Misperceptions of ignorance: reconsidering U.S. intelligence 'failures' in the Korean War

dc.contributor.advisorDenning, Robert
dc.contributor.authorCompton, Daniel Brown
dc.contributor.committeeMemberReed, Charles
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-29T19:53:03Z
dc.date.available2017-08-29T19:53:03Z
dc.date.issued2017-06
dc.description.abstractThe ongoing American popular perception that the United States committed significant intelligence failures during Korean War is certainly understandable, especially given that this view continues to persist within the scholarly consensus on the topic. However, historian Richard C. Thornton asserts compelling arguments to the contrary, which, when combined with careful examination of the relevant primary source evidence, help to unravel how conscious American policy decisions can explain these supposed intelligence failures. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the U.S. use of intelligence during the Korean conflict relative to that of its three communist adversaries—North Korea, China, and Russia—reveals not only that the U.S. did not commit any significant intelligence failures, but leveraged intelligence much more effectively during the North Korean invasion, Chinese intervention, and in the pursuit of strategic goals. An application of John A. Gentry’s intelligence failure analysis methodology further reveals that the three communist nations’ failures can all be directly attributed to their respective leaders, while intelligence agencies bare the blame for supposed U.S. failures. These results suggest a fundamental difference between the U.S. and the other three nations’ approaches to the use of intelligence. The communist nations relied on the abilities of one man to leverage all of the available intelligence in his decisions, while the American approach was one of policy-driven interpretation and action on intelligence. This difference in approaches to intelligence seems to explain how the U.S. managed to avoid the mistakes so frequently made by its adversaries, and why the U.S. used intelligence so much more effectively relative to the three communist nations. (Author abstract)en_US
dc.description.bibliographicCitationCompton, D.B. (2017). Misperceptions of ignorance: reconsidering U.S. intelligence 'failures' in the Korean War. Retrieved from http://academicarchive.snhu.eduen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster Artsen_US
dc.description.programHistoryen_US
dc.description.schoolCollege of Online and Continuing Educationen_US
dc.digSpecsPDF/A-1ben_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10474/3185
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSouthern New Hampshire Universityen_US
dc.relation.requiresAdobe Acrobat Readeren_US
dc.rightsAuthor retains all ownership rights. Further reproduction in violation of copyright is prohibiteden_US
dc.rightsHolderCompton, Daniel Brown
dc.subject.lcshSouthern New Hampshire University -- Theses (History)en_US
dc.subject.otherhistoryen_US
dc.subject.othermilitary historyen_US
dc.subject.othermilitary studiesen_US
dc.subject.otherfailuresen_US
dc.subject.otherTruman, Harry S.en_US
dc.subject.otherintelligenceen_US
dc.subject.otherStalin, Joseph V.en_US
dc.subject.otherKorean Waren_US
dc.subject.otherNSC 68en_US
dc.subject.otherNational Security Council Report 68en_US
dc.titleMisperceptions of ignorance: reconsidering U.S. intelligence 'failures' in the Korean Waren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
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