, such as weddings and militia musters. Due to the long history of both candidates, the first uses of what could be called “opposition research” were also raised.³¹ The intensity and inclusion of the campaign in society was such that Adams recorded in his diary that “It is so in every part of the Union. A stranger would think that the People of the United States have no other occupation than electioneering.”³²

Though the presidential campaign has become notorious for its focus on personality rather than issues, administrative Republicans did attempt to define their platform. The Adams administration and their supporters endorsed economic modernization, primarily through their improvement program.³³ Adams had a long, fulfilling career as a senator, ambassador, peace negotiator, secretary of state, and president. And yet, these accomplishments would not register with the electorate. The brutal reminders of the “corrupt bargain” made by the Democratic political machine throughout his presidency seemingly destroyed his entire political career, rendering his successes moot. The Democrats, however, chose to emphasize the persona of

²⁹ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 160.

³⁰ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 90.

³¹ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 161-163.

³² JQA, “August 5, 1828,” *Diaries*, II, 187.

³³ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 276.

Jackson. To an extent, the Democrats had little choice but to propagate Jackson's military heroics. Aside from his well-known military career, Jackson had very little political success of note that the Democrats could refer to—he never completed a single term in Congress and voted for no bill that made a significant difference when he was there.

Before the character debate of the campaign took place, Jackson supporters did try to establish a platform. Just as he did in 1824, Jackson took flexible positions on key issues so as not to upset the newly formed coalition. On tariffs he remained middle-of-the-road, effectively leaving every region to believe that he supported them economically. On internal improvements, he supported a federal surplus of funds to the states, but stopped short of endorsing projects that were national in scope. Overall, Jackson advocated for “reforms,” a broad theme with little specifics.³⁴ The one consistent message throughout the campaign was the rhetoric of the Democratic Party, which praised “the people as good and wise and capable of self-rule.” Jackson himself contributed to the rhetoric, emphasizing that once he became president he would “purify the departments” by removing corrupt agents, who received their positions through “political considerations or against the will of the people.” Reducing the size of government, and purging the corrupted officials who ran it, would restore republican rule in his view.³⁵

The prospect of a campaign built on issues diminished rather quickly with the application of partisan newspapers. Jackson's opponents attacked his lack of political experience, his temper, and his history of violence. Since Jackson himself campaigned on his war record,

³⁴ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 301-302. Wilentz identifies the idea of “reform” into two levels of meaning. In one respect, “reform” meant the undoing of the corruption in government that led to the “corrupt bargain.” Proposals by Jackson and his supporters ranged from limiting the presidency to a single term, denying positions in the cabinet to officials who held presidential ambitions, and banning the president from appointing congressmen to civil posts. The second level of “reform” ambiguously encouraged the return to Jeffersonian principles by halting what was viewed as neo-Federalism, masked under the American System.

³⁵ Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 116-117.

supporters of the administration decided to attack it. The most notorious reference to Jackson's military career, and violent past, was the aptly named "coffin handbill," created by Republican editor John Binns. Beneath the title "Some Account of some of the Bloody Deeds of General Jackson," lay a silhouette of six dark black coffins.³⁶ The coffins themselves represent six soldiers, whom were executed under Jackson's orders during the Creek War of 1813, after inciting a mutiny over their terms of service. Anti-Jacksonians continuously pushed the portrayal of what H.W. Brands calls a "vindictive monster, a despot who crushed the innocent beneath his boot heel."³⁷ Henry Clay and his supporters would periodically attack Jackson for being a "Military Chieftain" and reminded the public of his duels, in which he killed a man.³⁸ It should be noted that most of the allegations against Jackson's behavior were true. He was a brawler and a duelist. On more than one occasion he threatened sitting members of Congress and administration officials, including Henry Clay. He was not classically educated, nor well traveled, and despite his best attempts at trying to maintain the image of a Jeffersonian candidate, Jefferson himself had long criticized his presidential aspirations in apocalyptic terms. During the 1824 election, Jefferson remarked in an interview that Jackson's popularity was "evidence that the Republic would not last long."³⁹

The most serious charge against Jackson regarded his own marriage. Jackson's marriage to his wife Rachel was a point of sensitivity for both husband and wife. The controversy surrounding their marriage was that their union was born during Rachel's previous marriage.

³⁶ John Binns, *Some account of some of the bloody deeds of General Jackson*. Illustration. 1828. From Library of Congress Rare Book and Special Collections Division. Accessed August 16, 2018.

<https://www.loc.gov/item/2008661734/>. See Appendix D, Figure 1 for full illustration.

³⁷ H.W. Brands, *Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 398.

³⁸ Harlow Giles Unger, *Henry Clay: America's Greatest Statesman* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2015), 111; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 277.

³⁹ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 397.

Though Rachel's marriage to her first husband was for all practical purposes forfeit, Jackson mistakenly believed that her husband obtained a divorce when they married. Two years later, it was revealed that her first husband only petitioned for a divorce, thereby leaving Jackson technically married to a married woman.⁴⁰ Although all was made right, and the matter largely forgotten, it would unfortunately become a campaign issue in 1828. Adams's partisans resurrected the irregularities of the Jackson marriage. In some accounts, Rachel was cast as an adulteress, in others, a whore. One newspaper's commentator even likened her to a "dirty, black wench!"⁴¹ Even Jackson's deceased mother received criticism. An ally of Adams printed that Elizabeth Jackson was a prostitute, who married a mulatto man, with whom she had several children, including Jackson.⁴² These attacks are undoubtedly the low point of the campaign, and although there is no evidence that Adams himself encouraged the rancor from his side, he is nonetheless, guilty of not doing enough to stop it. Historian Fred Kaplan even suggests that Adams chose not to stop such vicious circulations as a reprisal to the unending editorial attacks on his own administration by the Jackson forces.⁴³

The Jackson camp was no less vindictive in their assaults on the incumbent president. Although many of the attacks against the character of Jackson were true, many of the accusations against Adams were less substantiated. One accusation charged the president with purchasing a billiards table for the White House with public funds. Another, more ludicrous charge, insinuated that while he was ambassador to Russia he provided a young American girl to the Tsar.⁴⁴ Like Jackson, Adams's immediate family was not removed from the political fray. In

⁴⁰ Jon Meacham, *American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2008), 22.

⁴¹ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 401.

⁴² Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 143-144.

⁴³ Fred Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams: American Visionary* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 427.

⁴⁴ Unger, *John Quincy Adams*, 254; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 279.

April of 1828, while delivering government papers for his father, a pro-Jackson newspaperman physically assaulted Adams's son John in the Capitol building.⁴⁵ The dignity and respectability that both candidates should have aspired to were rapidly evaporating, and yet, Jackson was still gaining momentum. No matter how best the candidates presented themselves or their opponents, Adams could not escape the charges of corruption, but Jackson was able to change his image "from a potential Caesar to a potential saviour."⁴⁶

The election results of 1828 would not resemble those of 1824, either electorally or by the plurality. Jackson handily defeated Adams, garnering an electoral margin of 178 to 83, while garnering 56 percent of the popular vote, a margin of victory that would not be surpassed for the remainder of the nineteenth century.⁴⁷ Adams was understandably depressed, writing in his diary, "The Sun of my political life sets in the deepest gloom."⁴⁸ Just like his father, Adams would not succeed in achieving a second term as president. And, just like his father, Adams would leave the White House as a man seemingly unloved by all. "I go into it [retirement] with a combination of parties, and of public men, against my character and reputation such as I believe never before was exhibited against any man since this Union existed."⁴⁹ Adams may have craved such a release from the presidency. He could leave the presidency and retire to the life of a quiet farmer, or perhaps, a local attorney. However, his Republican principles would never fully release him from serving his country. When asked of his plans following his departure from the presidency, Adams responded, "my intention was absolute and total retirement, but my principle would be what it had been through life. I should seek no public

⁴⁵ Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams*, 428.

⁴⁶ Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, 163.

⁴⁷ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 309.

⁴⁸ JQA, "December 3, 1828," *Diaries*, II, 188.

⁴⁹ JQA, "February 28, 1829," *Diaries*, II, 193.

employment in any form, directly or indirectly. It was not for me to foresee whether my Services would ever be desired by my fellow Citizens again. If they should call for them, while I have life and health, I shall not hold myself at Liberty to decline repairing to any Station which they may assign to me.”⁵⁰

Jackson, too, was left with heartbreak following the election. On December 18, Rachel suffered an apparent heart attack while at the Jackson home and died several days later. Jackson was beside himself with despair, but still ever the one with a temper, soon focused his anger on those he believed responsible. The abuse inflicted on his wife’s name, and their marriage, noticeably took a toll on Rachel. Jackson believed that her death was of his opponent’s doing. In keeping with his fiery temper and threatening wit, Jackson spoke the fateful words. During his wife’s eulogy, Jackson announced “I can forgive all who have wronged me, but will have fervently to pray that I may have grace to enable me to forget or forgive any enemy who has ever maligned that blessed one who is now safe from all suffering and sorry, whom they tried to put to shame for my sake.”⁵¹ Just as Adams deliberately referenced Shakespeare for his Macbeth Policy, Jackson now stumbled into sounding like Macduff, who in lamenting the loss of his family, realized that “they were all struck for thee! Naught that I am, not for their own demerits, but for mine, fell slaughter on their souls. Heaven rest them now.”⁵²

For all the sadness, vitriolic language, and tactics for what would become the modern methods of presidential campaigning, the election of 1828 was really about the identity of the Republican Party. Both Adams and Jackson campaigned on the belief that each man represented the Jeffersonian principles of governing the nation. Adams fulfilled several aspects of the

⁵⁰ JQA, “December 11, 1828,” *Diaries*, II, 189.

⁵¹ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 154.

⁵² William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), Act IV, Scene 3, 155.

Jeffersonian legacy. He embodied what Sean Wilentz described as a devotion to “intellectual excellence, rationality, and government by the most talented and virtuous.”⁵³ However, Jackson, too, saw himself as a figure of Jeffersonian principle. To Jackson, a Jeffersonian-Republican was one who believed in states’ rights, limited government, and the rights and will of the citizenry.⁵⁴ What made the distinctions difficult in practice is Jefferson himself. The man in whom Adams and Jackson admired, and whose legacy they contested, did not always keep to his own beliefs.

As is always the case in politics, there is the philosophical and the practical, the theory and the practice. One could easily fault Jefferson for breaking his beliefs in how he handled the Louisiana Purchase. For the good of the country he made a decision that expanded the power of the executive and the federal government, a decision grossly at odds with his own ideology. To this end Adams can find common ground with his federally backed programs of improvement. For the good of the nation, Adams recognized that government could be used to make the lives of all Americans better. However, Jackson could easily involve himself with the philosophical and theoretical attributes of Jefferson’s legacy by invoking the virtues of democracy, for supporting the farmer class, and ending the corruption in politics. His election appealed to republican nostalgia, but his ambiguity towards issues of government would soon challenge the principles of the executive office and defy even the Founding Fathers’ fears of an aristocratic leader.⁵⁵

⁵³ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 307.

⁵⁴ Meacham, *American Lion*, 48.

⁵⁵ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 95.

Chapter 5: Jackson's Presidency and the Death of Jefferson's Revolution

The winter cold had ceased on March 4, 1829, and gave way to “warm and Spring-like” weather when Andrew Jackson was sworn in as the seventh president of the United States. As the general attended his inauguration, the outgoing president, now living in the Washington neighborhood of Meridian Hill, wrote despondently in his diary. “I can scarcely realize my Situation,” Adams recorded.¹ The loss of the presidency had shocked him. Despite all of his desires and wishes for the betterment of his countrymen, the people rejected him in favor of a man he considered unfit for the office. Yet, for all of his sorrow in losing the presidency, Adams resolved himself to the future's possibilities. “I shall be restored to private life and left to an old age of retirement, though certainly not of repose,” he wrote in his diary.² Adams was incorrect about his retirement, but not of his repose. Within two years he would return to politics and undertake a crusade against the slave order of the South. As the only former president in America's history to do so, Adams was elected to the House of Representatives, becoming a champion of the abolitionist movement, and a hero in the North, prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. But for now, the once apostate Federalist was now a rejected president, and he returned to his family's home in Quincy, Massachusetts.

As one president departed from Washington another was sworn in. Andrew Jackson, just short of his sixty-second birthday, exited from the Capitol building to appear before an inaugural crowd of upwards to fifteen thousand people.³ Among the crowd was the famous Washington socialite Margaret Bayard Smith, who would describe the grandeur of the day in a letter to a

¹ John Quincy Adams, *John Quincy Adams Diaries, 1821-1848*, vol. II, ed. David Waldstreicher (New York: Library of America, 2017), 197.

² JQA, “February 28, 1829,” *Diaries*, II, 193.

³ H.W. Brands, *Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 409.

friend. “Thousands and thousands of people, without distinction of rank, collected in an immense mass round the Capitol...It was grand—it was sublime!” She goes on to write that following Jackson’s speech and recitation of the oath of office from John Marshall, “The President took [the Bible] from his hands, pressed his lips to it, laid in reverently down, then bowed again to the people—Yes, to the people in all their majesty.”⁴ The importance of the people was undoubtedly part of Jackson’s message. In his considerably short and vague inaugural address, Jackson humbled himself to the crowd below. Speaking of the “arduous duties” that were entrusted to him by the “choice of a free people,” Jackson briefly outlined what he called “the principles of action.”⁵ Despite its lack of specifics, Jackson’s speech clearly offers insight to how he viewed the powers of the president. Although all presidents indulge in how they will use their power to serve the people’s best interests, Jackson’s dominant concentration on the use of power signified his attachment to it.

Considering how history would unfold during his eight years in office, the issues raised in his inaugural speech could be taken as insincere. Referencing the balance of power and the administration of laws between the legislative and executive branches of government, Jackson stated that he would “keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent of the Executive power trusting thereby to discharge the functions of my office without transcending its authority.” For policies reflecting the relationship between the United States and Native American tribes, it was Jackson’s desire to have a “just and liberal policy,” that gave “humane and considerate attention to their rights and their wants.” In a section devoted to the preservation of militia forces within America, Jackson uttered a line that was worthy of Thomas Jefferson.

⁴ Margaret Bayard Smith, *The First Forty Years of Washington Society*, ed. by Gaillard Hunt (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906), 290-291. Accessed August 9, 2018. <https://archive.org/details/firstfortyyears00huntgoog>

⁵ Andrew Jackson, “First Inaugural Address of Andrew Jackson,” March 4, 1829. *The Avalon Project*. Accessed August 19, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jackson1.asp

“As long as our Government is administered for the good of the people, and is regulated by their will; as long as it secures to us the rights of person and of property, liberty of conscience and of the press, it will be worth defending.”⁶

What is missing from the inauguration is perhaps most telling. Unlike the prolonged inaugural speeches of men like Jefferson, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, Jackson included no references to the past accomplishments of America. For all of the rhetoric during the campaign, there is not a single reference to the Founding Fathers, the struggles of America, or the previous administration. Where Jefferson and Adams made a call for political unity, after emerging from contentious elections with divided factions, Jackson extended no such hand for peace. There were no incredible specifics for any issue that he raised, or a clear generational vision to achieve. It did not matter to most in the crowd. The Democrats under Jackson now controlled the government and his speech, in the words of one Democratic newspaper, embodied “the pure spirit of republicanism of the Jefferson school.”⁷

But how much of a Thomas Jefferson would an Andrew Jackson become? His presidency was undoubtedly consequential, like Jefferson, and led to one of the most transformational periods in American history. Within his first term in office, Jackson would come to redefine the presidency and set multiple precedents for future generations of American presidents to build upon. Although Jackson and his followers were now called Democrats, they considered themselves the true successors to the Republicans of the Jeffersonian era. However, the means in which this was accomplished seems to fly in the face of everything Jefferson stood for in regards to the role of president. As stated before, due to Jefferson’s own inability to

⁶ AJ, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1829.

⁷ *Telegraph*, March 5, 1829, quoted in Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832*, vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 176.

remain true to his own principles in the face of national opportunity, there was a Republican precedent set for a perceived overuse of power, when it served national interests. In this respect, Jackson would engage his power to the fullest, using what one historian calls, his “profoundly authoritarian instincts,” to accomplish his political agenda.⁸ This is the true difference between Jackson and Jefferson. For all his rabble rousing against the Federalists in his own day, or his concentrated rhetoric on returning power to the people, and advocating for limited government, Jefferson was never seriously threatened as a Caesar, or dictator of any sort. Jackson, however, would constantly battle his authoritarian tendencies as president while still advocating for a democratic society.

The contrasting reactions to Jackson’s inauguration were symbolic in themselves. At the sight of crowds gathering in front of the Capitol, Francis Scott Key, proclaimed that “It is beautiful, it is sublime!”⁹ The sheer size of the crowd, the distinction between class, race, and region, surely suggested a sense of unity for the country. “It was the People’s day,” wrote Margaret Smith, “and the People’s President and the People would rule.”¹⁰ Following Jackson’s speech, however, a different scene took place at the White House. Since Jefferson’s election, there had always been a public reception held at the presidential mansion on Inauguration Day. It was a chance for local Washingtonians to greet the president and offer their congratulations.¹¹ However, the large, diverse crowd that gathered at the Capitol had now followed the president home and engaged in the worst behavior to ever grace the White House. Hundreds had forced their way through the front doors, filling the entire first floor, trampling over waiters bringing

⁸ Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 328.

⁹ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 173.

¹⁰ Smith, *The First Forty Years of Washington Society*, 296.

¹¹ H.W. Brands, *Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 411.

drinks, breaking thousands of dollars worth of fine china and glassware, and standing on expensive furniture with muddied boots.¹² Within the ruckus, Margaret Smith observed how this mob of well-wishers nearly killed Jackson as he entered the pandemonium. “The President, after having been literally nearly pressed to death and almost suffocated and torn to pieces by the people in their eagerness to shake hands with Old Hickory, had retreated through the back way or south front and had escaped to his lodgings at Gadsby’s.” It was certainly a scene that troubled many. By her own admittance, Margaret Smith stated that the “Majesty of the People had disappeared.”¹³ In their place, emerged what associate justice of the Supreme Court Joseph Story coined as “the reign of King Mob.”¹⁴

Andrew Jackson’s interest in concentrating his power began at the very start of his election. Many believed that due to his inexperience in politics a strong-willed cabinet could easily manipulate him. However, with the exception of selecting Martin Van Buren as his secretary of state, Jackson chose to surround himself with loyal, yet ordinary, and in some cases, undistinguished men, who would not dominate over him.¹⁵ The selection of such men allowed the president to still operate from a position of power, where oppositional voices could not interfere. The reveal of the cabinet frightened men like John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, who were appalled by the lack of experience of each man. Unlike the qualified and idealistic cabinets of future presidents, such as the team of rivals that would encompass Abraham

¹² Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 177-178.

¹³ Smith, “*The First Forty Years of Washington Society*,” 295.

¹⁴ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 412-413.

¹⁵ Harry L. Watson, *Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 99-100. With the exception of Martin Van Buren at State and John C. Calhoun as Vice-President, Jackson selected what he called “plain, business men” for his cabinet. For the Treasury Department he appointed Samuel Ingham of Pennsylvania, who had mixed views on tariffs. John Branch and John MacPherson Berrien, both wealthy Southern planters, were appointed Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General respectively. William T. Barry, a Jackson loyalist led the Post Office. John Eaton, a close personal friend of Jackson, was appointed as Secretary of War. Eaton’s appointment was crucial for Jackson as both men held identical views on Native Americans, and it was the duty of the Secretary of War to handle Indian affairs.

Lincoln's cabinet, the brain trust of Franklin Roosevelt's, or the best and the brightest of John F. Kennedy's, Jackson's cabinet was made up of lesser men. Martin Van Buren had no foreign experience to speak of, Calhoun already showed his willingness to change political sides when it suited him, and the other cabinet members were Jackson loyalists, who all hailed from the South. What also stood out to Adams was the nonexistent representation of the New England states.¹⁶ Whereas James Monroe and Adams made symbolic strides to connect the country through their cabinet selections, Jackson clearly did not share their concerns over sectional representation.

Andrew Jackson's conflicting views towards leadership and government would confound his administration's supporters, and his critics. Throughout both of his terms, Jackson routinely alternated between making enemies and friends depending on the political issue at hand. However, the one constant theme throughout his presidency revolved around the issue of power. Unlike earlier presidential administrations, and in particular John Quincy Adams', Jackson took a considerably aggressive approach to governing the country. This was to be expected from a man like Jackson. In comparison to most of his predecessors, Jackson was first and foremost a military leader and accustomed to command. He naturally enjoyed power, he felt comfortable having it, and undoubtedly grew weary when faced with the possibility of losing it. This put him at odds with the legacies of his predecessors, including George Washington, who despite a long career as a military hero, never reached for additional powers. Historian Daniel Walker Howe wonderfully sums up Jackson's attitude towards his use of presidential power by stating, "Although Andrew Jackson defended his own authority with resolute determination, he did not

¹⁶ Fred Kaplan, *John Quincy Adams: American Visionary* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 435.

manifest a general respect for the authority of the law when it got in the way of the policies he chose to pursue.”¹⁷

The overuse of executive authority that came to dominate the Jackson presidency, and fulfill the Jeffersonian fears of a presidential autocracy, ended the era of Revolutionary politics in America. Although Jackson fashioned himself as the continuation of Jefferson republicanism, it is important to remember the general principles of a Jeffersonian ideology. The Republicans of Jefferson’s day believed in low taxes, relief from oppressive debts, the dominance of state power, the end of standing armies, strict interpretation of the Constitution, and most importantly, the limitation of power from a central government.¹⁸ Historian Jon Meacham asserts that Jackson took Jefferson’s views on these matters a step further. Meacham states that Jackson “saw that liberty required security, that freedom required order, that the well-being of the parts of the Union required that the whole remain intact. If he felt a temporary resort to autocracy was necessary to preserve democracy, Jackson would not hesitate.”¹⁹ The insistence on autocracy is where Jefferson and Jackson split in ideology. The entire concept of an authoritarian leader, using his powers in such an unabashed manner as Jackson, would horrify a Jeffersonian.²⁰

Although Jefferson and Jackson may have seen eye to eye on issues concerning Native American relations, the expansion of democratic principles in general, or the abusive power of the Bank of the United States, the means in which Jackson used his power would have certainly given a true Jeffersonian Republican pause. Several times throughout his presidency, Jackson

¹⁷ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 411.

¹⁸ Gordon Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 277.

¹⁹ Jon Meacham, *American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2008), 48.

²⁰ Jon Meacham, *Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power* (New York: Random House, 2012), 362. Meacham describes Jefferson’s governing style as one in which he preferred to use power without “being showy about it.” He includes a brief dialogue between Napoleon and a French traveler to articulate the point. Napoleon asks the traveler “What sort of government is that of the U.S.?” to which the traveler replies “One, Sire, that is neither seen or felt.”

overstepped the traditional norms that reigned in presidential power in order to assert his will. Unlike the presidencies of Madison, Monroe and Adams, where the president was expected to essentially bow to the legislative powers, Jackson's assertiveness would serve as an inspiration to future activist presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. It should be noted that for each president that has been accused of autocratic, or even imperial tendencies, their tenures typically occurred during unique periods in American history. Whether defined by war, economic hardship, or social and civil issues, the presidents that took the initiative over the traditional norms, like Jackson, would receive both praise and animosity in their own time, constantly questioned over whether their use of power violated the limitations of the executive branch as defined by the Constitution.

The first major "reform" that Jackson pursued was the sweeping expulsion of federal officeholders from the previous administration. The replacement of officeholders was not a new concept before or after Jackson, however the basis of their removal differed from that of previous presidents, such as John Quincy Adams. In the previous administration, Adams, against his own interests, attempted to put federal patronage on a meritorious basis, regardless of political affiliation. But now the political landscape was divided between two distinct political parties. Jackson wished to fulfill his campaign promise by ending corruption in government, and he believed that the best way to accomplish this was to remove all opposition. The replacement of Adams's appointees with political loyalists was so evident, that even pro-Jackson journalist Amos Kendall conceded the hypocrisy. In light of the recent actions it became clear to Kendall

that the Jackson administration was simply “availing themselves of the very abuses with which we charge our adversaries.”²¹

On the surface, this would appear as if one administration was simply removing the influence of the other. It was common and expected in American politics. Even Thomas Jefferson, in his attempts to replace Federalists with Republicans, participated in the practice. The speed and extent of the removals under Jackson, however, are what stand out. He dismissed more officeholders than all of his predecessors.²² Jackson also viewed the removal of officeholders as a fulfillment of the people’s wishes. He campaigned on removing corruption from politics, and now having won the presidency, believed that he received his mandate to do so from the people. He referred to his removals as simply “rotation” and it was necessary in order to “perpetuate our liberty.”²³ Jackson believed that long tenures in government bred corruption, so it was only natural to remove and replace such appointees. Moreover, under the pretext of democratic principles, Jackson wished to destroy the notion that a small elite possessed the necessary skills to hold public office. He wanted to ventilate and democratize the executive branch, and simplify the official duties of government so that “men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance.”²⁴

Although some of this logic is justifiable, and is indeed still used today, Jackson quickly found that rotation meant nothing if the replacements were themselves corrupted. For every scandal that followed, Jackson’s opponents charged that his program of “reform” was nothing

²¹ “Amos Kendall to Francis P. Blair, February 14, 1829,” quoted in Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 331.

²² Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 333. Howe offers figures on the Jackson removals to emphasize the scope of his “reforms.” Unlike Thomas Jefferson, Jackson did not only appoint favorable allies to positions in government, but also dismissed 919 federal officials, or about 10 percent of all government employees in his first year alone.

²³ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 190.

²⁴ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 103; Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 315.

short of corruption itself.²⁵ In fact, the “spoils system,” as it came to be called, only worsened the government’s ability to perform its duties. The rapid turnover of positions throughout the bureaucracies only led to incompetence and a loss of prestige in public service that would not recover until after the Civil War.²⁶ Furthermore, although there is definitive evidence that corruption took place throughout the different bureaucracies of the government, its extent was not equivalent to the level of Jacksonian replacements, therefore, the rhetoric of corruption was more significant than the actual practice.²⁷

Were the rotations really about protecting the purity of the government and the removal of widespread corruption? Historian Robert Remini vigorously defends the actions of Andrew Jackson by detailing how the multiple examples of bribery, kickbacks, and conflict of interests found in previous administrations were undone.²⁸ However, Daniel Walker Howe reveals another aspect of the rotation. Although conceding that corruption did take place within the government, Walker asserts that the removals were politically motivated, with many of the charges being fabricated as justification. Additionally, he points to the fact that many removals in specific areas, such as the Post Office, occurred in the Northeast, where a Jacksonian powerbase did not yet fully exist. The mail service in the region was already efficient and in no need of a managerial change.²⁹

²⁵ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 102. In one such example of corruption, Jackson awarded Samuel Swartwout, a political ally, the collectorship of the port of New York. Swartwout later absconded to England after stealing \$1.2 million in public funds. The scandal was a clear example of how Jackson’s appointment of political loyalists over virtue and merit endangered the government’s ability to operate successfully.

²⁶ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 191; Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 333-334.

²⁷ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 104.

²⁸ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 199. Remini defends Jackson by arguing that despite the scandals in his own administration, the decision to begin a process of rotation improved the working conditions of the many bureaucracies and departments within the government by ridding them of incompetent and corrupt employees.

²⁹ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 333.

Jackson's use of rotation was justifiable to his supporters, however, by placing partisan loyalists in those same positions, and thereby making them more likely to be answerable to the president alone, makes his position on corruption nothing short of hypocritical. However, this was the beginning of a new era in America politics. With the emergence of political parties, based in ideological differences, the standard for holding public office became less about merit and more about party affiliation. For all the pomp and circumstances seen at the president's inauguration that led to the appearance of national unity, the reality was quite different. Under a Jackson presidency, nearly everything in America became a divisive, partisan issue.

The concept of office rotation was only the first major "reform" to take place in the new American democracy. At all times, Jackson used the concept of majority rule to justify his actions. Believing himself to be the sole representative of the majority, Jackson still argued that federal powers must be exercised, regardless of the people's objections.³⁰ Under this pretext, Andrew Jackson, using the people's mandate, but for his own benefit, exercised and cultivated presidential power at levels unseen in earlier administrations. The threats to America had considerably changed since the days of the early republic. Since the conclusion of hostilities against Britain in 1815, America did not face an immediate threat from a foreign power and would not engage in a declared war until 1846, nearly ten years after Jackson's presidency. Yet, Jackson managed to expand the power of the presidency in ways not seen since the days of George Washington. One of the most significant internal threats in Jackson's mind during his first term was the continued existence of Native American tribes inhabiting land within the states east of the Mississippi River. Although earlier administrations acknowledged the need to seek

³⁰ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 98.

either compromise or relocation with many of the tribes, Jackson was the first president to take the broad step in addressing the issue head on.

Imbedded in his First Annual Message to Congress, Jackson argued that the United States had long followed a policy of voluntary assimilation towards the Native American tribes “in the hope of gradually reclaiming them from a wandering life.”³¹ Now, he believed that the labors made by the United States did not merit a continuation of such efforts. No president before Jackson had such an intimate experience with the Native Americans. He fought against many tribes in his military career and negotiated numerous treaties, albeit in bad faith, as he viewed any such treaties with tribes as “an absurdity.”³² Now, a conflict was brewing in the states of Georgia and Alabama, where local Cherokee and Creek tribes argued their autonomy over state law. At first the tribes appealed to Jackson for protection, however, he countered by arguing that the Constitution did not allow for the creation of states within states.³³ He then recommended the alternative, that land be given west of the Mississippi River, “to be guaranteed to the Indian tribes as long as they shall occupy it,” and that the “emigration should be voluntary.” However, behind his proposal, Jackson made clear the alternative to his alternative. For any member of the tribes that remained in the states, “they must be subject to their [state] laws.”³⁴

The situation grew more desperate for the tribes in Georgia, as none of them intended to give up their ancestral homelands. Looking to solidify his support in the South, Jackson rushed through Congress legislation known as the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Following Jackson’s

³¹ Andrew Jackson, “First Annual Message to Congress,” December 8, 1829. *The American President Project*. Accessed August 22, 2018. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29471>

³² Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 435; Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 107. Jackson’s views on the absurdity of signing treaties, according to Watson, was his belief that the tribes were not sovereign nations, as they claimed, but rather “subjects to the United States,” and privately believed that Congress and the states had the right to seize any lands at their pleasure.

³³ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 435-436.

³⁴ AJ, “First Annual Message to Congress,” December 8, 1829.

move, the state of Georgia passed the Cherokee Acts, which revoked Cherokee citizenship, voided their laws, and divided over nine million acres of their land into state counties.³⁵ The Supreme Court, still under the guidance of the Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall, intervened and declared in *Worcester v. Georgia* that Georgia's state law over the Cherokee was unconstitutional.³⁶ However, this put the Cherokee in an awkward position. They were not of the nation, but remained within it, and surrounded by a hostile white population.

Despite the ruling, the Supreme Court had no means of enforcing its decision, effectively leaving the Cherokee defenseless. Jackson, upon hearing the ruling, wrote that the "decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate."³⁷ To that end, Jackson effectively abandoned the tribe's call for protection in favor of Georgia's efforts to expel them from their land. Jackson could have taken the initiative and intervened, in order to enforce Marshall's decision of protection, but this would have involved the raising and sending of federal troops to Georgia to fight against any white threat. Due to the "racist realities of the time," Jackson would never have consented to such action.³⁸ Furthermore, the removal of the Cherokee, as well as other Native American tribes, would benefit America's vision of expanding into the western frontier. As this was a concept embraced by many Americans through the nationalist spirit of expansion, there was little opposition to be seen.

Jackson's attack against the Native American tribes would reverberate throughout future

³⁵ Harlow Giles Unger, *Henry Clay: America's Greatest Statesman* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2015), 154.

³⁶ Joel Richard Paul, *Without Precedent: Chief Justice John Marshall and His Times* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2018), 419-423. The case of *Worcester v. Georgia* centered on the arrest of northern missionaries Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler by Georgian authorities. Both men were arrested while residing on Cherokee land without a having obtained a state license or swearing an oath of allegiance to the state of Georgia, which violated an 1830 Georgia statute. Worcester's conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court where, speaking for the majority, Chief Justice John Marshall, ruled in favor of Worcester and cited that he was to be released, as the state of Georgia had no rights over tribal land.

³⁷ "AJ to John Coffee, April 7, 1832." *AJP*.

³⁸ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 492.

presidential administrations, and influence the expansion of prejudicial legislation against vulnerable minority groups, such as the passage of the Chinese Restriction Act in the late nineteenth century.³⁹

The interaction between Georgia, the Cherokee, Jackson, and the Supreme Court, are significant for several reasons. John Marshall's decision in *Worcester v. Georgia* emboldened both state right's activists and Jackson, albeit for different reasons. In effect, the court's decision retained the right of the federal government over the sovereignty of the state, which Georgia rejected. By standing against the court and siding with Georgia's resistance, Jackson appeared to support nullification, even if he never directly spoke of it. However, Jackson's support for Georgia was contingent on his policy of Indian removal.⁴⁰ He wanted to relocate the Indian tribes across the Mississippi River and the resistance made by Georgia offered him that opportunity. By doing so, however, Jackson emboldened southern nullifiers, convincing them that their cause was just, and perhaps supported by the president. The *Worcester* case worried many of the old National Republicans, who came to see the reemergence of nullification as the present threat to the Union. "The old vice of Confederacies is pressing upon us," John Quincy Adams recorded in his diary. "Whenever a state does set itself in defiance against the Laws or power of the Union, they are prostrated. This is what the states having Indian Tribes within their

³⁹ Heather Cox Richardson, *To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 119. The Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 was passed by a Democratic controlled Congress and prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers to avoid competition with white workers. As Richardson notes, the act "rejected the Republican theory of economic harmony and enshrined the idea of class competition in American laws."

⁴⁰ Merrill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 214.

limits are now doing with impunity, and all the powers of the General Government for protection of the Indians, or the execution of the Treaties with them are nullified.”⁴¹

Even if Jackson did not formally assert his position as a state right’s supporter, his actions following the *Worcester* decision were still troubling. As noted by historian Joel Paul, this was the first time that a president of the United States refused to enforce a decision of the Supreme Court. More frightening was Jackson’s belief that the decisions of the Supreme Court—a branch of the government, part of the checks and balance system, established by the Constitution—could not bind the executive branch. His resentment of the court’s decision may have also stemmed from his personal dislike of the Chief Justice, who according to Jackson was a Federalist who had stolen the authority of the states and empowered the federal government for the last thirty years.⁴² The prolonged tenure of Marshall further convinced Jackson that his earlier proposals of reform should include the termination of lifetime appointments for federal judges, and subject them to popular election, rather than by presidential appointment.⁴³

The question of whether or not Jackson did support the views of state right’s advocates was further expanded by his handling of South Carolina’s objections to the enactment of new tariffs. Still angered by the passage of the Tariff of Abominations in 1828, the South Carolinian legislature, encouraged by Georgia’s recent show of force against the federal government, passed the Ordinance of Nullification, which declared the 1828 tariff “null, void, and no law, nor binding.” In the months to come, the state legislature would also introduce provisions detailing

⁴¹ JQA, “March 12, 1831,” *Diaries*, II, 260.

⁴² Paul, *Without Precedent*, 423; Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 489-491.

⁴³ Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*, 315. Although Jackson never initiated any of the proposals that affected term limits, his aim was to rein in control of the executive branch of government. Jackson believed that many executive officeholders should be restricted to four-year terms, and the presidents themselves should only serve one term that lasted between four to six years, while federal judges would be restricted to seven years and democratically elected. Congressional term limits were not addressed, as Jackson believed that the voters could punish any charges of corruption against a sitting congressman.

that any government power attempting to collect any state money would be just cause for secession.⁴⁴ Much of South Carolina's logic for passing the Ordinance of Nullification was rooted in early Republican theory. Building off of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, and John C. Calhoun's Exposition and Protest of 1828, South Carolina believed they had a constitutional right to declare a federal law unconstitutional and not follow it.

The oddity in South Carolina's assertion that nullification would benefit the nation rested on the belief that it offered an oppressed minority—South Carolina—relief, without the need for secession. Although the emphasis on this point may have been reckoned on the state level it ran counter to the Jacksonian doctrine of majority rule at the national level, and although Jackson sided with Georgia in the *Worcester* case, he could not now allow South Carolina to break federal law and risking the loss of a state from the Union.⁴⁵ “Jackson was a Unionist first and last,” writes H.W. Brands.⁴⁶ His commitment to preserving the Union meant the continuation of his authority. The threats coming from South Carolina also resurrected long debated issues not reckoned with since the formation of the Republic. Was the United States perpetually bound by the Constitution where the federal government truly reigned supreme, or had the states voluntarily subjected themselves to the Union, and could therefore voluntarily leave? Jackson's views on this were clear. In what has become one of the most famous scenes in Washington political history, during a celebration honoring the birth of Thomas Jefferson, Jackson prepared a ceremonial toast and announced, “Our Federal Union—it must be preserved.” The act of defiance that came next would have long repercussions for the next generation. Vice-President John C. Calhoun rose from his seat and issued a response to Jackson's toast. “The Union—next

⁴⁴ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 166; Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate*, 215.

⁴⁵ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 117.

⁴⁶ Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 435.

to our liberty the most dear; may we all remember that it can only be preserved by the respecting the rights of the states and distributing equally the benefits and burdens of the Union.”⁴⁷

The split between Jackson and his own Vice-President over the power of the federal government only made matters worse for the country. The Federalists and Republicans had battled one another over issues of federal power in the past, but now the threat of secession and civil war were more real. Jackson’s decision over the brewing crisis stunned everyone. In a proclamation, Jackson discredited South Carolina’s challenge to federal law. Rather than side with South Carolina’s states right’s ideology, Jackson embraced the idea that the Constitution had created a national union and government of “*one people*” and that no state could violate federal law or secede.⁴⁸ Throwing down the gauntlet, Jackson challenged South Carolina’s intentions. “Their object is disunion,” he declared. “Disunion, by armed force, is TREASON. Are you really ready to incur its guilt?”⁴⁹

Calhoun was enraged by Jackson’s proclamation. He resigned from his position as Vice-President and returned to South Carolina, only to be immediately elected senator by the state legislature and returned to Washington.⁵⁰ The threat from Jackson in his proclamation was real. Moreover, this was the first time that a sitting president openly threatened a state with military action in order to deter them. In a letter to Joel Poinsett of South Carolina, just prior to the proclamation’s release, Jackson made clear his intentions. “You may say with great confidence to the Patriots & union men of the South that in forty days from the date of my orders, if force should become necessary to be employed, I will have forty thousand men in the State of South

⁴⁷ Irving H. Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun: A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 168.

⁴⁸ Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate*, 216.

⁴⁹ Andrew Jackson, “President Jackson’s Proclamation Regarding Nullification,” December 10, 1832. *The Avalon Project*. Accessed August 24, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jack01.asp#1

⁵⁰ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 166.

Carolina, and thereby put down the feeble voice of treason that is now boasting and deluding the good people, my countrymen, of South Carolina.”⁵¹ The message could not be clearer. The president, unlike any other, was willing to take action and march against his own people. He would not wait to respond to secession or violence. Instead, he would use violence to stop it from happening.

The only other time a president marched against his own citizens was when George Washington led a militia force of fifteen thousand men against the participants of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. Without a shot being fired, the show of force ended the rebellion and the ringleaders were pardoned.⁵² George Washington’s actions in the Whiskey Rebellion cemented the federal government’s authority over the country. Now, Andrew Jackson would attempt to do the same. In order to collect the needed taxes from the South Carolinian coffers the administration asked Congress to pass the Force Bill. If passed, the president would be granted the power to use military force against a state and its people in order to collect the federal revenue. The request stirred the emotions of Democrats and Republicans alike. Calhoun, now completely and openly against Jackson, deemed that the acquiring of such powers would lead to the president becoming a “military dictator.” Jackson supporter, William King of Alabama, refused to consent to such a bill, not wishing “to clothe any mortal man with such tremendous and unlimited powers.”⁵³ Despite reservations, the bill passed Congress. Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, putting aside their personal animosity towards one another, worked diligently with one another to find a solution in order to avoid a civil war. They agreed on a compromise to

⁵¹ “AJ to Joel Roberts Poinsett, December 9, 1832.” *AJP*.

⁵² Wood, *Empire of Liberty*, 138. See also Jon Avlon, *Washington’s Farewell: The Founding Father’s Warning to Future Generations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 66-68. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 began after the passage of twenty-five percent excise tax on whiskey. Frontiersmen along the western border, particularly in Pennsylvania, attacked numerous tax collectors, and burned down the home of Pennsylvania governor John Neville.

⁵³ Meacham, *American Lion*, 239-241.

change the formula for tariffs that protected northern industry without penalizing southern planters, a compromise that Congress quickly adopted.⁵⁴

The nullification crisis in South Carolina, as well as Jackson's actions during the calamity, left many impressions. Nearly everyone involved in the crisis considered it a victory. Clay avoided civil war by working with Calhoun. Jackson asserted himself as the head of the government. South Carolina, and the South in general, was granted a decreased tariff rate, while Northern manufactures were still protected. The long-term effects were more costly, however. Again, Southern states saw their actions as a righteous obligation on their part, and essentially stood down the power of the federal government. As was the case in Georgia, they were not attacked and received what they wanted, furthering their belief that the government favored agrarian interests over industrial economic development. As a result, the constitutional questions of secession and nullification continued to be fully unsettled.⁵⁵ Due to Jackson's actions during the crisis, specifically his call for the Force Bill, his opponents felt they had a winning issue by attacking his "image of a Crown." The mere notion that Jackson was willing to march against his own citizenry to arrest governors, and hang nullifiers, encouraged his perception as a dictator.⁵⁶

Perhaps the most consequential political battle of Jackson's tenure as president was his war against the Bank of the United States. From the start of the American republic, the Bank represented the upper echelons of society and formed the basis of the American economy. Despite its controversial origins under Alexander Hamilton, it maintained its existence and proved beneficial for the nation. After receiving a second charter by Congress in 1816, the

⁵⁴ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 169-170.

⁵⁵ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 129-130.

⁵⁶ Meacham, *American Lion*, 244; Brands, *Andrew Jackson*, 481.

Second Bank of the United States became the largest corporation in America, holding the Treasury's tax receipts on deposits and handling the federal government's financial transactions. In addition to its power, the Bank could extend or restrict money supplied to the state banks. The amount of power that the Bank wielded, with little oversight or safeguards, did leave it open to the possibility of mismanagement and corruption.⁵⁷ Jackson had long nurtured a general fear and distrust of all banks because of their power and bias. These fears, coupled with his distasteful views of the elites, dictated the necessity of his involvement. Just as Jackson saw corruption in government, he saw the same in the Bank.

His choice to engage with the Bank was particularly interesting given that prior to this, many did not understand where his views actually were. At times he sided with the states, others with the supremacy of the national government. Depending on the circumstances, he appeared to be either a Republican or a Federalist. To attack the Bank would seemingly put him at odds with the national government's supremacy over the banking economy and Jackson's personal views on "reform" over the economy were always ambiguous. To better articulate the president's message, and make clear his supporter's positions, Jackson's advisors officially reorganized into the Democratic Party. In the months to come, the opponents of Jackson—Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams—would also reorganize, declaring themselves as the Whig Party.⁵⁸ The existence of a two-party system would be the true enduring legacy of Jackson's presidency. The American people would have the opportunity to rally behind specific parties, representing their beliefs along economic, political, social, and even religious lines. Regional concerns were now based on one's definition of democracy and republicanism. The abolition movement was

⁵⁷ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 374-375.

⁵⁸ Watson, *Liberty and Power*, 134.

gaining steam in the North, aided considerably by the reemergence of John Quincy Adams in the House. For the coming generation, Americans would witness factions within the parties splinter into the creation of others, each maintaining their own views on specific issues, such as slavery or immigration. Regardless of the length of their existence, political parties, under a two-party system would continue for the remainder of the United States' history.

Jackson's assault on the Bank was the first true test of the two-party system's endurance. The Bank's recharter was set for 1836, however, the Bank's manager, Nicholas Biddle, began to lobby Congress as early as 1832. It was the hope of National Republicans that Jackson would veto the recharter efforts of Congress. The Bank had become popular in the South and West and if Jackson were to veto its upcoming legislation, he faced the possibility of losing favor in key areas, which in turn offered the possibility of defeat in the upcoming presidential election.⁵⁹ At the outset, the possibility of Republicans siphoning away Democratic votes was possible, as many came to favor the Bank's policies, as did many state banks. Although the Democrats overwhelmingly controlled the House, they sided with the Republicans and voted for the Bank's recharter. Jackson, in turn, vetoed the measure. He decried the Bank's power, declaring it as unconstitutional, even though the Supreme Court had not ruled it as such.⁶⁰

The Republicans believed that Jackson had fallen for the trap, however, although there was enough support in Congress to override Jackson's veto, the Democrats wavered. In between the passage of legislation and Jackson's veto, the president involved the Democratic press, and appealed directly to the voters. He included his usual rhetoric, basked in populist, anti-establishment sentiment. He denounced the Bank as unconstitutional, a symbol of aristocratic

⁵⁹ Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16.

⁶⁰ Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 379-380.

government that favored the wealthy at the expense of the poor. He depicted it as the concentration of private power that threatened the very liberty of the nation. Jackson's rhetoric worked and Democrats in Congress did not oppose the veto.⁶¹ Once again, the president managed to tear away at the government's institutions through the manipulation of the public's misunderstanding. Truly, prior to Jackson's attack on the Bank in the newspapers, most Americans were ambivalent about the Bank and its function, and likely did not view it as any particular evil, until Jackson declared to them that it was.⁶² Furthermore, the mere fact that Democrats in Congress fell in line to Jacksonian rhetoric was evidence that the new two-party system would affect American politics in more dramatic ways than ever before. Congressmen could no longer escape the connection to their leader, unless they wished to face personal defeat.

Republicans in Congress could only castigate Jackson for what they believed to be an overuse of presidential power. The Republican press portrayed the president as "King Andrew the First," and denounced what Clay called Jackson's assumption of "authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." Undeterred by any criticism, Jackson continued to move against the Bank, ordering his new, unconfirmed secretary of the Treasury to reroute federal deposits from the Bank to the states.⁶³ The Bank of the United States was undone and Republican anger towards Jackson grew even deeper with his defiance. In a symbolic move, the Senate, under the guidance of Henry Clay, censured the president for his actions, alleging that he exceeded his authority in removing the deposits, making Jackson the first and only president to ever be censored by the United States Congress.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party*, 16-17.

⁶² Howe, *What Hath God Wrought*, 377.

⁶³ Unger, *Henry Clay*, 173-174. For image of "King Andrew the First," see Appendix D, Figure 2.

⁶⁴ Meacham, *American Lion*, 278-279.

The fight against Jackson's policies included the increasing use of propaganda, depicting Jackson as an American Caesar. The president's enemies—Clay, Adams, Daniel Webster, and even John C. Calhoun—ultimately joined forces and created a loose political alliance. In a nod to the American Revolution, the alliance named themselves the Whig Party. But rather than depict Jackson primarily as a despotic English monarch, the Whigs constantly invoked him as a modern Caesar. The comparisons were simple to make in that Jackson and Caesar were both military commanders and stood accused of toppling a republic. Democrats, too, as a whole, stood accused of allowing Jackson to ferment a culture of obedience to a single individual rather than principle.⁶⁵

But for all of the charges against Jackson, the people did not relent in their support. As noted by historian Robert Remini, "times had changed and the people no longer feared their chief executive. Rather they identified with him. They looked to Jackson as their representative, and therefore these whiggish fears about his claim to despotic power sounded more like partisan politics than anything else."⁶⁶ Clay and the Whigs were surely baffled by the people's silence. To the observers of history, many anti-Jacksonians saw the parallels emerging before them and made every effort to convey them to the American public. When Andrew Jackson decided to remove federal deposits from the Bank, Clay likened it to Caesar's seizure of the Roman treasury during his war against Pompey.⁶⁷ But, just as in Caesar's time, the popularity and promise of the man outweighed the concerns of the privileged few. The American Caesar would end his presidency through retirement, not by the blades of his opponents, metaphorical or otherwise.

⁶⁵ Edwin A. Miles, "The Whig Party and the Menace of Caesar," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (Winter 1968): 366-367. Accessed August 25, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42623042>.

⁶⁶ Remini, *Andrew Jackson*, II, 371-372.

⁶⁷ Miles, "The Whig Party and the Menace of Caesar," 370.

Jackson's use of presidential power was the embodiment of every fear that the Jeffersonians of yesteryear originally conceived. For all the criticisms of despotism that the early Democratic-Republicans unleashed against the Federalists, it was now a Democrat, a self-proclaimed Jeffersonian, who inhabited the role. Jackson's ability to deflect the perception of having a kingly nature was no doubt aided by his ability to appease the masses. He cultivated the personality of hero-worship, constantly invoking his past achievements as a military conqueror over America's enemies. As he did with the election of 1828, or his fight against the Bank of the United States, he depicted every struggle as a matter of life and death and had a keen sense of awareness for when it came to choosing his enemies. He portrayed himself as fulfilling Republican concepts, such as limiting the size of government and returning the power to the people. However, the manner in which this was accomplished deserves criticism.

Jackson's attack against the Supreme Court and the Bank of the United States was an affront to the authority of the Constitution and the rule of law. His rhetoric against corruption, too, was often unfounded and misguided. The Jackson legacy—the Age of Jackson—was shaped by the belief that the “common man,” the will of the people, the majority, would determine the future of the United States. However, Jackson too often molded what he believed to be that direction, and used his personality and power to convince, rather than enforce, the people's will. Protesting his censure, Jackson sent a message to the Senate explaining that the president “is the direct representative of the American people.”⁶⁸ His decision to make the president the physical manifestation of the people's will was a significant departure from previous presidents, but could reasonably be justified by the assumption that his election by the

⁶⁸ Andrew Jackson, “Message to the Senate Protesting Censure Resolution,” April 15, 1834. *The American Presidency Project*. Accessed August 30, 2018. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67039>

people entitled him to carry out their mandate. In theory, if the people did not approve of Jackson's authority they would vote him out of office. Unlike earlier elections, however, the existence of a political party apparatus made this all the more difficult. Presidential candidates were now locked in epic campaigns that became more organized and divisive with every election.

One of the first lasting legacies was the election of Jackson himself. Jackson's election paved the way for the acceptance of presidents who built their careers on a celebrity status that endured them to the public. Aside from George Washington and Andrew Jackson, who were primarily known only for their military exploits, others would soon follow. Although many presidents in the nineteenth and twentieth century had a military background, including William McKinley, Rutherford B. Hayes, and Harry S. Truman, only a limited few were more readily known for their military exploits over anything else, and used their reputation to bolster their image to the American electorate. William Henry Harrison, the famed frontiersman and military hero, would be nominated by the Whig Party and defeat Martin Van Buren's chances at reelection in 1840. Zachary Taylor, the hero general of the Mexican War, Ulysses S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower would also ride their military fame into the White House.

Interestingly, and owing to the development of political parties, the line of succession following the Jackson presidency saw only the election of single term presidents, until the reelection of Abraham Lincoln nearly thirty years later. However, Lincoln's presidency during the Civil War fundamentally changed the perception of the president as well. Again, his was a presidency that fell victim to circumstance, rather than intention. Lincoln's tenure as president was unique, in that his entire administration took place during the Civil War, but his role as president shared a relevance to Jackson. Lincoln famously embodied the role of Commander

and Chief during the war and became an activist president. His assertion that “I am president of the United States, clothed with great power,” reminded those around him of the president’s influence and power.⁶⁹

The relationship between the Congress and the Executive were more important than ever. Following Jackson’s presidency, members of Congress, if their party was shared with that of the sitting president, increasingly looked more to the president’s guidance before enacting any legislation. No longer would the president simply wait for Congress to lead. The authority and concentration of executive supremacy would continue into the modern day, influencing every president, and for some, instilling a sense of imperial authority. For instance, in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s assessment of Lyndon Johnson, his view on the presidency was to identify problems, bring them to the attention of the public, and draft bills to solve them.⁷⁰ Like Jackson’s decision to attack the Bank of the United States, Johnson was more inclined to create an issue and use the popularity of the public to enact reform.

Jackson’s use of the presidential veto and threat of force by the Federal government, during peacetime, directly influenced two future presidents. In the wake of Lincoln’s assassination, his Vice-President Andrew Johnson, entered into a political war with the Republican Party. A Union-Democrat, Johnson worked hard to undermine the Reconstruction policies that were outlined by the Republican held Congress. Owing to his racial prejudices, Johnson chose to support the white Southerners following the Civil War, and vetoed numerous

⁶⁹ Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 687.

⁷⁰ Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1991), 138.

pieces of legislation that aimed to support newly freed slaves.⁷¹ Unlike Jackson, Johnson did not have a supportive majority to keep his vetoes from being overturned. His fear of an empowered federal government, working to provide civil rights to the black population, was too radical in his mind. Although the Congress would overturn several of his vetoes, Johnson solidified its use as an effective political tool to hamper congressional efforts and showed that a president can, in the words of Jon Meacham, “be formidable without being indomitable.”⁷²

The situations affecting America at the time of Jackson’s presidency were becoming increasingly complex, and viewing the presidency as an extension of his military career put Jackson’s decision making very much on the offensive. In his defense, Jackson’s reactions to certain events, such as the nullification crisis, were not of his making. Confronting the South Carolinian nullifiers with the threat of military force, however, was a purely Jacksonian decision to resolve a crisis. Jackson’s decision to push the Force Bill through Congress would later be mirrored by Ulysses S. Grant in his battle to destroy the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1870s. The Enforcement Acts, as they came to be known, were passed through Congress at Grant’s request and permitted him the authority to deploy military forces against the Klan, as well as suspending the right of habeas corpus.⁷³ Although the cause of fighting the Klan was morally right on the part of Grant, the authority granted to him—another military leader turned president—only further evolved the meaning of Commander and Chief in a non-war setting.

⁷¹ Jon Meacham, *The Soul of America: The Battle for Our Better Angels* (New York: Random House, 2018), 62-63. Over Johnson’s veto efforts, Congress was able to pass such legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson’s repeated efforts at vetoing Reconstruction legislation infuriated the Republicans in Congress and led to an eventual showdown by way of Johnson’s impeachment, the first in American history. Although Johnson avoided removal by one vote, the relationship between Congress and the president demonstrated the continued existence of the checks and balance system of government.

⁷² Eric Foner, *A Short History of Reconstruction*, Updated Ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), 112-113; Meacham, *The Soul of America*, 62.

⁷³ Meacham, *The Soul of America*, 66-67.

The extension of presidential power in the last century was best made possible through the all-encompassing concept of national security. During war, presidents have repeatedly invoked the necessity of being granted specific powers to confront internal and external threats. In each circumstance, Jeffersonian principles were chipped away and replaced with a more intrusive federal government. Mirroring John Adams's violation of the Constitution with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the Woodrow Wilson administration, upon America's entry in World War I, instigated the passing of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.⁷⁴ Although Andrew Jackson himself never enacted a law that directly violated the First Amendment in the same manner as John Adams, his leadership style of using the executive office to influence congressional legislation shares a distinct alignment with that of Wilson and Lincoln, who himself, over the Supreme Court's opposition, violated American civil liberties by suspending the writ of habeas corpus.⁷⁵

One of the most grotesque uses of presidential power during wartime was the invoking of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066, which allowed for the forced removal and placement of the Japanese-American population from the West Coast into multiple internment camps during World War II.⁷⁶ Under the guise of national security, Roosevelt's decision to intern the Japanese population in America eerily paralleled Jackson's relationship with the Native American tribes of the southern states. Although Roosevelt's decision did not lead to a

⁷⁴ Robert H. Zieger, *America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 197. The Espionage Act of 1917 granted the authority of the government to ban any publication that opposed the war or criticized its conduct. The Sedition Act of 1918, in an affront to the Bill of Rights, barred any "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the U.S." and outlawed speech or written expression that might encourage "contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute," of the government and military agencies.

⁷⁵ Goodwin, *Team of Rivals*, 355.

⁷⁶ Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 108. ProQuest Ebook Central. Accessed August 30, 2018. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-ebooks/reader.action?docID=3300446&query=>

twentieth century version of the Trail of Tears, the authority used by the president against an easily identifiable and vulnerable population was remarkably reminiscent of Jackson.

All presidents are victims of circumstance and have faced unwanted situations during their tenures, but it is how they exercise their power to confront such situations that leave a lasting impact for their future successors. Although it would be wrong to credit Andrew Jackson for every future use of executive power, his presidency was undoubtedly an evolution of the office. The expanded use of presidential power would be replicated, in varying degrees, by future presidents, and under different circumstances, in order to exert their political power over Congress and the American people. The precedents outlined by Jackson influenced, or at least allowed the acceptance of, some of the most consequential presidential decisions in American history.

The Jacksonian Revolution, as it was, effectively ended the political ideology of the Jeffersonians, especially in regards to the role of the president. Jefferson may have envisioned an America where the ruling class would be an assortment of ordinary people determining their fates through debate, principles and justice, but Jackson determined to achieve that vision through amassed power, while negating the rest. But is this what America wanted? If the election of an Andrew Jackson is the barometer of the people's will, and the people's acceptance of consolidated power, how will the United States leadership look in the years to come? There are already a host of examples that designate the overreaching uses of presidential power through the last two centuries, such as the suspension of habeas corpus, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, or the threat of federal force against internal dissent. A president like George Washington, John Quincy Adams, and even Thomas Jefferson, may very well quake at the presidential power invoked by Lincoln, Roosevelt, or Johnson.

And yet, Thomas Jefferson's words may once again explain the complexities of the situation in all too clear a light. The United States, as with all things, changes in time, and it is only natural that the role of the president and government expand with it. The direction and intention of that change, however, must always be questioned. Jefferson was well aware of that and it is one of the lasting messages of the Old Republican that is relevant today. Adorned on the panel of the Jefferson Monument in Washington D.C. is an excerpted section of a letter Jefferson composed while living in retirement in Monticello. Writing to a friend in 1816, Jefferson explained his views on the necessity of change in politics and power when the people demand it:

I am certainly not an advocate for frequent & untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because when once known, we [accommodate] ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as [civilized] society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ "TJ to "Henry Tompkinson" (Samuel Kercheval), July 12, 1816." *FO*.

Epilogue: A Brief Message from Cicero and Caesar to America

“There is nothing proper about what you are doing, but at least make sure you cut off my head properly.”¹ These were the final words of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the great orator, and defender of the Roman Republic. A wealthy and shrewd student of politics and rhetoric, Cicero lived during a time of giants in Roman history. The names of both famous and infamous men—Julius Caesar, Marcus Brutus, Mark Antony, and Augustus Octavian—were admired and feared in their own time. Cicero himself had enjoyed the Roman people’s admiration, not as a soldier or conqueror, like many others who gained the public’s attention, but as a man of integrity, who stood as a symbol of the republican way of life.

Cicero’s life came to an end when Roman soldiers found him on a road, being carried on his slave-drawn litter. The soldiers who found him were part of a much larger conspiracy that had been devised by the newly established leadership of Mark Antony, Marcus Lepidus, and Octavian, all supporters of Julius Caesar, who had been assassinated a year before. They were now engaged in yet another civil war, this time against the murderers of Caesar. To consolidate their power in Rome before their campaign against the murderers, this new political alliance, known as the Triumvirate, drew up a list of political opponents and had them executed. According to some ancient sources, the numbers of those listed went as high as fifteen hundred with Cicero himself specifically chosen by Antony to be one of the victims.²

¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome’s Greatest Politician* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003), 318.

² Stephen Dando-Collins, *The Ides: Caesar’s Murder and the War for Rome* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010), 218-219. Due to prior political alliance with Cicero, Octavian would argue against his execution for two days. Once Antony made it clear that the Triumvirate would dissolve unless Cicero was executed, Octavian relented.

It was more a personal, rather than political, decision for Antony to name Cicero as one of the proscribed. Cicero had been an ardent political enemy and severe critic of Antony's leadership in the past. In a series of fourteen speeches, known as *Philippics*, Cicero publically attacked Antony as an enemy of the state.³ Now, it was Antony's turn to respond to Cicero's words, however in a much more dramatic and soldierly way. When the Roman soldiers stopped Cicero on the road he requested a clean death. However, the soldiers, one of whom Cicero once defended in a court case, denied him his wish. One source claimed that "it took three blows and some sawing through" to remove Cicero's head from his body. Hoping to gain even more favor with their commander, the soldiers removed Cicero's hands—the hands that wrote *Philippics*—and presented them to Antony, who then proudly had them displayed in the Roman forum for all to see.⁴

In contrast to Cicero's reputation as a steadfast republican, another Roman had fundamentally challenged the very institutions of the republic. Julius Caesar, the famous conqueror and statesman, who won the hearts of the Roman people with his charisma and generosity, coupled with his military achievements, had been murdered a year before Cicero. On the fifteenth of March, in the year 44 BC, Caesar, who through sheer political power had become dictator for life, met with the Roman Senate. Unbeknownst to him, a conspiracy had been planned by the Roman nobility, which included his trusted friend, Marcus Brutus. Upon entering the hall and taking his place, Caesar was leapt upon by more than sixty conspirators, armed with small daggers, and stabbed more twenty times, until finally succumbing to his wounds.⁵ Caesar

³ Dando-Collins, *The Ides*, 172. Cicero's choice of *Philippics* as a title stemmed from the inspirational works of the Greek scholar Demosthenes, who denounced the Macedonian king, Philip II, in a series of speeches.

⁴ Dando-Collins, *The Ides*, 221. The soldiers that removed Cicero's hands were in fact compensated by Antony. Dando-Collins notes that Antony multiplied the reward for Cicero's death by nearly ten times the original offering.

⁵ Philip Freeman, *Julius Caesar* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2008), 358-359.

was ultimately responsible for his own downfall. He had fundamentally misunderstood the feelings of the people who had embraced him.

Caesar had come to believe that the republic, which to him only served to “perpetuate the rule and enrichment of a few powerful families at the expense of everyone else,” was dead.⁶ He never hesitated to show the hypocrisy of the ruling class to the people and periodically put on grand displays of their offenses. During a parade, celebrating his victory over the republican opposition in the recent civil war, a float depicted an image of the famous senator Cato with his guts falling out of his stomach. The tasteless display of a dead Roman senator, who was perhaps disliked, yet still respected, was a step too far.⁷ Although many had loved Caesar, the republic was not dead. His accumulation of power was tolerated, due to present circumstances, but not universally approved. Ironically, Caesar’s murder would set off a chain of events that would ultimately lead to the downfall of the republic and the rise of the imperial families that would transform Roman society for a thousand years.

Symbolically, Cicero and Caesar represented the transformation of Rome from a republic to an autocracy. Cicero was a gifted orator, an astute politician, and a staunch republican, while Caesar was the military hero of the people, who used his popularity to consolidate power and push through numerous political and social reforms that were viewed as detrimental to Roman republicanism. The ideological dichotomy between two of the most prominent Roman statesmen would be seen in America as well, this time in the form of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. The United States looked to the Classical Period for inspiration when creating the republic. Having received a classical education, many of the Founding Fathers, in their search

⁶ Freeman, *Julius Caesar*, 344.

⁷ Freeman, *Julius Caesar*, 330.

for an appropriate form of self-government, naturally looked to the ancient Greeks and Romans.⁸ Influences came in the form of architecture for government buildings, or symbolic representations, such as depictions of the eagle, or the Roman fasces. Classical works from the likes of Homer, and even Cicero himself, continued to be taught in American universities, such as Harvard. Cicero's writings, in particular his famed *Philippics*, were destined to be a personal favorite of John Quincy Adams and he often read them in his post-presidency.⁹

Despite their affinity to parts of the Roman past, the Founding Fathers stopped short of embracing the full autocracy of the Roman government in their own time. Regardless of the unforeseen divisiveness that would challenge the republic, the United States, even at the height of the Civil War, never fell victim to a dictator, or embraced the practice of mass executions against the political elite, such as those that led to the end of Cicero. Unlike the Romans, the United States also showed a measure of discipline when it came to idealizing its political leaders. There was little room for demagoguery, even among the most famous of heroes. When sculptor Horatio Greenough presented his *George Washington* in 1841, it was met with laughter and outrage. A ten-foot marble sculpture depicting the American Cincinnatus, draped in a toga, wearing sandals, a sheathed sword at his side, and his left arm raised in the air, unsettled its viewers. "No American had dared to be so monumental in scale or so majestic in pose and gesture."¹⁰ Washington was not a god, as Caesar had viewed himself centuries before, and the American people surely did not see him as one either.

⁸ Edwin A. Miles, "The Whig Party and the Menace of Caesar," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (Winter 1968): 361. Accessed July 9, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42623042>.

⁹ Kaplin, *John Quincy Adams*, 439.

¹⁰ Oliver Larkin, "The Great Stone Paradox," *American Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (Autumn, 1949), 223. Accessed July 9, 2018. <http://jstor.org/stable/2710716>. See Appendix D, Figure 3 for full image of *George Washington*.

The rise of what could be considered the first example of demagoguery in the United States came with the emergence of Andrew Jackson. Unlike Washington, who always made it a point to cast away doubts of imperial ambitions, Jackson, at the height of his power as president, came to be viewed as an American Caesar to those opposed to his administration. Though Jackson and his supporters viewed themselves as the continuation of the Thomas Jefferson administration, his opponents, among them John Quincy Adams and to a further extreme, Henry Clay, charged that his use of executive power more closely resembled “that of Rome under the first of the Caesars.”¹¹ Although he was tempted on more than one occasion, Jackson did not respond to such criticism with the strongest of his darker emotions. There were no mass arrests made against political opponents by the president, nor did conspiring Whigs carry out assassinations in the Capitol building. However, Jackson’s legacy over the use of presidential power is still an enduring warning that a democracy, even an American one, can quickly collapse in the absence of personal integrity, respect for the rule of law, and the rights of the people. If the voting body is easily moved by emotion and theatrics, rather than intellect and virtue, the loss of democratic values will come not only from those in a position of power but by those who put them there.

¹¹ Miles, “The Whig Party and the Menace of Caesar,” 366.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Founding Fathers envisioned a government that embraced the democratic will of the people. However, arguments over the limitation of power, representation, and the extent of the people's involvement in government, were destined to undercut the Founder's best intentions. From the beginning, the ideological split between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans was proof that the nation could not sustain itself in its current form. The unsubstantiated fears of a return to the monarchical style of government spurred American voters and lawmakers to turn against the presidential policies of George Washington and John Adams. The Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 appeared to many Americans as a potential solution to such fears. However, even with a Republican majority, the political identity of the nation was far from determined. Unforeseen circumstances inevitably altered the course of American history and the ideologies of those who embodied its Revolutionary spirit. The government's reaction to foreign policy crisis's, such as the French Revolution or the War of 1812, as well as internal debates, such as the expansion of slavery, or implementation of tariffs, forced American lawmakers to pragmatically shift their viewpoints on power in order to survive in an ever changing world.

The presidential elections of the 1820s represented the generational shift in American politics, and forced Americans to consider whom would best serve their interests. For the first time, candidates running for office were the products of the American Revolution, rather than the leaders of it. As their forefather's were tasked with the creation of a nation, it was the role of this generation to determine its fate. John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson were products of their time and molded by the circumstances they experienced. The oddity for both men was that their

individual talents did not suit them for the presidency in their own time. Adams was a man of intellect and vision that could not be translated to the American people. Jackson was a military hero, but unlike Washington, was emotionally and intellectually uncompromising. The issues facing both men were complex and many. Was America to isolate itself from the world, while it stood as a symbol of republican values? Would America continue the practice and expansion of slavery? Could the federal government continue to sustain itself without encroaching on the independent power of the states? Although neither Adams nor Jackson would fundamentally solve these issues in the own presidencies, their contributions furthered the debate.

The election of John Quincy Adams in 1824 could have been America's greatest moment. No other man in the nation's history was as qualified for the position of president or held such a grandiose vision for the future. However, Adams's fall from grace came the moment he named Henry Clay to be his Secretary of State. Any chance of preserving his integrity, through the eyes of the people, was lost forever. His failure to connect to the masses or pursue a more active role as president further destroyed his ability to push an agenda that would have enriched the nation. In many ways, Adams was a man unto himself. He believed in the virtue of statesmanship and the idea that the people, when needed, would come together as an entity and serve the best interests of their country. A Republican by name, Adams was pragmatic and understood that a nation, bound together in common interest, could be capable of achieving everlasting greatness. But Adams lived in a world far removed from reality. He failed to see, or chose not to see, the coming storm, and fell victim to the over-democratization of American politics and the emergence of political parties. He could never understand why a Southern farmer would object to the creation of an American university in the North, even if it meant the

nation would be enriched by it. The electorate had become too divided over the economy, slavery, state sovereignty, and government in general, to fulfill Adams's vision.

The election of Andrew Jackson and the subsequent expansion of presidential power was a turning point in American history. Prior to his tenure, the view of the American president was one of limited authority, whose power was checked by a congressional body and an independent judiciary. By the time Jackson left office, the traditional norms of the presidency were altered forever. Jackson's ability to forge such a power could not have been accomplished without the emergence of a political party apparatus that was capable of extending his message to the people. Unlike every president before him, with the exception of John Adams in 1800, partisanship had poisoned the political landscape. The clear division of party politics, whether it is Republican, Democrat, or Whig, forever changed the future of the country. The Jefferson, or even John Quincy Adams, approach to governing for the betterment of the nation was over. It was now a winner takes all competition, under any circumstance, in order to service your supporters. It was no longer about standing on principle, but rather gaining a victory for your respective side. The heightened partisanship bled into the politics of the day, engulfing nearly every issue in America, until the political divide became so great, it erupted into the Civil War.

Jackson's military background provided him with a personality that was unfit for the presidency and in no way provided him with the ability to heal the discord in the United States. He was accustomed to power and dispersing orders with no debate. The idea of relinquishing authority was too foreign, and his cultivation of the people's mandate was viewed as a necessity, rather than an endearment, in the fight against his opponents. The ways in which Jackson used his power was a significant departure from Republican values. He injected himself into the political debate and he manufactured crises' as much as he responded to them. Where James

Monroe chose to withdraw from the Missouri Crisis, believing it to be the role of Congress to decide the outcome, Jackson extended the powers of the presidency to destroy the Bank of the United States, or undercut the decisions of the Supreme Court.

In the modern day, the election of Andrew Jackson should be remembered for the means in which he was elected president in 1828. It was not a fluke election. America had radically changed since its republican founding. No longer was there party unity in America, or a government of intellectual equals, who rallied behind a single message. Regional concerns over tariffs, slavery, and states' rights transformed the political landscape. The people were too far removed from one another and divided on race, religion, and economic background. Arguments over the meaning of the Revolutionary War, the equality of man, the importance of political freedom, or the role of government itself were as debatable as any. And finally, although the expansion of voting rights made for a more inclusive electorate, the rise of a democratic body fulfilled the worst fears of the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans when they elected Andrew Jackson. The Federalists were always concerned with providing too much power to the people, out of fear that they would fall under the influences of a would-be Caesar. The Republicans, by contrast, feared that the limitation of the people's involvement would allow for the creation of a dangerous demagogue. In the end, both parties were correct.

Appendix A: First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson

First Inaugural Address

MARCH 4, 1801

FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS,

Called upon to undertake the duties of the first executive office of our country, I avail myself of the presence of that portion of my fellow-citizens which is here assembled to express my grateful thanks for the favor with which they have been pleased to look toward me, to declare a sincere consciousness that the task is above my talents, and that I approach it with those anxious and awful presentiments which the greatness of the charge and the weakness of my powers so justly inspire. A rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions of their industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye -- when I contemplate these transcendent objects, and see the honor, the happiness, and the hopes of this beloved country committed to the issue and the auspices of this day, I shrink from the contemplation, and humble myself before the magnitude of the undertaking. Utterly, indeed, should I despair did not the presence of many whom I here see remind me that in the other high authorities provided by our Constitution I shall find resources of wisdom, of virtue, and of zeal on which to rely under all difficulties. To you, then, gentlemen, who are charged with the sovereign functions of legislation, and to those associated with you, I look with encouragement for that guidance and support which may enable us to steer with safety the vessel in which we are all embarked amidst the conflicting elements of a troubled world.

During the contest of opinion through which we have passed the animation of discussions and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the Constitution, all will, of course, arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression. Let us, then, fellow-citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others, and should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is

not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government can not be strong, that this Government is not strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear that this Government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest Government on earth. I believe it the only one where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern. Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this question.

Let us, then, with courage and confidence pursue our own Federal and Republican principles, our attachment to union and representative government. Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation; entertaining a due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our own industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow-citizens, resulting not from birth, but from our actions and their sense of them; enlightened by a benign religion, professed, indeed, and practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man; acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence, which by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here and his greater happiness hereafter -- with all these blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow-citizens -- a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.

About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people -- a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military

authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burthened; the honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.

I repair, then, fellow-citizens, to the post you have assigned me. With experience enough in subordinate offices to have seen the difficulties of this the greatest of all, I have learnt to expect that it will rarely fall to the lot of imperfect man to retire from this station with the reputation and the favor which bring him into it. Without pretensions to that high confidence you reposed in our first and greatest revolutionary character, whose preeminent services had entitled him to the first place in his country's love and destined for him the fairest page in the volume of faithful history, I ask so much confidence only as may give firmness and effect to the legal administration of your affairs. I shall often go wrong through defect of judgment. When right, I shall often be thought wrong by those whose positions will not command a view of the whole ground. I ask your indulgence for my own errors, which will never be intentional, and your support against the errors of others, who may condemn what they would not if seen in all its parts. The approbation implied by your suffrage is a great consolation to me for the past, and my future solicitude will be to retain the good opinion of those who have bestowed it in advance, to conciliate that of others by doing them all the good in my power, and to be instrumental to the happiness and freedom of all.

Relying, then, on the patronage of your good will, I advance with obedience to the work, ready to retire from it whenever you become sensible how much better choice it is in your power to make. And may that Infinite Power which rules the destinies of the universe lead our councils to what is best, and give them a favorable issue for your peace and prosperity.

Appendix B: Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution

Twelfth Amendment to the US Constitution

The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and all persons voted for as Vice-President and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;

The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;

The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.

The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Ratified June 15, 1804

Appendix C: First Inaugural Address of Andrew Jackson

First Inaugural Address of Andrew Jackson

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1829

Fellow-Citizens:

About to undertake the arduous duties that I have been appointed to perform by the choice of a free people, I avail myself of this customary and solemn occasion to express the gratitude which their confidence inspires and to acknowledge the accountability which my situation enjoins. While the magnitude of their interests convinces me that no thanks can be adequate to the honor they have conferred, it admonishes me that the best return I can make is the zealous dedication of my humble abilities to their service and their good.

As the instrument of the Federal Constitution it will devolve on me for a stated period to execute the laws of the United States, to superintend their foreign and their confederate relations, to manage their revenue, to command their forces, and, by communications to the Legislature, to watch over and to promote their interests generally. And the principles of action by which I shall endeavor to accomplish this circle of duties it is now proper for me briefly to explain.

In administering the laws of Congress I shall keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent of the Executive power trusting thereby to discharge the functions of my office without transcending its authority. With foreign nations it will be my study to preserve peace and to cultivate friendship on fair and honorable terms, and in the adjustment of any differences that may exist or arise to exhibit the forbearance becoming a powerful nation rather than the sensibility belonging to a gallant people.

In such measures as I may be called on to pursue in regard to the rights of the separate States I hope to be animated by a proper respect for those sovereign members of our Union, taking care not to confound the powers they have reserved to themselves with those they have granted to the Confederacy.

The management of the public revenue--that searching operation in all governments--is among the most delicate and important trusts in ours, and it will, of course, demand no inconsiderable share of my official solicitude. Under every aspect in which it can be considered it would appear that advantage must result from the observance of a strict and faithful economy. This I shall aim at the more anxiously both because it will facilitate the extinguishment of the national debt, the unnecessary duration of which is incompatible with real independence, and because it will counteract that tendency to public and private profligacy which a profuse expenditure of money by the Government is but too apt to engender. Powerful auxiliaries to the attainment of this desirable end are to be found in the regulations provided by the wisdom of Congress for the specific appropriation of public money and the prompt accountability of public officers.

With regard to a proper selection of the subjects of impost with a view to revenue, it would seem to me that the spirit of equity, caution and compromise in which the Constitution was formed requires that the great interests of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures should be equally favored, and that perhaps the only exception to this rule should consist in the peculiar

encouragement of any products of either of them that may be found essential to our national independence.

Internal improvement and the diffusion of knowledge, so far as they can be promoted by the constitutional acts of the Federal Government, are of high importance.

Considering standing armies as dangerous to free governments in time of peace, I shall not seek to enlarge our present establishment, nor disregard that salutary lesson of political experience which teaches that the military should be held subordinate to the civil power. The gradual increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant climes our skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preservation of our forts, arsenals, and dockyards, and the introduction of progressive improvements in the discipline and science of both branches of our military service are so plainly prescribed by prudence that I should be excused for omitting their mention sooner than for enlarging on their importance. But the bulwark of our defense is the national militia, which in the present state of our intelligence and population must render us invincible. As long as our Government is administered for the good of the people, and is regulated by their will; as long as it secures to us the rights of person and of property, liberty of conscience and of the press, it will be worth defending; and so long as it is worth defending a patriotic militia will cover it with an impenetrable aegis. Partial injuries and occasional mortifications we may be subjected to, but a million of armed freemen, possessed of the means of war, can never be conquered by a foreign foe. To any just system, therefore, calculated to strengthen this natural safeguard of the country I shall cheerfully lend all the aid in my power.

It will be my sincere and constant desire to observe toward the Indian tribes within our limits a just and liberal policy, and to give that humane and considerate attention to their rights and their wants which is consistent with the habits of our Government and the feelings of our people.

The recent demonstration of public sentiment inscribes on the list of Executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with the freedom of elections, and the counteraction of those causes which have disturbed the rightful course of appointment and have placed or continued power in unfaithful or incompetent hands.

In the performance of a task thus generally delineated I shall endeavor to select men whose diligence and talents will insure in their respective stations able and faithful cooperation, depending for the advancement of the public service more on the integrity and zeal of the public officers than on their numbers.

A diffidence, perhaps too just, in my own qualifications will teach me to look with reverence to the examples of public virtue left by my illustrious predecessors, and with veneration to the lights that flow from the mind that founded and the mind that reformed our system. The same diffidence induces me to hope for instruction and aid from the coordinate branches of the Government, and for the indulgence and support of my fellow-citizens generally. And a firm reliance on the goodness of that Power whose providence mercifully protected our national infancy, and has since upheld our liberties in various vicissitudes, encourages me to offer up my ardent supplications that He will continue to make our beloved country the object of His divine care and gracious benediction.



Figure 2: King Andrew the First²

² *King Andrew the First*. Illustration. 1833. From Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. Accessed June 10, 2018. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2008661753/>.



Figure 3: Horatio Greenough's George Washington³

³ Horatio Greenough, *George Washington*. Photograph. 1920. From Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. Accessed August 17, 2018. <https://www.loc.gov/item/2016819405>.

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