Misperceptions of Ignorance: Reconsidering U.S. Intelligence 'Failures' in the Korean War

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dc.contributor.advisorDenning, Robert
dc.contributor.advisorReed, Charles
dc.contributor.authorCompton, Daniel Brown
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-11T04:40:25Z
dc.date.available2023-09-11T04:40:25Z
dc.date.issued2017-07-26
dc.description.abstractThe ongoing American popular perception that the United States committed significant intelligence failures during Korean War is certainly understandable, especially given that this view continues to persist within the scholarly consensus on the topic. However, historian Richard C. Thornton asserts compelling arguments to the contrary, which, when combined with careful examination of the relevant primary source evidence, help to unravel how conscious American policy decisions can explain these supposed intelligence failures. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the U.S. use of intelligence during the Korean conflict relative to that of its three communist adversaries—North Korea, China, and Russia—reveals not only that the U.S. did not commit any significant intelligence failures, but leveraged intelligence much more effectively during the North Korean invasion, Chinese intervention, and in the pursuit of strategic goals. An application of John A. Gentry’s intelligence failure analysis methodology further reveals that the three communist nations’ failures can all be directly attributed to their respective leaders, while intelligence agencies bare the blame for supposed U.S. failures. These results suggest a fundamental difference between the U.S. and the other three nations’ approaches to the use of intelligence. The communist nations relied on the abilities of one man to leverage all of the available intelligence in his decisions, while the American approach was one of policy-driven interpretation and action on intelligence. This difference in approaches to intelligence seems to explain how the U.S. managed to avoid the mistakes so frequently made by its adversaries, and why the U.S. used intelligence so much more effectively relative to the three communist nations.
dc.description.degreeMaster Arts
dc.description.programHistory
dc.description.schoolCollege of Online and Continuing Education
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10474/3766
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSouthern New Hampshire University
dc.relation.requiresAdobe Acrobat Reader
dc.rightsAuthor retains all ownership rights. Further reproduction in violation of copyright is prohibited.
dc.rightsHolderCompton, Daniel Brown
dc.subject.lcshHistory
dc.subject.lcshMilitary History
dc.subject.lcshMilitary Studies
dc.subject.otherFailures
dc.subject.otherHarry S. Truman
dc.subject.otherIntelligence
dc.subject.otherJosef Stalin
dc.subject.otherKorean War
dc.subject.otherNSC 68
dc.titleMisperceptions of Ignorance: Reconsidering U.S. Intelligence 'Failures' in the Korean War
dc.typeThesis

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