

Southern New Hampshire University

Strategic Analysis of Operation Anadyr

A Capstone Project Submitted to the College of Online and Continuing Education in Partial
Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in History

By

Gregory S Wilson

Pittsburgh, PA

Submitted December 2018

Copyright © 2018 by Gregory S Wilson
All Rights Reserved

Student: Gregory Stone Wilson


I certify that this student has met the requirements for formatting the capstone project and that this project is suitable for preservation in the University Archive.



Capstone Instructor

1/28/2019

Date



Southern New Hampshire University
College of Online and Continuing Education

2/1/2019

Date

Abstract

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was provoked by the US in response to the discovery of Operation Anadyr, the Soviet deployment of military equipment to Cuba. Operation Anadyr was intended to deter further US hostility against the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. For most of the history of US-Cuban relations, Cuba was either a US protectorate or client state, and under the Monroe Doctrine the US forbade Cuban cultivation of any European ally. In 1962, the US stationed nuclear missiles and conventional forces on Soviet borders; the US held unquestioned strategic superiority. The objectives of Operation Anadyr were to deter continued US attacks on Castro's Cuba and bolster the Soviet strategic deterrent, i.e., deter US hostile actions against the USSR. However, even if Operation Anadyr had not been discovered by the US, the impact of the deployed weapons on the balance of power and deterrence would have been minimal; the deployed weapons were not sufficiently numerous or capable of a disarming first strike. In contrast to the publicly held US position, the Soviet Operation Anadyr was neither an aggressive deployment intended to launch a first strike against the US nor an unprecedented escalation.

Table of Contents

Abstract	iv
Chronology	vi
Acknowledgments	vii
Glossary	viii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: US - Cuban Relations	7
Chapter 2: US - Soviet Strategic Balance, 1962	33
Chapter 3: Operation Anadyr	50
Chapter 4: Analysis of Operation Anadyr	64
Conclusion	74
Bibliography	80

Chronology

1952: Fulgencio Batista seized power through a coup, assuming dictatorial power in Cuba

1958: US curtailed arms sales to Batista; Castro considered by the US Department of State not to be a communist agent.

1959: US recognized Castro's government of Cuba on 6 January. Agreements signed between Turkey and Italy and the US to deploy US IRBMs in October. Assassination of Castro first contemplated by CIA in December.

1960: Castro considered a Soviet client by US in March. In April, U-2 flights over Cuba began. In July, economic and political pressure initiated by the US against Cuba.

1961: The US sponsored invasion of Cuba, the Bay of Pigs, fails in April. A follow-up campaign, Operation Mongoose, initiated in November.

1962: Khrushchev develops the idea for Operation Anadyr in May. The Cuban Missile Crisis begins in October.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my parents, without whose support this project would not have been possible.

Glossary

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

Counter-force: Weapons aimed at militarily significant enemy targets

Counter-value: Weapons aimed at enemy population centers

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

KGB: Committee for State Security (Soviet intelligence agency)

MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction

MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile

NIE: National Intelligence Estimate

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAS: Organization of American States

PRC: People's Republic of China

SAM: Surface to Air Missile

SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

UN: United Nations

US: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

Cuba has been a point of political contention for the United States (US) in the realms of domestic and foreign policy for many years, even before the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The role of the island has evolved over time, as has its political affiliation. Cuba has been a Spanish colony, a US protectorate, and an independent nation over the last three hundred years. One important context in which the island is known in the US is as the setting for the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. In this incident, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) experienced military tension above the baseline of the Cold War (1945-1991) as a result of the US discovery of a Soviet operation, called Operation Anadyr, to deploy military hardware to Cuba. This hardware included nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of striking targets in the continental US.

In the US, this deployment typically is presented as an act of Soviet aggression against the US. In the words of US participant Dino Brugioni:

The Soviet Union had attempted, clandestinely, to move a massive nuclear strike force into Cuba, construct it rapidly, and seize a position of nuclear superiority that it could present as *fait accompli*. The missile, military, and naval bases established in Cuba were an extension of Soviet nuclear power and not relevant merely to the defense of Cuba; the military and political benefits to the Soviets had international implications.¹

The clandestine transport and construction of the Soviet strategic force was necessary because the US occupied a position of strategic superiority and could mobilize international institutions and allies in an effort to deter the USSR from the deployment. As an Imagry Analyst for the US National Photographic Interpretation Center, Brugioni would have been aware by

¹ Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story Of The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1990), vii.

virtue of his position in the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the US held a definitive advantage regarding the balance of strategic forces, and the strategic forces of Operation Anadyr would not achieve nuclear superiority for the USSR. Whether or not the missile, military, and naval bases established in Cuba were an extension of Soviet nuclear power is irrelevant because the US had established a large number of bases in nations that bordered the USSR; if the Soviet bases in Cuba were an extension of nuclear power and not relevant to defensive purposes then the US bases bordering the USSR could also be viewed as extensions of US power and not relevant to the defense of those nations. The military benefits to the USSR were less important than the political benefits of deterring future US assault on Cuba, and the military deployment was considered necessary to deter such an attack.

The characterization of Operation Anadyr as aggressive implies that the US did not act in an analogous manner. According to this view, the Soviet behavior would not have been intended for defense of an ally - Cuba - whom the US had repeatedly attacked; the USSR would have behaved illegally and the deployment would have created some strategic advantage for the USSR. Strategic weapons (e.g. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)) had political impact, while tactical weapons (e.g. Luna rockets) were limited to battlefield uses. Tactical weapons could be employed in a strategic context if an enemy were warned that tactical nuclear weapons could be used in the event of an attack and the nation was confident in its strategic position in the event of escalation to nuclear total war.

Operation Anadyr sought to improve the general Soviet strategic position as well as defend Cuba from continued US military operations. The placement of strategic missiles would improve the Soviet nuclear deterrent, which would increase the safety of the USSR by expanding the damage inflicted on the US in the event of a first strike, thereby deterring the US from that

action. The placement also would provide a deterrent to further US attacks on Cuba because an attack on enemy strategic hardware could escalate to a full nuclear war. Even though the US was positioned advantageously for such a war, the cost to US civilians from a nuclear exchange deterred the US from exploitation of the strategic balance for political objectives. The USSR also was compelled to defend their only ally in the Western Hemisphere, who defied the Monroe Doctrine (i.e., the US policy that Central and South American nations could not be colonized or become client states of European powers) that had been promulgated by the United States since the Monroe Administration in the early nineteenth century.

Another issue to consider was the evolving nature of deterrence at the time. When the US and USSR both possessed limited quantities of nuclear weapons, nuclear war was deterred by the fear that an enemy would destroy a civilian population center at the first warning of an attack. The USSR possessed a much smaller nuclear arsenal than the US by 1962 and fewer and less capable launch systems. The doctrine of finite deterrence, the idea that any number of nuclear weapons was sufficient to deter aggressive action, was being replaced in the US-USSR strategic balance by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD was the concept that both the US and USSR would be deterred from aggressive action if the enemy response to a first strike was sufficient to destroy half of the population and industrial capacity of the attacking nation.² Finite deterrence and MAD had different requirements, both in terms of targeting and the deterrent force exerted by each type of arsenal. US strategic forces were equipped to adopt MAD, where Soviet forces were limited to the finite deterrence model.

² Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, No. 2 (Summer, 1995): 159.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Operation Anadyr both as a deterrent to further US military action against Cuba and a reinforcement of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. The first aim of this paper is to summarize the history of US-Cuban relations with a focus on 1957-1962. The second aim is to examine the balance of nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR as of 1962. The third aim is to assess the strategic relevance of Operation Anadyr, and the fourth aim is to assess the strategic character of Operation Anadyr. The conditions required for an assessment of Operation Anadyr as an aggressive Soviet act will also be examined.

More specifically, the first chapter will provide background of US-Cuban relations. From 1823, US political leaders had considered the possibility that Cuba would be integrated into the US at some point. While Cuba never was granted statehood, it was a US protectorate between the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the aftermath of the 1933 Cuban Revolution. However, even after Cuba was formally released from the status of protectorate, the US exerted an imperial influence over Cuban affairs. Immediately after the end of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the US attempted to re-establish influence over the Cuban government.

The second chapter will examine the strategic balance between the US and USSR as of 1962. In 1962, the US public perception was that the USSR held a substantial lead in the development of ICBMs and nuclear warhead design. This impression developed from the Soviet space accomplishments of the 1950s, particularly the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. Soviet First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev's public boasting about the rate of Soviet missile production continued to fuel this perception. However, this public impression was incorrect; US President Dwight Eisenhower and the US government were well aware that the missile gap actually favored the US. John F. Kennedy utilized the perception of the "missile gap" in his presidential campaign, but when he attained the position of President-Elect he was

informed that the 'missile gap' actually favored the US. This fact frequently is referenced in the context of the Soviet rationale for placing nuclear weaponry in Cuba.

The third chapter will assess the impact of Operation Anadyr on the Cold War balance of power. The placement of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba was not as substantial an action as is typically presented. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) possessed nuclear superiority by a substantial margin over the Warsaw Pact (USSR and allied states), including US placement of IRBMs in Turkey. From a nuclear strategy perspective, significant missile deployments to client states both protected the host nations from military action by an enemy state and raised the target priority for enemy war planning. Deployment of strategically significant systems accomplished both military and political objectives.

The fourth chapter will assess whether Operation Anadyr better fit the characterization of defensive rather than offensive action. Even if the Soviet missile installation had proceeded without US knowledge, those missiles would not have provided the USSR with nuclear parity, let alone superiority. The deployment of strategic missiles could defend Cuba from US action, because in the event of a US invasion of Cuba the missiles could be launched at targets in the US. Further, the placement of additional Soviet missiles strengthened the balance of MAD by narrowing the missile gap between the US and USSR. A power imbalance was destabilizing because the stronger power could attempt to exert influence that the weaker power would find difficult to counter. However the doctrine of finite deterrence was not discarded; the US was restrained by the impact of any type of nuclear war. Even if the US were 'victorious,' the risk to US civilians was not considered acceptable for the possible gains.

The final chapter will summarize how the Cuban Missile Crisis was an aggressive US action, with the objective of preventing the USSR from protecting their client state Cuba by the deployment of strategic equipment. The withdrawal of the US IRBM systems from Turkey, which was a strategically analogous deployment in terms of military value and political objective, can be interpreted as tacit acknowledgement that the US deployment to Turkey was equivalent to the Soviet deployment to Cuba and that the deployments should be strategically interpreted in the same way.

Chapter 1: US - Cuban Relations

As might be expected from their geographical locations, Cuba and the US had an extended history. The strategic significance of Cuba evolved as technology and political relations with European powers developed but Cuba was appraised as a valuable territory from the early years of the nineteenth century. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the history of US-Cuban relations between 1823 and 1961, before the genesis of Operation Anadyr.

Because of geographical proximity, Cuba had long been considered strategically valuable to the US. US President Thomas Jefferson opposed acquiring overseas colonies, drawing the line of expansion to those territories that could be defended without naval power in 1809, but felt that Cuba should be the geographic limit of US colonization.¹ Jefferson's attitude had shifted by 1823; in that year he "aspired only to keep it [Cuba] from falling into British hands, by supporting its independence,"² rather than advocating the incorporation of Cuba into US territory. In the words of US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823, Cuba was "an object of transcendent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union."³ Cuba is positioned 90 miles from the coast of Florida⁴ and as a US territory would give the US an expanded military and commercial presence in the Caribbean Sea. In 1823 US President Monroe promulgated a strategic doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine, in which he warned "European monarchs that the US would not tolerate further colonization or puppet monarchs" in South or Central

¹ D. S. Whittlesey, "Geographic Factors in the Relations of the United States and Cuba," *Geographic Review* 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1922): 243.

² Whittlesey, "Geographic Factors," 244.

³ Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10.

⁴ Mark J. White, *Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), 4.

America.⁵ This doctrine became a fundamental plank of US foreign policy;⁶ the US did not demand that European nations forfeit American colonies but forbade the establishment of new colonies. In 1821 the *North American Review* anticipated US imperialism of South America: "South American will be to North America...we are strongly inclined to think, what Asia and Africa are to Europe."⁷ Cuba occupied a position of strategic and political importance in the US view, so much so that the US "made clear that it would not allow Cuba to fall into the hands of another power (other than itself or Spain)."⁸ In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams believed that it was "scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba...will be indispensable [sic] to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself."⁹ In the years leading up to the US Civil War, Spanish control of Cuba was unquestioned. However, in the 1854 Ostend Manifesto some US politicians called for the annexation of Cuba; if not for the outbreak of the Civil War, "this proslavery reading of Monroe's message might well have led to the annexation of the slave state of Cuba."¹⁰ Cuba had become a factor in both foreign and domestic political affairs.

Cuba became a problem in both domestic and foreign political affairs in the years leading up to the US Civil War. A resolution introduced by Democratic Party Senator Lewis Cass in 1853 warned that the US would view the transfer of Cuba from Spanish control to the control of

⁵ Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823, Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 03/03/1825, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990, National Archives.

⁶ Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress.

⁷ Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), 41.

⁸ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 72.

⁹ Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), 78.

¹⁰ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 97.

any other power as an “unfriendly act.”¹¹ While this had obvious implications for foreign policy, Cass at no point called for a vote, aiming instead to unite the party in fear of England despite the differences between Northern and Southern Democrats over the issue of slavery.¹² The Democratic Party incorporated the Monroe Doctrine into their party platform, introducing a plank to that effect in 1856.¹³ Union victory in the US Civil War further isolated and pressured the remaining slaveholding states of the Caribbean, including Cuba.¹⁴

In 1868 the US faced a dilemma: what to do in response to an uprising in Cuba by rebels who sought “the abolition of slavery, if not the construction of a new racial order.”¹⁵ Racial attitudes of the US also influenced political decisions: “the (US) Secretary of State recoiled at the prospect of annexing an island (Cuba) populated by what he viewed as racial inferiors.”¹⁶ The Spanish responded with force to the rebellion; Spain relocated “almost the entire rural population of the island into coastal cities, where it was confined in concentration camps.”¹⁷ Cuba was considered a priceless strategic asset relating to control of the Gulf of Mexico,¹⁸ and the outrage caused by the Spanish conduct required to suppress the rebellion provided the reason for the US to develop war plans. Although this tension was insufficient to support a declaration of war against Spain, it was sufficient to cause the deployment of the USS *Maine* to Cuba as an expression of US interest.

¹¹ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 124.

¹² Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 126.

¹³ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 131.

¹⁴ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 159.

¹⁵ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 171.

¹⁶ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 171.

¹⁷ G. J. A. O’Toole, *The Spanish War: an American Epic 1898* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1984), 20.

¹⁸ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 98.

On 15 February 1898, the US battleship USS *Maine* exploded and sank in Havana harbor.¹⁹ A US court of inquiry determined the cause to be a submerged mine, and was “unable to fix responsibility for the placing of the mine.”²⁰ The court was unable to determine who was responsible for the placement of explosives. After this result was made public, the US position concerning Cuba was that “Spain must accept responsibility for the loss of the *Maine*, make reparations to the United States, *and* [italics original] grant Cuba independence. Otherwise President McKinley would not be able to resist the popular demand for war.”²¹

After US negotiations with the Spanish government, the Spanish refused the US demands. The US declared war on Spain on 22 April 1898, and launched a blockade of Havana harbor.²² Public enthusiasm for war was such that after US President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers for military service,²³ one million men sought enlistment.²⁴ In May 1898 the US offered peace to Spain on terms including the forfeiture of Cuba and Puerto Rico to US control,²⁵ but Spain again refused to surrender. On 14 June 1898 American forces captured Guantanamo Bay, which would be an American war prize.²⁶ US forces successfully conquered Cuba, and on 17 July Spanish forces in Cuba surrendered.²⁷ The peace articles stipulated that Spain was to relinquish sovereignty over Cuba, the US was to assume responsibility for protection of life and property for the length of occupation, and that the US was to assume all financial obligations for the length of occupation.²⁸ The Teller Amendment of 19 April 1898

¹⁹ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 124.

²⁰ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 148.

²¹ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 149.

²² O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 173.

²³ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 195.

²⁴ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 196.

²⁵ Musicant, *Empire by Default*, 587.

²⁶ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 249.

²⁷ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 350.

²⁸ Musicant, *Empire by Default*, 627.

stipulated that “the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island (Cuba).”²⁹ The US role was limited to a caretaker authority until such time as Cuba formed an independent government. Cuba was not incorporated into the US as a state; before US forces would be withdrawn Cuba was required to:

Incorporate into its constitution the so-called Platt amendment. The amendment forced Cuba to recognize the right of the US to intervene to protect Cuban independence, maintain a stable government, or protect life and property; it restricted the right of Cuba to enter into a treaty with any foreign government without American approval; and it granted the United States coaling stations and naval bases. Thus Cuba had become an American client state.³⁰

Under the terms of the Platt amendment, enshrined in the Cuban constitution by US demand, Cuba did not have any of the freedoms of an independent nation. Foreign relations were entirely controlled by the US; US military forces were stationed in Cuba and free to use Cuban facilities; the US was empowered to interfere with internal Cuban affairs if it so desired; and because economic relations were a subset of foreign relations, the Cuban government had no economic independence.³¹ Cuba remained a US client state until 1934.³²

In response to Cuban domestic political unrest in 1933, the US supported the coalition of Fulgencio Batista against the revolutionary Provisional Government.³³ Those political leaders expected that “they could control a poorly-educated mulatto with little political experience [Batista].”³⁴ As a sergeant in the pre-revolution Cuban military, Batista had neither the formal economic or political training nor the opportunity to ‘learn on the job.’ By promulgating

²⁹ Musicant, *Empire by Default* 186.

³⁰ O’Toole, *The Spanish War*, 399.

³¹ Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 219.

³² Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 219.

³³ Robert Whitney, “The Architect of the Cuban State: Fulgencio Batista and Populism in Cuba, 1937-1940,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, No. 2 (May, 2000): 437.

³⁴ Whitney, “The Architect of the Cuban State,” 441.

economic policies that benefited Cuban workers at the expense of the sugar industry, Batista was able to appeal to populist sentiment. However, mounting domestic and US political pressure forced Batista to secure his position before elections to form a permanent Cuban government.³⁵ Batista formed an alliance with the Cuban Communist Party, motivated on Batista's part by the need to become a civilian leader and on the Communist's part by a desire to resist fascism, which had already taken Spain.³⁶ Batista announced that he would run for president and promised to resign his position as Army Commander on 6 December 1939.³⁷ This positioned him to transition from military to civilian political leadership. Batista was elected president of Cuba; Cuban elections "gave the USA its long sought objective of a stable and quiet Cuba."³⁸ However, Batista would not be content to serve as a president electorally responsible to the Cuban population.

Batista served as elected president for the term 1940-1944, losing the 1944 election to Ramon Grau San Martin,³⁹ but continued to rule from the background and seized power in a coup in 1952.⁴⁰ Batista ruled by force, including the suspension of civil liberties to prevent the mobilization of peaceful political opposition.⁴¹ The central figure of resistance was Fidel Castro, who led a small band in resistance to Batista's rule but avoided battle with government forces, which possessed heavier weaponry.⁴² Castro's band, the 26th July Movement, burned sugar crops and sabotaged civil buildings, e.g. schools, in an effort to shift public sentiment away from

³⁵ Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 448.

³⁶ Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 451.

³⁷ Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 456.

³⁸ Whitney, "The Architect of the Cuban State," 457.

³⁹ Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy*. University of Georgia Press, 2003, 206. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46ng92>

⁴⁰ D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," *The World Today* 14, No. 4 (Apr., 1958): 162.

⁴¹ D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," 163.

⁴² D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," 163.

Batista; "it says much for the unpopularity of the Government that the public who are the chief sufferers from this campaign appear to support the rebels in ever-increasing numbers."⁴³ The idea that the man ordering the bombing of civil buildings and burning crops would be seen as a savior to the country speaks volumes about the opinion of Batista held by the Cuban people.

Batista believed that the US possessed the capability to select the Cuban government, but US support for Batista's regime was due more to the US ambassador's anti-Castro sentiments than to direct US support of Batista's rule.⁴⁴ Complaints came from some members of the US Congress and neighboring nations that military equipment sold to Cuba for defensive purposes was utilized to suppress domestic rebellion; the US severed the supply of arms to Batista's government on 14 March 1958, thereby equalizing military supply chains between the Cuban government and the rebels.⁴⁵ The Cuban government attempted to use the Cold War in an attempt to elicit US assistance, enabling more effective resistance to the 26th July Movement by charging that Castro was a member of the Communist Party.⁴⁶ In April 1958, the US Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that "the evidence available to the Department does not confirm the Cuban government's charge that Castro is a communist."⁴⁷ Castro did not become a communist until "sometime between fall 1960 and fall 1961."⁴⁸ However, whether Castro was a communist at the time of his ascent to power, the CIA judged near the end of 1958 that "a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United

⁴³ D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?," 163.

⁴⁴ Mark Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Back to the Beginning," *World Affairs* 156, No. 3 (Winter 1994): 112.

⁴⁵ Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States," 113.

⁴⁶ Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States," 114.

⁴⁷ Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States," 115.

⁴⁸ Richard E. Welch, *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 10.

States.⁴⁹ Batista resigned on 31 December 1958, creating a power vacuum that soon would be filled by Castro.⁵⁰ Castro gained control of Havana two days after Batista fled the country, ending the 1953-1959 Cuban Revolution.⁵¹

The US had foreseen Castro's victory, or at least Batista's defeat, for some time. For the six months before the end of the 1958 Cuban Revolution, Castro (and not Batista) had been "the principal recipient of U.S. arms."⁵² Arms sales are one of the most frequently used methods of signaling approval of a client government or rebel group in another nation, even more so when the weapons are not sold but freely given in return for influence. However, US policy toward Cuba shifted dramatically after January 1959.

The US was the first nation to recognize Castro's government, on 6 January 1959.⁵³ Initially, the US government held a positive impression of Castro, hoping for "a Cuban government that would combine necessary political reform with respectful attention to long-standing diplomatic and economic ties to the United States."⁵⁴ The necessary political reform constituted the transformation from dictatorship to a democratic system, and the respectful attention to the relationship with the US implied that Cuba was a pliable US client, more like a protectorate than an independent nation. In Castro's first weeks in power he assured the world that he would reform the Cuban political system, but combined these assurances with "denunciations of the collaboration of the U.S. military with the fallen dictator [Batista]."⁵⁵ Even as the political reform appeared the first tenet of the US government wish list, the accusations

⁴⁹ Jack B. Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959 - January 1961, Vol. 3*, (Books Express Publishing, 2011), 16.

⁵⁰ Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States," 114.

⁵¹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 3.

⁵² Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States," 116.

⁵³ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 29.

⁵⁴ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 29.

⁵⁵ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 31.

that the US government had aided and abetted Batista's government would not be received in the same way.

The US Ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsal, believed that "the Cuban government must recognize that it needed the aid and support of the United States,"⁵⁶ and so must comport itself in ways meeting US approval. As indicated by Castro's accusations that the US had assisted his enemy during the revolution, it is doubtful that Castro perceived his relationship to the US in the same light. While the US had acted to assist Castro in some regards, e.g. curtailing arms sales to Batista's government, Castro would have considered the US an enemy rather than an ally.

Ideologically, the world had been divided into three realms: The 'First World' consisting of the US, its affiliates, and its allies; The 'Second World' consisting of the USSR, its affiliates, and its allies; and the 'Third World' consisting of all unaffiliated nations. Cuba under Batista had been a member of the First World, and it was a US goal that Cuba resumed that political affiliation. Ambassador Bonsal believed that Castro was not a communist or communist agent, and therefore should be treated as a potential ally rather than an ideological enemy.⁵⁷ Castro had not announced any political affiliation, and at this point was treated as a potential client rather than a hostile actor.

In late March 1959, the CIA reported to US President Eisenhower that "the Castro regime was moving more and more towards an outright dictatorship."⁵⁸ Because of that assessment, President Eisenhower refused to meet with Castro when Castro visited the US at the behest of the American Society of Newspaper Editors to speak to the National Press Club on 17 April, in

⁵⁶ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 34.

⁵⁷ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 37.

⁵⁸ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 34.

Washington D. C.⁵⁹ The US government had assessed the unreliability of Castro's rule; "Unless he [Castro] gets a strong helping hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his regime will collapse within a matter of months."⁶⁰

In contrast to the expected request for financial aid to Cuba that could purchase US influence over domestic Cuban political considerations, Castro did not request any aid.⁶¹ The US had no opportunity to purchase political or ideological concessions, because Castro did not position himself as a supplicant to US economic or military power. Ambassador Bonsal believed that "Castro must be persuaded that the best hope for Cuba lay in renewed alliance with the American security system."⁶² This alliance would take form for Cuba in both political and economic policy considerations. However, the economic relationship between the two nations soon would be stressed by Cuban economic policy.

In May 1959, Cuba passed an Agrarian Reform Law that was seen by the US "as little more than a cover for confiscation."⁶³ The Cuban government was empowered to "expropriate private property within its jurisdiction for public purposes," provided that it offered "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation."⁶⁴ However, the Cuban government neither offered any payment nor ceased to expropriate foreign property outside the scope of the Agrarian Reform Law.⁶⁵ Castro's contemptuous opinion of the OAS, which was seen by the US as "an instrument for preserving U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere,"⁶⁶ further divided the US from Cuba.

⁵⁹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 34

⁶⁰ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 19.

⁶¹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 35.

⁶² Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 36.

⁶³ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 37.

⁶⁴ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 37.

⁶⁵ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 37.

⁶⁶ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 37.

The Eisenhower administration attempted to use the Organization of American States (OAS) conference in Santiago, Chile on August 1959 to establish "an expanded version of the Monroe Doctrine,"⁶⁷ thus cloaking US regional policy in the guise of international law. The US claimed in a statement delivered in October that it had attempted to "prevent illegal acts by its [US] residents" and prohibited arms sales to Castro's government as part of a general ban on arms sales to the Caribbean region.⁶⁸ Further, the US "earnestly hoped that the government of Cuba would carefully review its policy and attitude toward the United States,"⁶⁹ and once again submit to US pressure. The US anticipated that Castro would come in line with US wishes, alternately bribed and coerced by military and economic pressures. President Eisenhower did not understand why Castro did not relish the status of client, and "gradually came to the conclusion that CIA reports of increasing communist influence must be correct."⁷⁰ From the US perspective, the only reason why a nation could refuse the status of US protectorate was because that nation had become the protectorate of another power, and the only other superpower patron was the USSR. US policy makers had not yet concluded that Castro was a communist client, but agreed that "the spread of Castroism would endanger U.S. influence and effective economic development in Latin America."⁷¹ Whether Castro was a Soviet client at this point was irrelevant: Castro's example made him an enemy of US regional policy.

Assassination of Fidel Castro by US agents had been proposed as early as December 1959, with the coordination of Mafia leadership.⁷² It is noteworthy that the US government cooperated with a known criminal organization in the name of achieving foreign policy

⁶⁷ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 38.

⁶⁸ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 41.

⁶⁹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 41.

⁷⁰ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 41.

⁷¹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 41.

⁷² Peter Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 9.

objectives. On 11 December 1959, the CIA proposed a program with the objective to "overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections 6 months after assumption of office."⁷³ The CIA had begun to gather recruits from the Cuban exile community in the US for a covert operations force to be used against Castro's government.⁷⁴ By 8 January 1960, the CIA had begun a series of covert anti-Castro programs.⁷⁵ On 13 January 1960 a group was tasked with the assassination of Fidel Castro;⁷⁶ given these activities, Castro was right to anticipate overt and covert US action against Cuba and against him personally.

The US publicized a policy statement on 26 January 1960 stating a nonintervention pledge; claiming that the US and not Cuba was "preventing the use of its territory for illegal acts;" expressing concern about Castro's accusations against the OAS and US; claiming to recognize "the right of the Cuban government and people to undertake social, economic, and political reforms;" expressing hope for diplomatic negotiations; and stating concern about the "intrigues of international communism" which endangered the US-Cuban friendship.⁷⁷ This statement can be condensed to wishes that the Cuban government once more act as a pliable client to US interests. Castro's reception to this statement was skepticism; both US diplomatic efforts and the intermediary effort of the Argentinean ambassador "were judged propaganda ploys designed to conceal America's true intentions"⁷⁸ by Castro. Castro evidently judged that the US policy statement was unsupported by substance; "in the summer of 1959, [US] President

⁷³ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 28.

⁷⁴ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 49.

⁷⁵ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 31.

⁷⁶ Sergo Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November*, (Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 63.

⁷⁷ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 44.

⁷⁸ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 45.

Eisenhower planned to ask Congress to declare war on Cuba if the island fell under the Soviet Union's control."⁷⁹ The Monroe Doctrine was valued above the UN Charter in the eyes of US policymakers during the Cold War.

Castro responded to the US offer by inviting Soviet Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960 through the intermediary of KGB (Soviet intelligence agency, Committee for State Security) agent Aleksandr Shitov.⁸⁰ Because Castro was suspicious of US motives and plans, it would have been logical to pursue an alliance with the only other global entity capable of deterring the US from hostile action. Mikoyan obliged, and during the trip Mikoyan and Castro spoke of economic relations. Mikoyan extended the Soviet offer of 100 million dollars US as an economic credit,⁸¹ and an agreement was made that Soviet technicians and engineers would be dispatched to Cuba to "help the Cubans become familiar with Soviet technology."⁸² This referred only to civilian technology, e.g. construction equipment, because US-Cuban relations had not yet decayed to the point where the Cuban government feared US invasion.⁸³ However the artificially friendly status of US-Cuban relations could be due to US fears of regional repercussions to US action against Cuba,⁸⁴ "in March 1960, U.S. Cuban policy took a distinct turn."⁸⁵ At this point the US deemed Cuba an enemy state instead of a potential client.

The US perceived Mikoyan's visit to Cuba as the point at which the US goal of the overthrow of Castro's government became inevitable.⁸⁶ On 17 March 1960 the US government approved the creation of an anti-Castro Cuban opposition group as part of the effort to achieve

⁷⁹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 48.

⁸⁰ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 55.

⁸¹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 70.

⁸² Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 71.

⁸³ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 71.

⁸⁴ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 44.

⁸⁵ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 47.

⁸⁶ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 72.

"the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention."⁸⁷ At this point the US desired the overthrow of Castro's government and its replacement by a pliable client group that would not adopt anything but a pro-US position on all issues. Enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine was sought with the preservation of plausible deniability; one of the goals listed in the CIA policy paper of 17 March was that "Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated."⁸⁸ This policy reflects the US determination that Castro had become a Soviet agent, and that "Castro was the self-declared enemy of hemispheric security and the United States."⁸⁹ The US operated under the assumption that it alone was the arbiter of hemispheric security, and any action or policy not approved by the US was a threat to US national security.

In April 1960, the US military approved a CIA request to conduct U-2 surveillance flights over Cuba.⁹⁰ The operational altitude of the U-2 protected it from Cuban interception efforts at this time. This information was required to plan military operations against Cuba, along with information about the Cuban armed forces. These missions were regularly conducted until the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, despite their flagrantly illegal nature. This also was the mechanism by which the US discovered the Soviet deployment of strategic nuclear missiles on 14 October 1962.⁹¹ US disregard for the laws governing international relations and territorial security was displayed prominently during the events of October 1962.

⁸⁷ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 301.

⁸⁸ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 307.

⁸⁹ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 45.

⁹⁰ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 93.

⁹¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 801.

Eisenhower's Cuba policy contributed to the depth of relations between the USSR and Cuba; because only the USSR was positioned to fill the role of economic and political patron of Cuba should the US cede that ground. "On 6 July Eisenhower ordered a 700,000 ton cut in Cuba's 1960 sugar quota of 3,120,000 tons."⁹² This was the beginning of US economic action against Cuba, designed to pressure Castro to bow to US wishes. The decision to cut the sugar quota had been made in March 1960, along with the decision by Eisenhower to begin training Cuban exiles for anti-Cuban operations.⁹³ The Cuban government denounced the US action to unilaterally reduce the import quota for Cuban sugar to the UN "as an example of economic warfare and illegal interference in Cuban affairs."⁹⁴ As an isolated incident this reduction probably would not have been significant. In combination with the political pressure and military threat exerted by the US, Cuban accusations of economic warfare were not unfounded.

Whereas the Cuban economy was much smaller than that of the US, the Cuban response was to negotiate with the USSR for the USSR "to increase their sugar imports to equal the American cut."⁹⁵ Because the main Cuban export was sugar, this Soviet action was received positively by all Cubans, including Castro's enemies.⁹⁶ In this way, the Cuban government secured a replacement market and strengthened political and economic ties with the other superpower and a potential Cuban patron. In August and September, the Cuban government nationalized US business in "manufacturing, commerce, finance, and transportation," therefore greatly reducing the US-held share of Cuban property.⁹⁷ Although the Cuban economy could not

⁹² Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 50.

⁹³ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 51.

⁹⁴ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 51.

⁹⁵ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 51.

⁹⁶ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, 75.

⁹⁷ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 51.

directly compete with the US economy, by nationalizing US property in Cuba the Cuban government secured for itself a windfall with limited economic or political cost.

The US economic response was to cancel agriculture and civil aviation technical assistance programs to Cuba, instruct US owned oil refineries in Cuba to refuse processing of imported Soviet oil, and freeze the US assets of Cuban citizens.⁹⁸ However this economic action backfired in the same manner as the sugar quota reduction; the USSR responded by increasing their oil exports to Cuba,⁹⁹ and the Cuban government nationalized US refineries in Cuba.¹⁰⁰ The direct result of US economic action was for the USSR to move into the demand vacancies and reinforce Castro's domestic political position. An unanticipated consequence was that Cuba would now become a Soviet client state, and the economic actions "destroyed the possibility of reconciliation between Cuba and the United States."¹⁰¹

The US viewed the Cold War political environment as if the US belonged in the position of unquestioned global superiority. Soviet First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech on 9 July 1960 enveloping Cuba under the Soviet strategic umbrella: "Figuratively speaking, in case of need, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against Cuba."¹⁰² This further reinforced US policymakers' views that Castro's Cuba was now a Second World nation, rather than either a US ally or an unaffiliated nation. The US claimed it would not "in conformity with its [US] treaty obligations permit the establishment of a regime dominated

⁹⁸ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 52.

⁹⁹ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 53.

¹⁰⁰ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 52.

¹⁰¹ Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 53.

¹⁰² Welch, *Response to Revolution* , 54.

by international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."¹⁰³ However the UN Charter, of which both Cuba and the US were members as of 24 October 1945,¹⁰⁴ states one purpose of the UN as "the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."¹⁰⁵ The claim that the US would interfere in the domestic political affairs of another UN member state violated the UN Charter. This did not stop US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge from asserting that the Monroe Doctrine was "fully alive and will be vigorously defended by the United States,"¹⁰⁶ legality and international obligations notwithstanding.

American behavior referencing the OAS was similarly aggressive. The OAS Charter states that each member state is to be free to select domestic political, economic, and social systems in the way it chooses, without external interference.¹⁰⁷ This external interference could take the form of foreign economic pressure (e.g., that exerted on Cuba by the US in 1959-1960), political pressure (e.g., the US effort to isolate and subjugate Cuba), or military pressure (e.g., that exerted by CIA trained Cuban exile groups). All of these actions directly violated the UN and OAS charters, as well as the fact that "in several OAS resolutions between 1946 and 1958, the United States had explicitly agreed that interference by one American state in the domestic affairs of another was forbidden."¹⁰⁸ The US did not act as if it were bound by those promises.

In July 1960, the US began the process of screening Cuban exile pilot recruits and negotiated with the Defense Department for instructional personnel and equipment for the

¹⁰³ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 54.

¹⁰⁴ "Member States," *United Nations*, Accessed 10/6/18. <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>

¹⁰⁵ "Charter of the United Nations," *United Nations*, Accessed 10/6/18. www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

¹⁰⁶ Welch, *Response to Revolution* 55.

¹⁰⁷ "OAS Charter," *Organization of American States*, Accessed 10/8/18.

http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp

¹⁰⁸ Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 85.

operation that would become the Bay of Pigs landing.¹⁰⁹ This was problematic, because the scope of the operation had expanded and those assets were not sufficient to address the revised objectives. By June 1960, "the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees - even though the actual training of the initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun."¹¹⁰ The program of training Cuban exiles to act as US agents against Castro's government had begun in a disorganized manner; the exiles' cause was not assisted by the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion that "no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged."¹¹¹ However institutional inertia had begun to gather around this effort to utilize the Cuban exiles as a tool to remove a political enemy; if the operation were to be cancelled, the CIA feared that the Cuban exile community would then accuse the US government of fearing to attempt to oust Castro, resulting in a loss of respect for the US among Central and South American states.¹¹²

The US attempted to assassinate Castro on numerous occasions with the help of the US Mafia. In August 1960, CIA officials proposed that the assassination be conducted using the services of assassins "handpicked by the American underworld, specifically syndicate interests who have been driven out of their Havana gambling casinos by the Castro regime."¹¹³ This would preserve the plausible deniability of the Kennedy administration, further conceal the role of the US government, and enlist an unconventional ally against a common enemy. The CIA considered that these efforts "were viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of

¹⁰⁹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 29.

¹¹⁰ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 105.

¹¹¹ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 106.

¹¹² Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 112.

¹¹³ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 274.

Pigs."¹¹⁴ The effort to remove Castro from office was ambivalent regarding the method of his removal, stipulating only that he be removed along with whichever associates who could successfully retain power and continue the existence of a Soviet allied Cuban state.

In autumn 1960, the operational plan for the Bay of Pigs mission changed from the insertion of a small number of guerilla operatives with the objective of bolstering existing rebel forces to the insertion of a military force designed to oust Castro independent of any existing rebel forces.¹¹⁵ This force would now consist of a landing force of at least 1500 men, with the objective of seizing an advance position by combined sea and air attack.¹¹⁶ The strategic idea for this operation was the same that the CIA had used against Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz in the 1954 CIA sponsored coup; this idea presumed that the Cuban people were rebellious against Castro's rule and that "Castro would lose his nerve."¹¹⁷ However Castro, as well as the US, possessed knowledge of this Guatemalan operation, and Castro expected some form of US action.¹¹⁸ Cuban intelligence services had penetrated the Bay of Pigs landing operation, and Castro was very well informed about US operational planning.¹¹⁹

Cuban political isolation was extended after the Seventh Consultative meeting of the Ministers of the OAS. At that meeting a Cuban proposal to condemn the aggressive action of one American state (US) against another (Cuba) was voted against by 19 governments, and Cuba withdrew from the meeting.¹²⁰ The US assumption that international bodies, e.g. the OAS, existed to support the US stance regarding international relations seems vindicated by this vote.

¹¹⁴ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 274

¹¹⁵ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 32.

¹¹⁶ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 275.

¹¹⁷ Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, No. 3 (Autumn, 1984): 472.

¹¹⁸ Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 473.

¹¹⁹ Brian Latell, *Castro's Secrets* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 10.

¹²⁰ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 274.

The US began supply missions to Cuban resistance groups on 28 September, with the first mission resulting in the supplies delivered to Castro's forces, the death of the US agent on the ground, and the aircraft used being impounded in Mexico after navigational error.¹²¹ This was not a promising hallmark for the military phase of anti-Castro operations, but military operations were the recourse chosen when "efforts to isolate Cuba internationally and to cripple it through trade sanctions seemed unpromising."¹²² The US had defined Cuba as an enemy ideological outpost and the incoming Kennedy administration had campaigned vigorously in favor of action against Cuba and chastised the Eisenhower administration for a tepid response to Castro's leadership of Cuba.¹²³

On 7 October, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa publicly revealed details about the Bay of Pigs operation, basing his announcement on intelligence gathered by Cuban agents.¹²⁴ On that same day, candidate Kennedy publicly attacked the Eisenhower administration for "permitting a communist menace ... to arise only ninety miles from the shores of the United States."¹²⁵ Kennedy expanded his attacks in the next two weeks, stating that Cuban revolutionaries against Castro had "virtually no support from our government."¹²⁶ Kennedy's political rival and campaign opponent Richard Nixon, who as Eisenhower's Vice President was very well informed of both current and planned anti-Castro operations, characterized Kennedy's position on Cuba as "irresponsible and reckless."¹²⁷ Domestic political tension was beginning to have an effect on Kennedy, for if he were to win the election on this platform and fail to deliver the return of Cuba

¹²¹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 275.

¹²² Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 472.

¹²³ Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 484.

¹²⁴ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 276.

¹²⁵ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 276.

¹²⁶ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 276.

¹²⁷ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 276.

as a client state he and his party would attract criticism. Kennedy was locked by his political promises into immediate action rather than a calculated strategy.

Guatemalan agents of Cuban intelligence delivered to Cuba records of the growing force of exiles, the aircraft with which they were training, and the basing locations on 13 November.¹²⁸ Five days later, CIA leadership told President-elect Kennedy about the operational plan.¹²⁹ Castro knew about the Bay of Pigs operation before Kennedy did, and Kennedy was the man who would order the plan's execution. The change in US political leadership also hindered operational planning, because "the hallmarks of the new [Kennedy] administration were ad hoc, informal decision processes and impatience with matters of organization."¹³⁰ These hallmarks would deny the Kennedy administration the rigorous debate incorporated in the planning process for most military operations. At the time of Kennedy's inauguration, rather than sponsor his own plan of anti-Cuban action he was faced with the decision to proceed with a plan that had been developed and was being actively promoted by the CIA.¹³¹

In January 1961, operational preparation accelerated and US-Cuban tension climbed. On 1 January the US accelerated recruitment for its Cuban exile force, and on 3 January the Cuban government announced that "the total number of personnel at the U.S. Embassy and Consulate should not exceed eleven persons."¹³² In response to this Cuban demand, the US announced a break in relations and demanded the recall of all Cuban nationals stationed in the Cuban embassy in Washington DC.¹³³ Still on 3 January, Castro announced a future declaration to the UN: "if the United States believes it has the right to promote counterrevolution in Cuba, and believes it has

¹²⁸ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 278.

¹²⁹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 278.

¹³⁰ Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 485.

¹³¹ Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 473.

¹³² Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 280.

¹³³ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 281.

the right to promote counterrevolution in Latin America, then Cuba has the right to encourage revolution in Latin America!¹³⁴ The US had a greater opportunity for political defeat than did the Cuban government at this point. A failed US attempt to overthrow the Cuban government would have greatly reduced influence in Central and South America and demonstrated aggressive intent in the international political arena.

CIA officials prepared a memorandum to conceptualize the invasion plan in which it was stated that the landing force would execute "no early attempt to break out of the lodgment for further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by US military forces has taken place."¹³⁵ The fact that the Cuban military numbered at least 200,000 men¹³⁶ and was capable of repelling a landing force of 1500 without active support from US military forces is not addressed in the sources. On 6 January, the US State Department "says it doubts that Castro is planning to let the Soviet Union establish missile bases in Cuba."¹³⁷ Soviet missile facilities in Cuba would transform Cuba from an allied state into a Soviet strategic outpost, incorporating Cuba into the Soviet strategic apparatus to deter US attack.

In mid-January, the US imposed a travel embargo on Cuba, prohibiting US citizens from travelling directly between US territory and Cuba.¹³⁸ The US had economically and politically isolated Cuba and now had barred any travel between the two nations. On 19 January, Eisenhower endorsed the Bay of Pigs operation to President-elect Kennedy, deeming the operation a strategic necessity even if it required public US intervention because "we [the US]

¹³⁴ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 281.

¹³⁵ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 281.

¹³⁶ Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure," 473.

¹³⁷ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 282.

¹³⁸ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 283.

cannot let the present government there go on."¹³⁹ The political consequences of a failed operation to unseat Castro's government had been deemed less severe than the continued existence of that regime.

In April 1961, Castro prepared Cuban defenses against external invasion, and prepared his air force to withstand an enemy strike and be capable of response.¹⁴⁰ These preparations were chronologically coordinated with US operational planning; on 4 April the US decided to proceed with the invasion.¹⁴¹ Air strikes against the Cuban air force were executed on 15 April, and that same day the Cuban Foreign Minister accused the US of executing the bombing as "the prologue to a large scale invasion, planned, organized, provisioned, armed, and financed by the government of the United States."¹⁴² The US denied that it had any role in the events, but the next day Kennedy formally approved the landing plan for the invasion force.¹⁴³ However, that evening Kennedy cancelled the air cover for the invasion force, leaving it unprotected from Cuban air force operations.¹⁴⁴ The landing of the invasion force occurred on 17 April and sustained heavy casualties from the Cuban military; at the UN the Soviet delegate read a document calling for a cessation of anti-Cuban operations.¹⁴⁵ Kennedy's response is a claim that the US has the right "to protect the hemisphere from external aggression,"¹⁴⁶ a claim not supported by international law but consistent with the exercise of the Monroe Doctrine. On the morning of 19 April, Kennedy declared that he would not "commit U.S. forces to combat."¹⁴⁷ By

¹³⁹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 284.

¹⁴⁰ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 298.

¹⁴¹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 298.

¹⁴² Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 298.

¹⁴³ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 305.

¹⁴⁴ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 306.

¹⁴⁵ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 316.

¹⁴⁶ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 316.

¹⁴⁷ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 318.

the end of the day, CIA Director Allen Dulles admitted that "the Cuban invasion is a total failure."¹⁴⁸ On 5 May, the US National Security Council declared that "U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro."¹⁴⁹ Covert operations rather than poorly concealed military imperialism were chosen to overthrow Castro.

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, President Kennedy changed US policy to one of reduced public attention to Cuba (to deny the Cuban government the opportunity to play victim); increased economic activity and sabotage of the Cuban economy; increased military pressure (e.g., nearby naval exercises); accelerated covert operations; and the spread of anti-Cuban propaganda.¹⁵⁰ The chosen alternative to proxy invasion was a large scale covert action program to overthrow Castro, termed Operation Mongoose, initiated on 4 November 1961.¹⁵¹ According to US Attorney General Robert Kennedy, "a solution to the Cuban problem today carries the top priority in the United States Government - all else is secondary - no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared."¹⁵² By February 1962, US operational plan "aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962."¹⁵³ At this time, the US Department of Defense analyzed the idea that "the USSR could establish ground, sea, or air bases in Cuba and that it also delivered missiles with nuclear warheads."¹⁵⁴ It was considered likely that as time progressed, the probability that the USSR would establish military bases in Cuba increased.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁸ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 319.

¹⁴⁹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 323.

¹⁵⁰ Jacinto Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose: Prelude of a Direct Invasion on Cuba* (Havana: Editorial Capitan San Luis, 2004), 20.

¹⁵¹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 326.

¹⁵² Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose*, 35.

¹⁵³ Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose*, 36.

¹⁵⁴ Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose*, 42.

¹⁵⁵ Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose*, 45.

A Soviet military presence in Cuba would deter the US from further aggressions, for fear of starting an open war between the US and USSR. For example, if the proposed introduction of corrosive materials with the purpose of causing hardware failure¹⁵⁶ were to occur to a Soviet craft in such circumstances that the placement of the material was identifiable as the result of US action, the Soviet response could trigger an escalating chain of events that would lead to war. Further, if the USSR were successfully to install operational, strategically relevant nuclear systems in Cuba, any attack on Cuba or those missile systems would be an attack against the Soviet nuclear deterrent. This would carry the same strategic significance as a Soviet strike against Turkey. Regardless of whether the strike was targeted at the missiles it would be a strike against enemy strategic systems.

MAD is the main reason why the Cold War did not degenerate into an active conflict. Each side believed that it could detect an enemy nuclear launch in time to launch its own weapons in response, and therefore a first strike would invite a reprisal strike against one's own cities. Unless it was possible to destroy all enemy weapons with a surprise first strike, in 1962 there was no reason to launch a first strike absent international tension. If the USSR attacked Turkey or the US attacked Cuba (assuming Cuba harbored strategically significant Soviet nuclear systems), such a strike against one portion of the enemy nuclear deterrent would leave the bulk of enemy nuclear hardware untouched. This would have created the aforementioned international tension, and might have led to nuclear war.

The US had an established record of covert and overt hostility to Castro's government in Cuba. Cuban intelligence had penetrated many of these operations, and Castro was well aware of the continued efforts to replace or assassinate him. The only political entity with the ability to

¹⁵⁶ Valdes-Dapena, *Operation Mongoose*, 41.

deter the US from continued action was the USSR. Rather than force Castro to co-operate with US wishes the US pressure instead encouraged him to cultivate an alliance with the USSR. However, Soviet strategic inferiority limited the power of the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

Cuban/US relations encompassed several models: regional power vs. client; mother nation vs. protectorate; and enemy vs. enemy. From the 1823 imposition of the Monroe Doctrine, the US desire for political authority over Cuba was clearly expressed even as Cuba was expressly permitted to remain a Spanish possession. After the Spanish-American War, Cuba was incorporated as a protectorate under US authority. That status was maintained until 1933, at which point Cuba became a client state but remained under US authority. That status was maintained until the end of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, and the ascent to power of Fidel Castro. Castro would become a Soviet client, which forced the US to incorporate the modern exercise of the Monroe Doctrine into the Cold War political environment.

Chapter 2: US - Soviet Strategic Balance, 1962

The balance of deterrence evolved throughout the Cold War. At the beginning, US and Soviet strategists appraised nuclear war differently. Both nations attached political significance to strategic nuclear systems (e.g., ballistic missiles, aircraft), but not to tactical systems designed for battlefield use. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the balance of nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR before the deployment of Operation Anadyr.

The USSR launched the first military photo-reconnaissance satellite in 1961;¹ this satellite was not restricted by national boundaries and could provide images of military hardware as it was deployed in launch facilities in the US. The first experimental US reconnaissance satellite was launched in 1959, with successor operational systems to follow during the 1960s.² However, the US had access to another reconnaissance system without a Soviet equivalent in the U-2 aircraft. The U-2 was designed to fly at altitudes of 70,000 feet and provide a stable base for camera equipment,³ in order to fly over Soviet missile sites and air bases to provide intelligence about Soviet military capabilities, while avoiding interception or destruction by Soviet air defense forces.

To facilitate the environment of deterrence, on 21 July 1955 President Eisenhower proposed an Open Skies initiative to the USSR under which both nations would be permitted to fly over the enemy nation and inspect nuclear launch sites in order to defuse the possibility of a surprise nuclear first strike by either power.⁴ The USSR refused this proposal, which prompted

¹ Valery Babintsev, "The Peaceful and Military Development of Space: A Historical Perspective," 22. Accessed 3 November 2018. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpj66.9

² Babintsev, "The Peaceful and Military Development of Space," 23.

³ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 18.

⁴ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 26.

the US to develop an aerial reconnaissance strategy.⁵ The first U-2 flight over the USSR, in violation of international law, was launched on 4 July 1956 to inspect Soviet bomber bases; the Soviet air force was not capable of intercepting the U-2 due to the aircraft's high-altitude capability:

The Russians attempted more than twenty interceptions of the U-2. MiG [Soviet aircraft manufacturer Mikoyan-Gurevich] fighters were photographed desperately trying to reach the U-2, only to fall and tumble back to an altitude where they could restart their flamed-out engines.⁶

After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, U-2 missions were focused on ICBM production and deployment sites, as well as nuclear industrial sites.⁷ The USSR was aware of these flights, but had no recourse because Soviet aircraft were incapable of intercepting the U-2. Soviet Surface to Air Missile (SAM) development provided the answer; in 1959 the SA-2, which was capable of destroying a U-2, was in the process of deployment around strategic nuclear sites.⁸ On 1 May 1960, this SAM system was responsible for the interception of US U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers' aircraft,⁹ and in the ensuing scandal Eisenhower insisted that the espionage activities, however distasteful, were "a vital necessity in the world as it is today."¹⁰ By the end of 1960, no evidence had been discovered of "a single deployed Soviet ICBM site outside of Plesetsk,"¹¹ leading to the conclusion that the USSR possessed only one ICBM launch facility. The US accurately appraised the Soviet nuclear deterrent, and both nations were well aware that the US possessed overwhelming nuclear superiority.

⁵ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 27.

⁶ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 30.

⁷ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 35.

⁸ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 43.

⁹ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 43.

¹⁰ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 45.

¹¹ Brugioni, *The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 36.

One of the crucial pre-requisites for a situation where nuclear weapons served as political deterrents is knowledge. Before Operation Anadyr, both the USSR and the US possessed reconnaissance systems in addition to human espionage activities. Both nations were engaged in espionage, with the Soviet effort penetrating the Manhattan Project during World War II and the US effort recruiting Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. Penkovskiy provided intelligence on "Soviet political intentions and the current condition of Soviet military preparations" between April 1961 and August 1962.¹² Because the development of the SA-2 had imposed flight restrictions on the U-2 over Soviet nuclear sites, the US did not have a technological solution but Penkovskiy was able to provide information about Soviet strategic capabilities.

The strategic purpose of a deterrence system is to impose a well defined, valuable cost to any enemy action. In the context of MAD, the cost of military action against the enemy itself, its aircraft, submarines, or equipment stationed in an allied state, or personnel stationed in those locations would be a nuclear attack against the population centers of the attacker. In 1962, the two anticipated actions of this type were the Soviet action against Turkey and the US action against Cuba. Turkey had attempted to protect itself by political alliance with the US and harboring of US nuclear systems; Cuba had made a political alliance with the USSR and agreed to harbor Soviet nuclear systems, even though they had not all become operational.

Khrushchev's original concept of nuclear strategy relied upon the assumption that minimum deterrence was a valid strategic concept, i.e., a minimal Soviet nuclear force would be capable of deterring a substantially larger US nuclear force. The US Air Force sought a force of

¹² Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 4.

2500 new Minuteman ICBMs, to compensate for the expected large Soviet strategic arsenal.¹³ If the US had a substantial strategic advantage, a counter-force strike against the much smaller Soviet nuclear force could prevent a Soviet nuclear response and enable a successful first strike. MAD requires that all sides possessed a substantial nuclear arsenal, so that a successful counter-force strike would be impossible. Deterrence formed the basis for a balance of power between the two superpowers; any military action would be answered by a full nuclear response resulting in the destruction of both nations.

The US strategic nuclear forces formed a tripod: aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missiles. For the USSR, the dominant force was ballistic missiles, with minimal reliance upon aircraft or Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) systems. In 1955, the Soviet navy began testing a submarine outfitted with an experimental missile launching system. The missile chosen for this purpose, the R-11FM, was fueled by corrosive hypergolic (i.e., ignition on contact) liquids and loaded into the submarine already fueled; the nitric acid used as an oxidizer in this missile corroded the missiles and was extremely dangerous for the crew.¹⁴ These missiles had primitive guidance systems, and were regarded by Soviet officers as suitable for training crews and not as a capable military force.¹⁵ The Soviet military valued these missiles for training crews to operate ballistic missiles, rather than as effective fully-functional combat systems themselves.

¹³ Steven J. Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000*. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 77.

¹⁴ Steven J. Zaloga, *Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race 1945-1964* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993), 177.

¹⁵ Zaloga, *Target America*, 180.

In December 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev announced the formation of a new military branch, the Strategic Rocket Forces,¹⁶ whose responsibility was strategic missile weaponry for the Soviet nuclear deterrent force. This branch was accorded the highest priority for allocations of both material and manpower, reflecting Khrushchev's conviction that missile weaponry was the way of the future.¹⁷ However, the structure of Soviet defense industries and the nonexistent state of Soviet civilian technological development made the prospect of an arms race daunting.¹⁸

The most advanced Soviet ICBM at this point was Soviet ballistic missile designer Mikhail Yangel's R-16, which experienced a severe accident at the first test of the finished missile. On the morning of 23 October 1960 the test missile was fueled with hypergolic liquids, but before the launch problems were discovered with the fuel piping for the first stage engine.¹⁹ The missile technicians worked overnight without removing the fuel and oxidizer from the missile, and the next morning a fuel leak was discovered and the launch was rescheduled for 24 October at 7:15 pm.²⁰ By this time, the launch pad was crowded with personnel not limited to those required for the test, including Yangel, military personnel, and many of the design assistants.²¹ Just after 6:45 pm, a test connection malfunctioned and sent the ignition signal to the second stage engine, resulting in an explosion and the death of most of Yangel's designers.²² The first successful test flight of the R-16 did not occur until 2 February 1961.²³ This accident, called the Nedelin Disaster, after the first head of the Strategic Missile Forces who was killed by it, was

¹⁶ Zaloga, *Target America*, 187.

¹⁷ Zaloga, *Target America*, 187.

¹⁸ Zaloga, *Target America*, 192.

¹⁹ Zaloga, *Target America*, 195.

²⁰ Zaloga, *Target America*, 195.

²¹ Zaloga, *Target America*, 195.

²² Zaloga, *Target America*, 197.

²³ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 67.

a monumental setback to the Soviet ICBM program because the competing ICBM design, Sergei Korolev's R-9, was not an equivalent strategic system.²⁴ Due to the delays, fewer than two dozen R-16 missiles were operational in 1962, and Korolev's R-9 was not deployed until 1963.²⁵ A limited number of R-16 systems comprised the ICBM portion of the Soviet strategic deterrent.

While the R-16 was an operational ICBM, it was not based in a facility that would allow it to survive a US nuclear first strike.²⁶ The shelters were designed to resist nearby detonation of nuclear warheads²⁷ and were not capable of resisting either a direct hit from an enemy missile or an airstrike. The US Gaither Commission of 1957 concluded that the only way to shield strategic missiles from enemy nuclear action was inside an underground silo that could protect them from enemy weapons.²⁸ Silo basing would remove the time requirement of erecting the missile on the launch pad, conceal fueling preparations from enemy surveillance, and protect the missile from enemy attack. The Soviets had no analogous initiative, so those strategies had not been adopted by the USSR. The US adopted this basing strategy beginning with the Minuteman I of 1962.²⁹ For Soviet ICBMs, Khrushchev allowed that the planned surface basing arrangements would suffice for initial deployment, but that silo basing was foreseen in the near future.³⁰ Multiple strategic implications for Soviet strategic forces were that: the missiles would be much more vulnerable to enemy attack; missile fueling or launch preparations could not be concealed; and launch sites would be obvious to enemy reconnaissance.

²⁴ Zaloga, *Target America*, 197.

²⁵ Zaloga, *Target America*, 197.

²⁶ Zaloga, *Target America*, 198.

²⁷ Zaloga, *Target America*, 198.

²⁸ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 62.

²⁹ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 62.

³⁰ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 64.

Technology was another area in which the USSR was at a disadvantage to the US. In the event of an R-16 launch, the missile had to be moved to the launch pad, erected, and fueled in a process taking between one and three hours.³¹ Aside from the basing arrangement failing to protect the missile against an enemy attack, the ability of these missiles to survive an enemy first strike provided a reasonable chance of exacting a counter-value (i.e., targeting enemy population centers) strike. Targeting equipment provided another advantage to the US: US navigation systems were capable of running constantly while the missile was prepared for launch, but Soviet systems required as long as 20 minutes to prepare their navigational systems.³² The recognized disadvantage of Soviet military systems was one reason for the less effective nature of Soviet forces as a political deterrent.

As of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet nuclear forces had neither the number of weapons required to destroy US missiles in a first strike nor the required intelligence for targeting.³³ Further, Khrushchev believed the strategic role of nuclear weaponry was to deter an enemy attack rather than to initiate a counter-force (i.e., targeting enemy strategic weapons) strike.³⁴ In July and August 1962 the Soviet government cancelled work on the first generation of Soviet ICBMs,³⁵ saving the resources to accelerate the development of the second generation. Khrushchev was not in any position to indulge in brinkmanship or to threaten an enemy who had overwhelming strategic superiority, but the Soviet military convinced him that Operation Anadyr could be executed without US discovery.³⁶ The operation was named after a river in the Soviet

³¹ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 68.

³² Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 68.

³³ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 79.

³⁴ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 79.

³⁵ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 81.

³⁶ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 83.

Arctic, the river Anadyr, but camouflage measures for this deployment were insufficient and poorly executed.³⁷

In 1962, the USSR was severely disadvantaged regarding the Cold War balance of strategic forces. The USSR was surrounded by enemy allied states, NATO in the European theater, China and Japan in the east, and all of the aforementioned nations politically. Speaking only of the balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between the US and USSR, the US was armed with 78 land ICBMs, 96 SLBMs, and 1505 nuclear capable bombers.³⁸ The USSR was armed with 56 ICBMs, 0 internationally ranged SLBMs, and 182 bombers.³⁹ The Soviet SLBM force was weak; the bulk of the submarine force was diesel fueled rather than nuclear,⁴⁰ limiting range and patrol length. In 1961, one of the Soviet strategic missile submarines suffered a reactor accident, rendering unfeasible the idea of a possible strategic missile patrol offshore of the US in the manner practiced by US ballistic missile submarines.⁴¹ US submarines routinely patrolled the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which decreased the flight time for their SLBMs to strike enemy targets and made their detection by Soviet forces less likely. The Soviet strategic forces also suffered from a divided focus, because Khrushchev ordered Yangel's missile bureau to cease work on SLBM systems to concentrate on the R-16.⁴² Khrushchev's strategic vision was driven by the belief that missiles were the future, so expenditures on strategic aircraft were curtailed in favor of missile development.⁴³ The US was developing a nuclear force of aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missiles, while the USSR had a marked disadvantage in the realm of submarines and

³⁷ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 83.

³⁸ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

³⁹ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

⁴⁰ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 72.

⁴¹ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 74.

⁴² Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 74.

⁴³ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 75.

was subordinating the development of aircraft in favor of missile development. However, stationing strategically important military equipment was a public way for a superpower to prove the benefit of alliance to a client state, because it demonstrated the value of the client state to the superpower's war plans and ensured a steady supply of financial aid to the client state.

The US did not have a development program for any IRBM system until 1955.⁴⁴ Ballistic missile programs were a legacy of World War II; the US and USSR both profited from knowledge of Nazi German missile research facilities and staff. At a NATO conference in December 1959 the US offered to deploy IRBMs to NATO allies.⁴⁵ The British and the US had had an agreement regarding IRBMs, at one point discussing joint development of such a system;⁴⁶ in March 1957 an agreement was reached to base some IRBM systems in England under joint control.⁴⁷ President Eisenhower attached political weight to missile systems, completely divorced from their military efficacy.⁴⁸ While the deployment of strategic missile systems to Europe would have some deterrent value against Soviet action, the motivating factor for the US to offer this deployment was to restore the credibility that the US would stand with NATO in the event of a Soviet attack and not abstain because it was not threatened directly.⁴⁹ The Soviet launch of Sputnik into orbit on 4 October 1957 created the impression among NATO allies that the Soviet Union held strategic superiority.⁵⁰ For domestic and international political

⁴⁴ Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters 1957-1963* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 7.

⁴⁵ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 7.

⁴⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 8.

⁴⁷ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 10.

⁴⁸ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 11.

⁴⁹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 27.

⁵⁰ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 55.

reasons, the Eisenhower administration reversed the planned reduction in defense spending and instead increased the pace of the nuclear arms race.⁵¹

The problem with the first generation ICBMs was the launching facility required; each missile required its own launch facility and these facilities were expensive. The construction delay required to create these bases substantially outlasted the time required to produce a missile; at one point in 1960, 24 US ICBMs without any available basing were stored rather than deployed.⁵² This requirement also afflicted Soviet first generation missiles; as of 1962 the US had begun to deploy the solid-fueled second generation Minuteman ICBM⁵³ while a comparable Soviet ICBM did not yet exist. An unsuccessful development program for a Soviet Minuteman analogue was initiated on 4 April 1961 but the USSR was unable to field a second generation solid fueled ICBM.⁵⁴

The IRBMs offered to NATO in the 1957 meeting were intended by US planners to fulfill political rather than military objectives; US policymakers did not consider the IRBMs to be capable military systems.⁵⁵ NATO nations were noncommittal in response to this offer, with the exception of Turkey, who was eager to accept these weapons for their political significance.⁵⁶ These weapons would have to be defended by NATO forces, which would bring money into the Turkish economy; Turkish requests for aid in return for hosting weapons would be considered from a national security perspective. The US National Security Council in March 1958 approved the decision to install IRBMs on Soviet borders, but noted that such deployments must be

⁵¹ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 55.

⁵² James C. Dick, "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961: Who Opened a Missile Gap?," *The Journal of Politics* 34, No. 4 (Nov., 1972): 1073.

⁵³ Dick, "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961," 1083.

⁵⁴ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 105.

⁵⁵ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 27.

⁵⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 29.

carefully managed to prevent the USSR from ascribing aggressive motivations to those deployments.⁵⁷ This is an interesting concern because the US exhibited aggressive motivations. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Eisenhower administration, and President-Elect Kennedy all were aware that the US possessed strategic superiority over the USSR and that further expansion of US military equipment on Soviet borders could not be construed as anything other than aggressive, as was indicated by Khrushchev's protests that "American missiles were aimed against us [USSR] in Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany."⁵⁸ Eisenhower contemplated how an analogous Soviet effort would look to the US with the analysis, "If Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists, and then began getting arms and missiles from them, we would... it would be imperative for us to take positive action, even offensive military action."⁵⁹ However, Eisenhower approved the deployment of IRBMs to NATO allies, having anticipated the Soviet reaction to these deployments.

At a summit in June 1961, Khrushchev discussed the analogy between the US support of Turkey and the Soviet support of Cuba, citing the precedent set by the US invasion of the Bay of Pigs: stating that Turkey and Iran "have U.S. bases and rockets. If the U.S. believes it is free to act (as in the Bay of Pigs), then what should the USSR do?"⁶⁰ Kennedy responded "these two countries are so weak that they could be no threat to the USSR, no more than Cuba [is] to the US."⁶¹ Yet the US had launched a proxy invasion of Cuba, so this comparison could be paralleled by a similar Soviet action against Turkey. The US government did not consider these placements analogous, instead one US official claimed that the Soviet deployment to Cuba was

⁵⁷ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 37.

⁵⁸ Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 493.

⁵⁹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 63.

⁶⁰ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 99.

⁶¹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 99.

"less a matter of the Monroe Doctrine than one of elemental national security...not the same as missiles in Turkey."⁶² The US bases encircling the USSR were deemed "for the defense of freedom" while the Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere was considered an aggressive outpost. That strategically equivalent installations should be characterized differently is illogical.

Just as US-Cuban relations had been declining for some time before 1962, Soviet-Turkish relations had evolved in a similar manner. Soviet-Turkish relations had been unfriendly for some time; Turkish fears of Soviet invasion had compelled Turkey to insert a clause into a treaty signed with France and Great Britain stating that regardless of any existing obligations, Turkey would not enter the war against the USSR.⁶³ Turkey feared Soviet action because the USSR coveted unrestricted passage through the Bosphorus strait, which was controlled solely by Turkey. In 1945, the US and Great Britain co-operated to block a Soviet demand for the mandate over the formerly Italian colony Tripolitania (today, Libya), denying the USSR any military presence in the Mediterranean Sea.⁶⁴ In 1946, the Soviet government attempted to negotiate a revised treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus strait with Turkey, the US, and Great Britain.⁶⁵ The US too believed that allowing the USSR to assume some responsibility for the Bosphorus strait posed a danger to Turkish security, and further believed "the introduction of Soviet arms into Turkey would result in Greece and the whole Middle East...falling under Soviet control."⁶⁶ The Soviet effort to renegotiate the treaty governing access to the Bosphorus was unsuccessful, and rather

⁶² Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 110.

⁶³ Anthony R. De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits," *Political Science Quarterly* 92, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977): 504.

⁶⁴ Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 39.

⁶⁵ De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits," 516.

⁶⁶ De Luca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits," 518.

than increasing Soviet control over the strait, Turkey was encouraged to join NATO and ally itself with the US.

Eisenhower "ascribed little military value to the IRBMs from the outset but offered them to NATO mainly with the political objective of alliance cohesion in the nuclear realm" in mind.⁶⁷ Military weaponry was being used to achieve a political objective, regardless of the strategic value of the military hardware. With the Polaris missile submarines now entering service, the Jupiter missiles were obsolete before the deployment began.⁶⁸ The military purpose of these land-based missiles could be better addressed by the submarines, so the only reason for the deployment at that point was political.

In May 1961, President Kennedy received a memo from US Senator Claiborne Pell pointing out the hypocrisy of "declaring allied missiles in Turkey acceptable yet Soviet missiles near the United States unacceptable."⁶⁹ Kennedy replied that the analogy was not troublesome, and "expressed his intention thereafter to emphasize the different purposes of U.S. and Soviet overseas bases."⁷⁰ The purpose of a military base depends on whom the military threat is directed; to the USSR the US bases would have the same aggressive purpose as Kennedy ascribed to the Soviet bases. Khrushchev noted that "the United States had already surrounded the Soviet Union with its own bomber bases and missiles."⁷¹ That US and Soviet bases should be differentiated by the nation rather than strategic purpose is illogical.

If any crisis between nuclear armed opponents is defined as a nuclear crisis regardless of threatened use of nuclear weapons, then the relative nuclear balance has an impact on the

⁶⁷ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 89.

⁶⁸ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 89.

⁶⁹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 95.

⁷⁰ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 95.

⁷¹ Trans. Strobe Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 493.

resolution of the conflict.⁷² The nuclear balance in the early 1960s heavily favored the US, so the USSR was at a political and military disadvantage. Nuclear brinkmanship became a political bargaining strategy; because the US was positioned to win a nuclear confrontation, it was more willing to escalate the risk in an attempt to obtain concessions from the USSR. If the original plan for Operation Anadyr, the covert installation of strategic systems and their public revelation in November 1962, had been successful it would have had a minimal influence on the strategic balance but would have publically bolstered Soviet resolve to resist US threats. "Nuclear strategists recognize that not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating,"⁷³ so an introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba would increase the cost of US victory in a nuclear war. This increased cost would provide some deterrent value to actions against both the USSR and Cuba because "nuclear superiority reduces the expected costs that a country would incur in the event of nuclear war;"⁷⁴ the deployment of additional Soviet IRBMs would decrease the margin of US nuclear superiority and therefore increase the potential cost of US action.

The problem of interpretation was exacerbated by the character of the IRBMs installed in Turkey by the US. Because these early missiles used cryogenic liquid fuel, they could not be left fueled indefinitely. They were stored empty of fuel and so had to be fueled before firing, a time lag that would result in their destruction by an enemy first strike in the event of war. Because they were sited close to the border, in the event of a US first strike these weapons possibly could kill Soviet decision makers or destroy Soviet strategic sites before a Soviet retaliatory strike

⁷² Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," *International Organization* 67, No. 1 (Winter 2013): 142.

⁷³ Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve," 148.

⁷⁴ Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve," 149.

could be launched. These weapons did have some value as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on Turkey, but the only US military use was as an instrument for a first strike against the USSR.

The US nuclear deployment to Turkey completed the encirclement of the USSR with enemy nuclear weapons. NATO had deployed IRBMs in a number of nations, the US was capable of striking the USSR from the north, east, and west depending on the target, and the Turkish deployment cemented a threat from the south. The idea that the USSR would not receive this deployment as an aggressive act is not credible; the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons in a Soviet border state could not be considered a defensive necessity from a military perspective. Another important consideration is the orientation of Soviet launch detection systems. Before real-time satellite imagery, over-the-horizon radar was one of the main Soviet launch detection methods. This required an elaborate transmission array, which was not portable and had to be constructed to observe one particular direction. The Turkish missiles had a chance of executing a launch against a Soviet target with minimal or no warning, because no such Soviet facility had been constructed from which to observe the Soviet border with Turkey.

With the NATO IRBMs and the US ICBMs, NATO had overwhelming nuclear superiority. The Soviet conventional superiority on the border with NATO was irrelevant; in the event of an attack NATO war plans would have called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a Soviet advance. The political calculations surrounding the placement of US nuclear weapons in Turkey and Western Europe were irrelevant to the strategic threat they posed to the USSR; because of the short distance, consequent flight time, and lack of protection enjoyed by these systems, these IRBMs had one strategic role: first strike. MAD required that nations have equivalent counterforce capability; the capability of the US to eradicate the Soviet nuclear force without reciprocal Soviet capability destabilized the US-Soviet strategic balance.

One of the requirements for MAD was that both nations possessed second-strike capability, i.e., even after an enemy first strike a nation would be capable of a counter-value strike against the aggressor. However, in October 1962 the US possessed overwhelming nuclear superiority. This meant that while the US was capable of destroying the Soviet nuclear deterrent, the USSR was neither capable of a counter-force first strike nor a counter-value second strike because of the manner in which their strategic systems were deployed. The US had deployed SLBM systems and nuclear submarines were limited only by the provisions aboard, allowing them to hide in international waters. These submarines were capable of a first strike, potentially launched from within Soviet waters, against the land based Soviet strategic missiles. US submarines were not vulnerable to Soviet strategic missiles, because their location was unknown and Soviet ICBM forces were aimed as US land targets. From the Soviet perspective, the US was operating under the guidelines of MAD while the USSR was forced to operate under a doctrine the US never considered: finite deterrence.⁷⁵

The US reached the conclusion that "nuclear weapons must be used not for defeating an enemy in war but for preventing such a war from happening in the first place."⁷⁶ This transformed the primary function of nuclear weaponry from combat to political maneuvering. However, the Soviet military viewed nuclear weaponry "simply as significantly more destructive arms that fit readily into the canon on conducting and winning a conventional war."⁷⁷ This interpretation removes the political significance from a strategic deployment, because the deterrent facility is limited solely to the military aspect rather than the political domain. The

⁷⁵ Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," 160.

⁷⁶ Alexi Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Vladimir Evseev, "The Inherent Contradictions of Nuclear Deterrence," *Transforming the US-Russia Equation*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, 18. Accessed 8/19/18. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1mtz694.6

⁷⁷ Arbatov, Dvorkin, and Evseev, "The Inherent Contradictions of Nuclear Deterrence," 19.

Soviet military interpretation makes Khrushchev's conclusion that nuclear missiles in Cuba would enable Cuba to deal an extremely destructive blow to the US in the event of an invasion⁷⁸ significant from the perspective of Soviet institutional politics.

As of the summer of 1962, the Soviet strategic position was distinctly inferior to the US position. Both nations were capable of counter-value strikes; however the US position was superior in terms of deliverable weaponry and warning time. The US would have substantially more warning time because of the distance required between the launch system and the target, whereas US strategic materiel was deployed on Soviet borders and would offer a limited response time to Soviet leadership. Elements of the US nuclear deterrent were placed in Europe to achieve political objectives, including assurances to NATO that the US would not abandon those nations in the event of a Soviet invasion, but the strategic use of those systems was limited to a first strike. The military dimension of US IRBM deployments categorized those systems as aggressive, despite the politically defensive reason for their deployment.

⁷⁸ Ed. Sergei Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 329.

Chapter 3: Operation Anadyr

Operation Anadyr was the Soviet military deployment that prompted the US to instigate the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October 1962.¹ The deployment consisted of ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft, and ground forces. The only strategically significant systems were the ballistic missiles, because the presence of tactical nuclear weapons was not announced and so did not serve a deterrent function. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the military deployment and capabilities of the weapons deployed in Operation Anadyr and their significance.

In May 1962, Khrushchev determined that further US aggression against Cuba, which was intended to replace Castro's government with one more reflective of US interests, was probable and could best be forestalled by the deployment of Soviet strategic forces to Cuba.² Khrushchev's impression of nuclear weaponry as "something to be used in battle or diplomacy,"³ in combination with the presence of US strategic forces in Turkey and US public threats directed at Cuba, led Khrushchev to conclude that "Kennedy intended to use America's nuclear advantage to force Moscow to desert our new partner in the Caribbean."⁴ If successful, this effort would establish the reputation of the USSR as an unreliable ally, and set the precedent that the US could use superior strategic capability to force the USSR to heed US demands. In light of the Cold War political tensions and the emerging Sino-Soviet split, this precedent would severely

¹ Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1971), 19.

² Anatoli Gribkov and William Smith, *Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 4.

³ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 10.

⁴ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 11.

disrupt Soviet political objectives and allow both the US and People's Republic of China (PRC) to establish their sovereignty in positions formerly occupied by the USSR.

The US use of strategic weapons to achieve political objectives in Western Europe and Turkey provided an example for Khrushchev to follow, and the fact that the US deployed these weapons in client states against the USSR set the precedent that this deployment strategy was legal and strategically sound. The decision to send strategic forces to Cuba defended the USSR as well, because it allowed the USSR to ameliorate somewhat the 17 to 1 ratio of US strategic nuclear forces to Soviet strategic nuclear forces.⁵ The addition of strategically relevant missiles would decrease the margin of US strategic superiority. Thus the operation could achieve both political and military objectives: to defend a client state from US aggression and further develop the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

During a visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, Khrushchev decided that because "the United States had surrounded the Soviet Union with its military bases and placed its missiles all around our country," that a symmetrical action would be to place analogous forces in Cuba.⁶ The intention was that the US would experience firsthand the strategic circumstance in which they had positioned the USSR; "they had surrounded us with military bases and kept our country under the constant threat of possible nuclear attack."⁷ Khrushchev's purpose in deploying nuclear arms was to bring Cuba under the Soviet strategic umbrella, under the theory that the potential destruction of US cities "would restrain the powers that be in the United States from invading Cuba."⁸ In addition to deterring any US attack on Cuba, strategic weaponry deployed to Cuba

⁵ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 11.

⁶ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 325.

⁷ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 326.

⁸ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 329.

"would have equalized what the West (NATO) likes to call the 'balance of power.'"⁹ This deployment would have bolstered the Soviet nuclear deterrent; somewhat addressing the issues caused by US strategic superiority. The USSR was not yet positioned to replace the strategic doctrine of 'minimum deterrence' (i.e., the idea that a small nuclear force would deter an enemy in the same manner as a larger one) with MAD; whereas Operation Anadyr was insufficient to independently facilitate that transition, it was considered capable of expanding the Soviet ability to deter a US attack on either the USSR or Cuba.

Operation Anadyr included deployment of 36 IRBMs capable of striking US targets 1400 miles away from the launch sites in Cuba and 24 MRBMs capable of striking US targets 2800 miles distant.¹⁰ The operation involved 51,000 soldiers, their weaponry, and supplies.¹¹ The deployment also included nuclear armed cruise missiles, a small number of bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons, and tactical rockets because "it was felt that Pliyev's (the Soviet General commanding Operation Anadyr) troops on Cuba, so far from reinforcements, might need the added battlefield strength that such tactical atomic arms could provide."¹² Tactical nuclear weapons would not be strategically useful; tactical deployment systems did not have the range or a warhead powerful enough for a counterforce mission; their utility was limited solely to battlefield use against an enemy invasion force.

One risk factor, unknown to the US, was the set of instructions given to General Pliyev regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons: "If there is no way to communicate with Moscow, Pliyev may use the tactical 'Luna' rockets at his discretion in the event of an American attack and

⁹ Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 494.

¹⁰ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 13.

¹¹ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 23.

¹² Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 27.

if troops actually land on the coast."¹³ Independent nuclear launch authority was an extremely unusual event, even with the limit to tactical weaponry. Nuclear launch authority was held only by the heads of state, the Soviet leader's express delegation of such authority to a field commander was unprecedented. Had the delegation of independent launch authority been made public, it is unlikely that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have been sanctioned by Moscow because of the overwhelming US superiority of strategic weapons. The use of these weapons in a limited engagement could have escalated into a nuclear total war, for which the USSR was not well prepared.

Operation Anadyr was launched with many concealment measures because announcing the presence of strategic missiles would be futile unless they were operational. Even the ship's captains did not know the intended destination before departure:

Before casting off, the troop commander and the ship captain would jointly receive a large sealed envelope tied with brown ribbon. Unfastening it, they would find a smaller envelope to be opened only at such-and-such coordinates in the Atlantic Ocean. For that revealing ceremony, an officer of the KGB's Special Department would join them. The letter inside would tell them to proceed to a Cuban port.¹⁴

The ships were loaded in a deceptive fashion: "combat and specialized military equipment was stored below, out of sight; ordinary automobiles, trucks, tractors and harvesters were put on the top deck to make it seem that only agricultural gear was being transported."¹⁵ However the camouflage efforts deemed logical and sufficient in Moscow, decided on the basis of maps and with no knowledge of the local terrain, were inadequate:

Cuba's forests would provide just the needed cover for our missiles. Only someone with absolutely no competence in such technical matters could have reached that conclusion.

¹³ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 43.

¹⁴ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 31.

¹⁵ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 36.

A missile-launching complex is not easily disguised. The area is filled not with slim, upright rockets but with multiple command and support buildings, rows of fuel trucks and hundreds of meters of thick cable - all surrounding the large concrete slabs that anchored the missile launchers. Once the heavy equipment had been moved in, such an installation - but not the roads built to it - could be hidden from ground-level view. From above, however, it could and did stick out like a sore thumb.¹⁶

The operational design for Anadyr assumed that the strategic systems could be constructed in a way concealed from enemy intelligence until they had become operational. The camouflage measures taken with regard to the soldiers and equipment while in transport provide a stark contrast to the measures taken to disguise the deployment in Cuba. Because of the geography, even if the Soviet SAM deployments deterred flights over Cuba by the U-2, this aircraft was able to fly outside of Cuban territory and still obtain pictures of Soviet launch facilities. If the launch facilities could not be concealed from hostile surveillance, the measures taken in transporting the men and equipment to Cuba were irrelevant because their presence easily could be discovered once they arrived.

The 24 MRBMs would not have provided the USSR with a viable counter-force weapon; even though they had sufficient range to strike targets in the continental US, they were insufficient in number and not deployed in a hardened manner (e.g., in a structure that would protect them from enemy assault, either conventional or nuclear). However, MRBMs would provide a counter-value deterrent, which would force the US to consider whether the prospect of conquering Cuba was worth the nuclear destruction of US cities. Launching such weapons 90 miles away from the continental US would provide minimal time for warning, and the US did not have systems in place to monitor a nuclear launch from the south. However, once the US was

¹⁶ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 39.

aware of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles, it was straightforward and easy to deploy a system to monitor for a launch from Cuba.

The MRBMs deployed to Cuba had the range to strike targets anywhere in the continental US. However, there were far more strategic targets than deployed missiles. In 1962, the US possessed 78 ICBMs and 96 SLBMs.¹⁷ The 24 missiles deployed would be insufficient to launch a counter-force first strike, not considering the air bases for the 1505 US strategic bombers.¹⁸ Because the Soviet MRBMs were deployed in Cuba without any protection from enemy attack, they had no value as instruments of reprisal in the event of a US attack on the Soviet mainland. These weapons were not strategically useful except as part of a Soviet first strike, but they were ill suited for that role because of the time required to ready them for launch and the limited time they could remain fueled. The MRBMs were politically useful as a symbol of Soviet support for Cuba and strategically useful to deter a US attack on Cuba. The US would not strike at a Soviet strategic base for fear of initiating an open nuclear war.

The 36 IRBMs would not have provided the USSR with a counter-force weapon either. The insufficient numbers and imprecise targeting made them incapable of destroying silo based weapons like the US solid-fueled Minuteman that had begun to enter service. These forces provided a similar counter-value capability to the MRBMs, and the combined purpose would be to deter nuclear war. The Soviet government informed General Anatoli Gribkov of the purpose of the deployment; "you know very well that we are stationing the missiles in Cuba in order to deter possible aggression of the United States of America and its allies."¹⁹ The combination force of ballistic missiles would not have provided the USSR with anything resembling nuclear

¹⁷ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

¹⁸ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

¹⁹ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 43.

superiority; however it would reduce the magnitude of the US strategic advantage. Operation Anadyr would reinforce the Soviet nuclear deterrent but not in a manner capable of surviving a US first strike.

The deployed IRBMs were of more limited strategic use than the MRBMs. They possessed the same strategic limitations as the MRBM systems, with the additional range constraint. The IRBMs were less capable of either a counter-force or counter-value strike, because their range limited the target selection of either US population centers or military facilities. This constraint limited their utility for a first strike, which was the purpose the US ascribed to the deployment. This assumption caused the US to doubt Foreign Minister Gromyko's desire "to emphasize that the Soviet Union would never become involved in the furnishing of offensive weapons to Cuba."²⁰ The strategic function of the Soviet ballistic missiles deployed to Cuba was not that of a first strike, and many of the missiles deployed would have been of limited use in such a mission.

Operation Anadyr included aircraft as well as strategic missiles. The Soviet philosophy of strategic warfare is evident in this deployment; the 17 IL-28 bombers included only 6 equipped to carry nuclear weapons.²¹ Also included were helicopters, two antiaircraft divisions, and 11 aircraft intended for noncombat missions.²² Strategically, none of these was relevant; even a nuclear armed force of six bombers would not have any effect upon the strategic balance and would be destroyed by US air defenses before they could accomplish any mission. According to Khrushchev, the IL-28s were "outdated bombers. We (USSR) had stopped production of them

²⁰ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 31.

²¹ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 27.

²² Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 27.

long before and were gradually removing them from our arsenal."²³ If the US invaded Cuba, the US would do so with air support that easily could destroy these bombers. The IL-28s would be tactically useful against a landing force; their deployment was intended for coastal defense.²⁴

In 1962, the USSR was capable of fielding 182 bombers of intercontinental range.²⁵ This force was strategically inferior to 1505 US bombers with intercontinental range,²⁶ and against such numbers the six bombers deployed to Cuba were irrelevant. It is curious why the nuclear-capable IL-28 models were deployed; they were not intended to accomplish any strategic or deterrence objective and were tactically inferior to the other deployed systems for coastal defense. The USSR "did not see much defensive advantage to be gained by announcing that such arms [the IL-28s] were part of our arsenal on Cuba."²⁷ Without public announcement or US intelligence information, the US did not learn of the existence of these weapons and therefore they could not deter US action.

The 80 nuclear armed cruise missiles would be limited to use against forces landing on Cuba or offshore naval support of such a landing. These coastal defense missiles were designed to be launched from land deployments against naval targets, and so were optimized for use against a hostile invasion fleet.²⁸ They were nuclear armed, but possessed tactical warheads suitable for battlefield use rather than strategic warheads intended for use against hardened targets or cities. In combination with their limited range, the cruise missiles could not serve either counter-force or counter-value functions; the intended purpose of these weapons was purely defensive in a tactical sense.

²³ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 333.

²⁴ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 333.

²⁵ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

²⁶ Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 77.

²⁷ Gribkov and Smith, *Operation Anadyr*, 28.

²⁸ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 333.

The deployment of Luna rockets armed with tactical nuclear weapons also was a defensive maneuver. These rockets had limited effective range, and like the cruise missiles were limited to use for tactical objectives. They could not serve as strategic weapons in any capacity; the independent launch authority given to Pliyev in the event of lost contact with Moscow was destabilizing rather than a force for deterrence because this detail was not announced to US political or military leadership. However given that the strategic missile deployments had not become operational at the time of their discovery by the US, the use of tactical nuclear weaponry could have escalated into a nuclear total war for which the USSR was not well prepared.

In the US-organized Bay of Pigs landing, the naval targets observed by the Cuban Air Force consisted of "seven or eight large boats and an indeterminate number of launches and landing craft."²⁹ These craft were engaged in the deployment of the Cuban exile landing force, and contained stores of ammunition and fuel.³⁰ Had a similar landing been executed by US forces once the tactical nuclear systems were operational, the landing force easily could have been destroyed with minimal Cuban or Soviet losses. If the US had deployed aircraft carriers or other surface vessels, in the event of hostilities these too could be destroyed easily. However the use of these missiles could escalate the conflict from a limited proxy engagement to a limited nuclear war, and potentially a nuclear total war, so the tactical nuclear missiles were much more suited to an exercise of political power than actual use.

Soviet first use of tactical nuclear weapons would escalate the conflict to a limited nuclear war, even if that use were defensive in nature. Even if the strategic inventory of Operation Anadyr were included, the USSR was at a massive strategic disadvantage. The US

²⁹ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 310.

³⁰ Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 310.

was in a position to threaten a counter-force strike and escalate the conflict, because the USSR could not threaten a counter-force strike or risk escalation to the nuclear level for fear of inevitable defeat. US strategic superiority executed a deterrent function upon Soviet action because the USSR was restrained in a way the US was not, as demonstrated by the Soviet abstention from covert operations against Turkish or NATO targets and the continued US covert action against Soviet client state Cuba.

The Soviet deployment of strategic weaponry to Cuba was viewed as equivalent to the US placement of strategic weaponry in Turkey by Khrushchev.³¹ Khrushchev knew that "American missiles were aimed against us (USSR) in Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany."³² The USSR did not make their deployment public, but the US did not "warn us (USSR) that they (US) were going to place missiles in Turkey or that they had missiles already in Italy and other NATO countries,"³³ so this strategy is not without precedent. Publically warning an enemy that one nation was placing strategically significant weaponry in a border nation would have expanded that nation's nuclear umbrella to protect the client state. It would also warn the enemy nation that a potential first strike platform had been deployed; such warnings were necessary for the missiles to fulfill any deterrent function. The Soviet deployment was nothing the US deployments to NATO had not been, in the words of Khrushchev "we merely made use of the same methods our opponents used toward us."³⁴ The US deployment to Turkey and the Soviet deployment to Cuba were both intended to politically support a client state, using strategically significant equipment as the medium. Under Cuba-USSR treaties of

³¹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Missile Crisis*, 89.

³² Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 493.

³³ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 335.

³⁴ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 335.

1961, the USSR had been supplying Cuba with military hardware and ammunition,³⁵ so Operation Anadyr was executed within an existing legal framework.

The Jupiter missiles deployed to Turkey were subject to different strategic controls than were the Soviet missiles deployed to Cuba. The Soviet missiles were entirely under Soviet command,³⁶ with the warheads controlled by the KGB and the missiles controlled by the military. However, in NATO deployments the US would have custody of the nuclear warheads but the host nation (in this case Turkey) would have launch authority over the missiles independent from the US.³⁷ This introduced an element of instability because this launch arrangement was only practical in the event of a US launched first strike. In the event of a Soviet first strike, even if these missiles survived, the circumstances required for a launch demanded orders from both US and Turkish authorities and such communication would likely not be reliable in case of a nuclear war.

The US deployment to Turkey was executed in the aftermath of the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik I, which demonstrated both the status of Soviet technological development and ICBM capability.³⁸ The launch highlighted NATO dependence on US nuclear weapons, and threatened the idea that NATO was incorporated under the US nuclear umbrella.³⁹ The US sought to establish its strategic credibility by basing strategic weapons in NATO nations, so that if NATO were attacked the US would be both able and compelled to react. The weapons were intended to solve a political problem; "As taken as U.S. policymakers were with the political and psychological value of the missiles, the documents clearly suggest that they were unimpressed

³⁵ Tomas Diez Acosta, *October 1962 The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba* (New York: Pathfinder, 2002), 65.

³⁶ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 329.

³⁷ Larry M. Loeb, "Jupiter Missiles in Europe: A Measure of Presidential Power," *World Affairs* 139, No. 1 (Summer 1976): 28.

³⁸ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 13.

³⁹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 13.

with their military utility."⁴⁰ These missiles were not intended for a first strike against the USSR, even though their deployment in sites with no protection from enemy attack and their liquid fuel rendered them incapable of surviving a Soviet strike (whether conventional or nuclear) and therefore their strategic utility was limited to a first strike. The missiles were intended to reinforce the NATO deterrent and cement political unity rather than serve any military function.

The Soviet missiles in Cuba similarly were intended to deter US attack, not constitute part of any Soviet offensive planning. Khrushchev intended "to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean" by the deployment of missiles in the same manner that the US had deployed around the USSR.⁴¹ The difference with the US deployment to Turkey lies in the relative strategic significance of the deployment: the US missiles deployed to Turkey were not a substantial portion of the US strategic arsenal, but the 60 missiles deployed to Cuba were roughly one fifth of available Soviet strategic systems. Strategic forces deployed to Turkey were much less relevant to the balance of deterrence for the US than were the Soviet weapons deployed to Cuba by the USSR.

Cuba had been developing a military deterrent force, albeit non-nuclear, so that "in the event of a direct U.S. military attack, [Cuban forces] would be able to put up stiff resistance and cost the enemy a high price in lives - a price that the U.S. politicians and strategists would not be ready to pay."⁴² Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko published an article stating that Khrushchev privately expressed the sentiment to him that "in order to preserve Cuba as an independent state it was indispensable to install a certain number of nuclear missiles on the

⁴⁰ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 27.

⁴¹ Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 493.

⁴² Acosta, *October 1962 The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba*, 61.

island."⁴³ While a Cuban conventional assault could make a US attack costly, it could not deter a sufficiently motivated US leader; a Soviet nuclear presence could deter an attack altogether by raising the cost of a US attack to civilian population centers rather than military casualties.

The deterrent capability of Cuban conventional forces to US hostile action was not a factor in US decision-making. The US was currently engaged in covert operations to replace Castro's government, in such a manner that the efforts could be denied and therefore not require the public use of the US military. Because the operations would not require the use of uniformed US forces, the Cuban conventional forces posed an increasing obstacle to operational success but did not deter operational planning. According to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the military option discussed involved "five hundred sorties, striking all military targets, including the missile sites, airfields, ports, and gun emplacements."⁴⁴ An operation of this scale not deterred by the Soviet surface to air missile (SAM) capability would not be deterred by the Cuban military either.

Just before the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko emphasized the defensive nature of the weapons deployed to Cuba; "he (Gromyko) wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union would never become involved in the furnishing of offensive weapons to Cuba."⁴⁵ While the strategic value of the missiles limited them to a Soviet first strike on the US, Khrushchev's "principal aim was only to deter America from starting a war."⁴⁶ The presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons likely would have filled a deterrent function if the US had been aware of their presence.

⁴³ Acosta, *October 1962 The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba*, 95.

⁴⁴ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 29.

⁴⁵ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 31.

⁴⁶ Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 495.

Khrushchev's speeches lent themselves well to the assessment of the USSR as holding a superior strategic position to the US, and therefore his bellicose rhetoric conveyed the impression that he was willing to start a nuclear war. The Soviet announcement that tactical nuclear weapons were operational and had been deployed as a fundamental part of Operation Anadyr definitely would have influenced US decision-making. The US faction supporting an attack on the strategic missile sites before they could become operational would have been faced with a choice: to expand the target list to include those sites or to be deterred by the presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. The blockade eventually announced, in violation of international law, would not have prevented the deployment of these weapons.

In summary, the equipment of Operation Anadyr does not support the US analysis of an aggressively intended operation. The only strategically significant weapons deployed were 60 ballistic missiles, a force insufficient to execute a counter-force mission and based in a way that prevented survival of a US strike to exact a counter-value second strike. The aircraft, tactical nuclear weapons, and conventional forces deployed were not strategically significant because of the low number and obsolescent design of aircraft, the range restriction of tactical nuclear delivery systems, and the defensive nature of the conventional deployment. The objective of the operation was to deter US operations against Soviet allied Cuba, for which the strategic nuclear weapons were essential; the tactical nuclear weapons and conventional arms were deployed to demonstrate Soviet support for Cuba and to defend the strategic weapons in the event of US attack.

Chapter 4: Analysis of Operation Anadyr

Operation Anadyr was characterized by the US as an 'aggressive expansion of Soviet power.' Although the deployment of nuclear weaponry to a Soviet ally was unprecedented, it could be considered a defensive deployment in both military and political contexts. Militarily, Operation Anadyr was a defense of an ally as well as a reinforcement of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. Politically Operation Anadyr expressed Soviet protection of Cuba and Cuban inclusion under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the military and political significance of Operation Anadyr.

General deterrence (e.g., MAD) takes advantage of the balance of strategic forces to shape an enemy's decisions over an extended time period, whereas immediate deterrence is a measure to prevent a specific enemy action or reaction.¹ Operation Anadyr was an example of both general and immediate deterrence: General because it reinforced the Soviet strategic deterrent and therefore the balance of MAD and immediate because it aimed to deter further attacks on Cuba (e.g. US Operation Mongoose). Both general and immediate deterrence by the USSR ran counter to US interests: the US enjoyed strategic superiority over the USSR and did not want the USSR to attain nuclear parity. Furthermore, Operation Anadyr challenged the US enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.

Operation Anadyr did not appreciably alter the strategic balance between the US and USSR. The Soviet deployed cruise missiles, Luna rockets, and 6 nuclear capable bombers were useful tactically but had no strategic significance. The IRBM and MRBM systems deployed were strategically relevant, but did not appreciably alter the balance of forces or provide the USSR

¹ Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," 161.

with any counter-force capability. Their strategic utility was limited to a defense of Cuba through immediate deterrence, as they were not deployed in hardened launch sites and were not capable of surviving a US first strike to launch a counter-value response. In 1962, the US held overwhelming strategic superiority and was therefore positioned to exercise general deterrence to prevent the USSR from deploying missiles in non-Soviet nations that might alter the strategic balance in the direction of parity.

Finite deterrence, the belief that even a minimal nuclear arsenal would deter an enemy, would prompt both factions to consider whether a given tactical objective was worth the price exacted by a small nuclear arsenal; however with tactical nuclear weapons it was difficult to differentiate between deterrence and military value.² Tactical weapons are intended to achieve tactical military objectives (e.g., destroying a land army or naval detachment) and therefore have little strategic significance; an exception is when an enemy is forewarned of these systems and therefore a deployment that could provoke their use would risk escalating to a limited nuclear war. The Luna rockets and cruise missiles deployed to Cuba would likely have exercised an immediate deterrence function against a US attack had the US been aware of their presence.

As part of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US demanded that the USSR withdraw any weapon systems that could have an offensive capability, "a vague formulation that could imply any kind of weapon that the United States asserted to be for that purpose."³ This definition allowed the US to demand that any weapon systems it did not want the Cuban government to access be withdrawn by the USSR, as it would eventually demand in the case of the IL-28 bomber. A small number of obsolete nuclear capable bombers obviously were not

² Arbatov, Dvorkin and Evseev, "The Inherent Contradictions of Nuclear Deterrence," 29.

³ Acosta, *October 1962 The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba*, 192.

intended for aggressive purposes, so this demand must have been based upon other considerations. The IL-28 was no longer being produced by the USSR and was in the process of phasing out of active service in the Soviet air force. However, Khrushchev "thought that in Cuban conditions, for purely defensive purposes, they could play a role."⁴ Their intended purpose was coastal defense,⁵ to augment by conventional arms the defensive capability of the nuclear armed Luna rockets and cruise missile systems, which may have been the reason for the withdrawal demand in light of the plans for Operation Mongoose.

The US had continued to plan hostile operations against Cuba and Castro's government after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Bay of Pigs invasion had utilized a force of Cuban exiles equipped and trained by the CIA, and had failed to overthrow Castro because the Cuban people did not rise up in revolution as had been expected by the operational planners. Before President Kennedy publicly announced the US would cease hostile operations against Cuba, the planners of Operation Mongoose would not have wanted the Cuban government to gain additional defensive materiel because it would make operational planning more difficult. Operation Anadyr successfully achieved one of its objectives, to protect Cuba from continued US action.

Operation Anadyr was less successful regarding the other objective of compensating for Soviet strategic inferiority. The deployment to Cuba was withdrawn, so no additional nuclear capability was added to the Soviet arsenal. However, part of the resolution process was the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey provided the USSR did not make that provision public. In that regard, the NATO nuclear force aimed at the USSR was reduced; to some extent

⁴ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 332.

⁵ Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Vol. 3, 333.

Operation Anadyr did achieve the goal of defending the USSR. The US removal of the Jupiter IRBMs from Turkey also reveals US acknowledgement of the equality of the two deployments; both used strategically significant materiel to achieve political and military goals. When the US deployed Jupiter missiles to Turkey, Kennedy disarmament advisor John McCloy answered Foreign Minister Gromyko's complaints with the claim that the weapons were intended for defensive purposes only.⁶ The deployment of similar materiel for similar purposes should be interpreted similarly, regardless of the nationality of the materiel involved. That the crisis was resolved with concessions from both the US and Soviet Union challenges the characterization of the Cuban Missile Crisis as an unqualified US victory; the US had to acknowledge the analogous relationship between the US missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba.

The manner in which the US missiles in Turkey were deployed and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba had strategic consequences. Both deployments were situated in unprotected sites that offered no protection to the missiles to survive an enemy first strike. This limited the military utility of these missiles to launching a first strike. Further reinforcing that strategic demand was the fact that the host nations were situated in such a way that an enemy nuclear attack would not come from the expected direction, allowing the launching nation to achieve tactical surprise. Expected missile approaches were from the east, west, and north, but at this point not the south; deterrents in the form of missile submarines had not developed. The US missiles required cryogenic fuel, which limited both the amount of time they could retain fuel and the strategic readiness. The Soviet missiles were fueled by hypergolic liquids, which similarly limited the time they could retain fuel and the time delay fueling required. Because both Cuba and Turkey were a short distance from the US and USSR, respectively, there would

⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October*, 94.

not be sufficient warning of enemy attack to fuel and launch the weapons of either deployment. These weapons were useless as a counter-value deterrent because they would not survive any enemy first strike, whether from conventional or nuclear weapons.

Although Operation Anadyr did not fundamentally change any military fact, it did challenge the US established political order. The US had long promulgated the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union. This position directly contradicted the founding charters of two political institutions whose formation the US had assisted, the OAS and the UN. Under the terms of the UN Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."⁷ This tenet directly forbade US interference in Cuban political affairs. The OAS Charter offered additional protections:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.⁸

The US record of economic warfare, political isolation, and covert activity flagrantly violated these terms. The US behaved aggressively toward Cuba, attempting to coerce Cuba to return to the status of US client. The Cuban alliance with the USSR involved an ally with deterrent power in US-Cuban affairs.

Operation Anadyr could be considered a Soviet pyrrhic victory. At the cost of a near outbreak of nuclear war in addition to the financial and political costs associated with deployment and removal of a substantial force to Cuba, the USSR secured the removal of US

⁷ "Charter of the United Nations."

⁸ "Charter of the Organization of American States."

missiles from Turkey and a non-invasion pledge. Those US concessions resulted in the achievement of the original objectives: protecting Cuba from further US aggression and a reduction in the US strategic nuclear advantage. Although this reduction came as the result of a reduction to the US arsenal rather than addition to the Soviet one, the goal of removing a US force not strategically capable of a reprisal strike and therefore only useful in an aggressive role contributed to the balance of stability. The US goal of removal of strategic missiles was accomplished, but at the cost of canceling US efforts to overthrow Castro's government and returning Cuba to the status of US client. Before US discovery of Operation Anadyr, the US goal was the overthrow and replacement of Castro's government. In the resolution the US forfeited the opportunity to achieve that goal without unilateral abrogation of a public promise, which would destroy American credibility.

Operation Anadyr had additional political significance for both the US and USSR because the US publicly and repeatedly threatened: "the U.S. would not tolerate the introduction of offensive surface-to-surface missiles, or offensive weapons of any kind, into Cuba."⁹ With this statement the US attempted to preserve a strategic asymmetry that strategically favored the US and enforced general deterrence on the USSR. Politically, this demand would have divorced Cuba from the Soviet strategic umbrella because the Soviet Union would be forced to decide if the alliance with Cuba was worth a substantial risk of nuclear war. This was the same scenario in which the US and NATO found themselves, and was a motivating factor for the US deployment to Turkey. The solution the US settled upon was to encompass NATO in the US nuclear umbrella by deploying strategic equipment in NATO nations, so that a Soviet attack on any NATO nation would provoke strategic consequences. This arrangement assured NATO that the

⁹ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 22.

US would not decide that the alliance was not worth a nuclear war, and leave the European nations to face a Soviet invasion alone. The USSR felt the same pressure regarding its alliance with Cuba, and Khrushchev decided that a strategic deployment would achieve political objectives with ancillary military benefit.

Operation Anadyr successfully accomplished the goal of protecting Cuban political independence. The US had an extended record of interference in Cuban affairs, dating from the Spanish-American War. Fidel Castro's alliance with the Soviet Union introduced a rival ideology to the Western Hemisphere, in defiance of the US extension of the Monroe Doctrine to ideological as well as political allegiances. That the Cuban alliance with the USSR was a response to US political, military, and economic aggression against Cuba was not considered relevant to the US extension of the Monroe Doctrine; from the US perspective, the Cuban government should once again abide by US imperial edicts as a client state as had the previous Cuban government.

Operation Anadyr developed the Soviet position in the Communist world by protecting a client state that was a Soviet affiliate. After the death of Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin in 1953 a division emerged between the USSR and PRC governments. After Stalin's death, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was the elder Communist leader and expected the newly ascendant First Secretary Khrushchev to yield primacy of position in the Communist world to Chairman Mao. Both the PRC and the USSR had been supporting international Communist parties, attempting to further the ideologies promulgated by each nation. Communist parties had begun to appear in South and Central America in the 1920s,¹⁰

¹⁰ William R. Garner, "The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1968): 246.

after the Russian Revolution had produced a Communist government capable of spreading ideology abroad. After the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC adopted an ideology distinct from the Soviet interpretation, and the PRC competed with the USSR to attract foreign Communist parties to its interpretation.¹¹ No previous attempts had been made to cultivate or develop these parties before WWII, and under the Monroe Doctrine "the most plausible cause of this liberty was the overwhelming preponderance of power then exercised in the hemisphere by the United States"¹² However the US no longer wielded unquestioned power over the affairs of Central and South American nations, due to increased Soviet power and the international organizations (e.g., the OAS; UN) that attempted "independently" to sanction US action.

Cuban defiance of the Monroe Doctrine by alliance with the USSR provided an example where the US was unable successfully to remove an Eastern European allied government in what the US had previously considered a zone necessary to its national security. Even one successful defiance of a previously exercised doctrine rendered that doctrine of questionable potency. Under the tenets of the UN Charter; Article I states that the first purpose of the UN is: "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression;"¹³ Article II states: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."¹⁴ The US was a founding member of the UN and holds a seat on the UN Security Council, so the exercise of a doctrine blatantly contrary to the UN Charter would be indefensible. The inclusion of a US non-invasion pledge in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis could be interpreted as an abdication of the Monroe Doctrine.

¹¹ Garner, "The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America," 245.

¹² Garner, "The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America," 247.

¹³ "Charter of the United Nations."

¹⁴ "Charter of the United Nations."

US-Soviet relations did not suffer any enduring damage from the events proceeding from Operation Anadyr. Precisely because the fear of escalation into nuclear war had been sparked, the US and USSR realized that no mechanisms were in place, aside from the evolving deterrence framework, to prevent the escalation of a crisis into a nuclear war. The most important consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the creation of a direct line of communication between the Soviet government's headquarters in the Kremlin and the US President's residence in the White House.¹⁵ Regardless of political tensions, a nuclear total war would result in the complete destruction of both nations and so the creation of a hotline for direct communication would be required for negotiations to limit any engagement to tactical weaponry and not allow escalation to total war.

The hotline also changed the strategic significance of a nuclear first strike designed to eliminate an enemy nation's leader; for such a strike to result in a limited nuclear war instead of a full nuclear exchange, communication with the new enemy leadership would be necessary. If the missiles of Operation Anadyr were to be used in a first strike, that strike could not be against Washington DC because the hotline connection would be destroyed and there would be no direct way to contact the new US leadership to negotiate an end to hostilities.

As an aggressive expansion of Soviet strategic power, Operation Anadyr was a failure. The limited ballistic missile force dispatched to Cuba was capable of neither counter-force nor counter-value retaliatory strikes because they were not based in hardened facilities. The aircraft deployed were limited both in terms of obsolescence and numbers; six nuclear capable aircraft could exercise no strategic role. The deployment of cruise missiles and Luna rockets was not publicly

¹⁵ Robert A. Pollard, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Legacies and Lessons," *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 156.

announced, which would be required for tactical weaponry to exercise a deterrent function. Soviet military deployment of both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons was intended to protect the strategic weaponry, whose goal was to deter further American attacks on Cuba.

Conclusion

From the early years of the US government, incorporation of Cuba into the US Empire in some form had been contemplated. Before the Spanish-American War of 1898, Cuba had been considered by US politicians as a fundamentally important territory even as it remained as a Spanish colony. After US victory, Cuba was acquired as a protectorate that was required to submit relations with all foreign powers to US approval. This status was maintained until Fulgencio Batista's 1933 revolution installed him as President of Cuba. Batista had no previous political experience, and would eventually maintain power through use of military power. In 1952, Batista led a coup against the democratically elected government and installed himself as an authoritarian leader. Batista did not have the support of the Cuban people, and was overthrown in a coup by Fidel Castro in December 1958. By this point the CIA had assessed that US interests might not be well served by the Castro government,¹ an analysis that would be validated by the events of 1962.

In 1962 both the US and USSR had access to information about the other superpower's strategic deterrent by utilizing satellite imagery. However, the US alone had access to a system capable of providing imagery on an abbreviated timeline in the U-2. U-2 flights had provided the US with knowledge of the Soviet nuclear deterrent, in addition to the information provided by US agent and Soviet Colonel Penkovskiy. The USSR did not have the same level of information; the Soviet intelligence sources in the US were not of the same caliber and there was no Soviet equivalent of the U-2. As of May 1962, both US and Soviet governments were aware of the true balance of strategic deterrence, where the US was capable of a counter-force strike and the

¹ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*, Vol. III, 16.

USSR was only capable of a limited scope counter-value deterrent. This balance allowed the US to deter a range of Soviet actions, while the USSR was limited deterring hostile military activity.

Operation Anadyr did not involve sufficient materiel to alter the strategic balance. The deployment of 60 strategically relevant missiles would bolster the Soviet deterrent, affording the USSR an additional measure of political leverage, but would not provide enough additional nuclear weapons to enable a counter-force strike. The aircraft, cruise missiles, and Luna rockets were not strategically relevant because they did not provide any additional ability to deliver weapons on US targets. The cruise missiles and rockets did not have sufficient range to attack all but a fraction of US targets, and the 6 nuclear capable aircraft would be intercepted and destroyed before they could mount an attack on any target. The tactical use of nuclear weapons, even in a defensive capacity, could escalate to a nuclear total war for which the USSR was not well positioned; even if the presence of tactical nuclear weapons had been announced to the US, those weapons would not have served a deterrent function. The presence of strategic missiles was a necessity if the USSR were to successfully deter a US attack on Cuba.

The US assessment of Operation Anadyr as an aggressive expansion of Soviet power is not well supported by the historical record, unless 'aggressive expansion' is defined as a threat to US global primacy. The political and military objectives of Operation Anadyr were defensive; the objectives were to defend Cuba by deterring US hostile operations and to defend the USSR by developing the Soviet strategic deterrent. Further, the materiel comprising the deployment was insufficient to alter the strategic balance. However, Operation Anadyr provides a historical example of the political uses of strategic weaponry. Study of the political and military complications of Operation Anadyr and the resultant Cuban Missile Crisis will inform future

commanders who contemplate deployment of strategically significant equipment to achieve political objectives, with the military function relegated to ancillary importance.

As stated by US participant Dino Bruggoni, the US view of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that it was an effort to threaten a nuclear first strike, escalating the Cold War by deploying strategically significant military equipment in an unprecedented fashion with minimal geographical separation between the missile bases and the targets. Further, the Soviet deployment to Cuba was considered illegal and a threat to the peace in the Western hemisphere. However, Operation Anadyr was not illegal or without precedent.

The US deployment to Turkey had preceded Operation Anadyr. Therefore, Operation Anadyr was not an escalation. The Turkish deployment was to a nation that shared a border with the USSR, while the Cuban deployment was located 90 miles away from the US. While both deployments were intended to solve political rather than military goals, the use of strategically significant equipment resulted in a military dimension.

The idea of defending an ally with the deployment of strategic weaponry remains relevant; currently that circumstance occurs in the Republic of China (Taiwan), where US forces are deployed to deter an invasion by the PRC. Similar deployments exist in South Korea, Japan, and Eastern Europe to deter potential action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the PRC, and the Russian Federation, respectively. These deployments are an example of general deterrence; forces are deployed to increase the cost of an invasion and involve an ally rather than to deter any immediate threat. However, these deployments also can be characterized as US deployments intended to threaten the developed power with nuclear weapons and expand the already overwhelming US strategic advantage.

The US Navy regularly patrols the strait between Taiwan and the PRC. A standing patrol is not the same level of patronage as a US strategic deployment to a base on Taiwan would be, but it still exerts an immediate deterrent effect on the PRC. The US had stationed nuclear weapons in Taiwan in 1958,² when the US officially recognized the Taiwanese government and was bound by treaty to protect Taiwan against the PRC. However the Taiwanese government launched its domestic nuclear weapons program at some point in the interval 1965-1967, because Taiwan did not trust the US nuclear umbrella to deter a PRC first strike.³ The subsequent US effort to force Taiwan to abandon its domestic nuclear program suggests that a superpower client state with an independent nuclear deterrent would involve the superpower in the event of an outbreak of war. If Taiwan were to use a nuclear weapon against the PRC, the ensuing chain of escalation could involve the US in a nuclear crisis even if the US sought to remain removed from those events.

Another current example of a scenario analogous to the Cold War is the situation involving Iran and Israel. Iran has been developing a nuclear weapon, and a present international agreement prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear state; Israel possesses a developed domestic nuclear industry and is widely believed to be a nuclear power, but has refused to declare itself either as a nuclear or non-nuclear power. Both nations possess conventional militaries armed with advanced weaponry, as well as chemical and possibly biological weapons. Chemical and biological weapons possess counter-value capability, and as such are politically useful in the same manner as are nuclear weapons. Because of the domestic unrest in Syria and Iranian support for some militia groups, it is possible that chemical or biological weapons would be

² Nicholas L. Miller, "The Taiwanese Nuclear Program (1967-1977)," 172. Cornell University Press, 2018. Accessed 11/13/18. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1w1vkd5.12

³ Miller, "The Taiwanese Nuclear Program (1967-1977)," 174.

deployed in territory occupied by those groups in order to exert immediate deterrent value. The lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis apply to the Iran-Israel scenario in the same manner as the US and USSR in the Cold War.

The Iran-Israel situation parallels the Cold War in that both nations possess unconventional arms, substantial conventional arsenals, and opposing ideologies. Even if Iran does not possess a nuclear arsenal, Iran does possess a substantial stock of chemical and biological weapons suitable for a counter-value strike. Both nations exert general deterrence through un-conventional arms as well as immediate deterrence through conventional arms and the force of foreign allies. Both nations have governing ideologies that constrain the action of their leaders, although the ideologies are founded on religious rather than political rhetoric.

The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis is portrayed in US sources as an unqualified US victory because the resolution involved the removal of equipment deemed offensive to the US. The USSR did not achieve an enduring change to the strategic balance in the sense that the missiles reinforcing the Soviet nuclear deterrent were removed. However, the USSR did achieve an enduring alteration because the operational Turkish missiles were removed and therefore the US nuclear deterrent force was decreased. The Soviet goal of achieving a defensive benefit to the USSR was achieved, if not in the manner that Khrushchev intended. The second Soviet goal of the operation, the defense of Cuba, was achieved by President Kennedy's non-intervention promise. After President Kennedy's assassination in 1963, every subsequent US President has treated Kennedy's non-intervention pledge as a political and military commitment. Operation Anadyr achieved the intended goals of protecting Cuban political independence and adjusting the strategic balance to Soviet benefit, and should therefore be considered a success rather than a failure from the Soviet perspective.

The US also achieved its Cuban Missile Crisis goal of removing the Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba. After the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, no strategically relevant Soviet equipment remained in Cuba. Some Soviet conventional forces remained, which would have complicated US hostile action such as Operation Mongoose, but were unlikely to deter the attempt. However as part of the agreement that led to the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the non-intervention pledge required the cancellation of Operation Mongoose. Cuban political independence would be preserved, which created an exception to the Monroe Doctrine that was upheld by the US during the Cold War.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Brugioni, Dino A. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story Of The Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1990.
- Chang, Lawrence, ed. and Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*. New York: The New Press, 1992.
- "Charter of the United Nations." *United Nations*. Accessed 8/30/18. www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/
- Diez Acosta, Tomas. *October 1962: The 'Missile' Crisis as seen from Cuba*. New York: Pathfinder, 2002.
- Gribkov, Anatoli I. and Smith, William Y. *Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Chicago: Edition Q, Inc, 1994.
- Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1971.
- Khrushchev, Sergei, ed. *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, Volume 3. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007.
- Kornbluh, Peter. *Bay of Pigs Declassified*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- "Member States." *United Nations*. Accessed 10/6/18. <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>
- Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823; Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 03/03/1825; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives.)
- Penkovskiy, Oleg. *The Penkovskiy Papers*. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965.
- Pfeiffer, Jack B. *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959 - January 1961*, Volume III. Books Express Publishing, 2011.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.
- Talbott, Strobe, trans. and ed. *Khrushchev Remembers*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.

Secondary Sources

- Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. HarperCollins Publishers, 1971.
- Arbatov, Alexi, Dvorkin, Vladimir, and Evseev, Vladimir. "The Inherent Contradictions of Nuclear Deterrence" in *Transforming the US-Russia Equation*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Accessed 8/19/18. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1mtz694.6
- Babintsev, Valery. "The Peaceful and Military Development of Space: A Historical Perspective." Accessed 3 November 2018. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpj66.9
- D. K. M. K. "Can Cuba's Dictatorship Survive?" *The World Today* 14, No. 4 (Apr., 1958), pp. 162-167.
- De Luca, Anthony R. "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits." *Political Science Quarterly* 92, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 503-524.

- Dick, James C. "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961: Who Opened a Missile Gap?." *The Journal of Politics* 34, No. 4 (Nov., 1972), pp. 1062-1110.
- Falcoff, Mark. "Cuba and the United States: Back to the Beginning." *World Affairs* 156, No. 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 111-123.
- Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy. *"One Hell of a Gamble."* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
- Garner, William R. "The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America." *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 244-255.
- Kroenig, Matthew. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization* 67, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 141-171.
- Latell, Brian. *Castro's Secrets*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Lebow, Richard and Stein, Janice. "Deterrence and the Cold War." *Political Science Quarterly* 110, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), 157-181.
- Loeb, Larry M. "Jupiter Missiles in Europe: A Measure of Presidential Power." *World Affairs* 139, No. 1 (Summer 1976), 27-39.
- Mikoyan, Sergo. *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November*. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012.
- Miller, Nicholas L. "The Taiwanese Nuclear Program (1967-1977)." Cornell University Press, 2018. Accessed 11/13/18. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1w1vkd5.12
- Munton, Don and Welch, David A. *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Musicant, Ivan. *Empire By Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998.
- Nash, Philip. *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters 1957-1963*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- "OAS Charter." *Organization of American States*. Accessed 10/8/18. http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp
- O'Toole, G. J. A. *The Spanish War: An American Epic 1898*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1984.
- Pérez, Louis A. *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy*. University of Georgia Press, 2003. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46ng92>
- Pollard, Robert A. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Legacies and Lessons." *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 148-158.
- Sexton, Jay. *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011.
- Valdes-Dapena, Jacinto. *Operation Mongoose: Prelude of a Direct Invasion on Cuba*. Havana: Editorial Capitan San Luis, 2004.
- Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." *Political Science Quarterly* 99, No. 3 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 471-491.
- Welch, Richard E. *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
- White, Mark J. *Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997.
- Whitney, Robert. "The Architect of the Cuban State: Fulgencio Batista and Populism in Cuba, 1937-1940." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, No. 2 (May, 2000), pp. 435-459.

- Whittlesey, D. S. "Geographic Factors in the Relations of the United States and Cuba." *Geographic Review* 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1922), pp. 241-256.
- Zaloga, Steven J. *Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964*. Novato: Presidio, 1993.
- Zaloga, Steven J. *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002.
- Zubok, Vladislav. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.